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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis was greatly motivated by the desire to understand and explain the foreign policy 
decision making process of the South African government on climate change. The study 
deploys Allison and Zelikow’s triple model from their famous analysis of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis as lenses in unmasking the complexities associated with processes of foreign policy 
decision making, on climate decisions in South Africa. In spite of the multi-sectoral 
interventions of government, business, NGO’s, civil society and academics in mitigating the 
impact of climate change, the decision making process excluded participation of other 
stakeholders at the political level. This was evident in 2009 at Copenhagen when the 
president announced that South Africa had committed itself to reduce carbon emissions by 
34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. A possible explanation why the multi-stakeholders 
participation was excluded in setting these numerical targets in the climate change decision 
making process, lies with the failure of the incumbent government to uphold the democratic 
principles of inclusive participation. Drawing from the work of Allison and Zelikow (1999), 
that state that it is not adequate to explain government’s events on decision making through 
the Rational Actor Model only, it is more useful to also consider the organisational processes 
and government politics  from which the decision emerged. In this regard, interviews and 
documentary analysis were deployed within a qualitative case study design to gain an in-
depth understanding of South African foreign policy decision making processes on climate 
change targets. Overwhelmingly, the study established that there was a gross exclusion of 
multi-stakeholders participation in foreign policy decision making on setting the climate 
targets, ignoring the effects of the outcome of those decisions on socio-economic issues. This 
study therefore concluded that, although efforts are being put into place to ensure maximum 
participation by both government and other actors, there is still a need for South African 
government to allow participation of external actors. Premised in the forgoing conclusion, it 
is recommended that South African government foreign policy decisions on climate change 
can work better if entrenched on other multi-stakeholders’ decisions and following inclusive 
participation at the political level. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and Contextualisation 
1.1 Introduction  
Climate change is a global environmental issue that can be addressed through a collective 
effort. This effort requires that countries play their part in addressing climate change. In this 
context climate change is the change of climate induced by humans, either directly or 
indirectly, which changes the composition of the atmosphere, furthermore it contributes to 
climate variation that is felt throughout the planet (United Nations Framework for Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), 1992). Perpetual pervasiveness of climate change has become a thorn in 
the flesh for both developed and developing countries. Adverse effects of accumulation of 
Greenhouse Gases (GHG) in the atmosphere are felt throughout the earth by all nations. This 
metamorphological process of climate change is posing a threat towards human life and the 
environment due to inter alia increasing temperatures, reductions in water availability and 
rising sea levels.  
The change in the composition of the atmosphere is collectively known as global warming 
due to the tenacious increase of global temperatures.  Dutt and Gaioli (2007) offer a scientific 
explanation of global warming, namely it is caused by the gradual increase of the earth’s 
temperature as a result of increasing concentration of gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) which are also called Greenhouse Gases (GHG). 
Often commentators and politicians use global warming and climate change concepts 
interchangeably as if they mean the same thing. Before interrogating these issues, it is 
beneficial for this study to distinguish the two. Climate change refers to the alteration process 
of the climatic conditions of the earth whether by increase or decrease of temperatures, 
whereas global warming is associated with unrelenting increase of global temperatures 
(IPCC, 2007). 
 In order to address climate change and its detrimental effects, in 1992 the UNFCCC 
provided a platform for all nations to discuss and negotiate how climate change can be 
tackled. Obligation to address climate change lies with industrialised countries that emit most 
carbon such as Germany, Russia, USA and emerging economies such as Brazil, China and 
India. However emergence of climate change has also engendered the genesis of a climate 
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injustice phenomenon whereby the poorest countries that don’t make a significant 
contribution to the change of climate are the most vulnerable to climate change effects.   
Subsequently, countries that emit most GHG are adamant to commit to mitigate (reducing 
their emissions of GHG) climate change and assist developing countries to implement 
adaptation (responding to adverse effects of climate change), to deal with the adverse effects 
of climate change (National Climate Change Response Policy, 2011).  As a result climate 
change negotiations have dragged on for twenty one years without yielding a tangible 
outcome. Developed countries such as the United State of America (USA) and regions such 
as the European Union (EU) had been leading in the climate change negotiations prior to 
COP15 in Copenhagen, yet COP15 was signified by the absence of leadership on climate 
change issues, which offered an opportunity for emerging countries such as South Africa, 
India, China and Brazil to lead negotiations and press for an agreement particularly to support 
developing countries (Death, 2011. This trend has given rise to a growing salience of SA’s 
global environmental politics and its dominance in the climate change negotiations under the 
developing countries. To emphasise their leadership role, South Africa took a bold step in 
2009 at the 15
th
 Conference of the Parties and made an announcement that astounded both the 
domestic community and international community. South Africa had committed to reduce 
carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. 
It was unanticipated and suprising that a developing industrializing country such as South 
Africa whose energy is mostly generated from coal made such an announcement (Shahbaz, 
Tiwari & Nasir, 2013). According to Shahbaz at al. (2013) South Africa is one of the biggest 
carbon emitters on the continent due to its coal intensive economy as a result of coal 
generated electricity used in the metallurgical industry, petrochemical industry, daily business 
operations, government and household’s electricity usage. In this context South Africa is 
labelled an “emitter” due to the voluminous amounts of GHG released into the atmosphere.  
According to Shahbaz et al. (2013) the country is responsible for 1% of the world’s carbon 
emissions, where 77% of its energy need is generated by coal. South Africa’s carbon 
emissions have increased with the growth of the economy. This was visible immediately post 
1994 after the democratic government had taken over. The South African  economy displayed 
some strength and grew up to 4.3% between 2001 and 2007, even though later this growth 
was halted by the economic crisis in 2007, empirical evidence indicates that economic growth 
in SA increases carbon emissions (Shahbaz et al., 2013: 1453). 
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1.2 Legislative framework 
South Africa became a signatory to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol in 1995 which 
commits countries to stabilise GHG in the atmosphere (Richards, 2008). South Africa is also 
signatory to other international treaties such as on Ozone Layer Protection, Antarctic-
Environmental Protocol, Antarctic-Marine Living Resources, Antarctic Seals, Endangered 
Species, Hazardous Waste, Law of the Sea, Marine Life Conservation, and Wetland 
Protection (Richards, 2008). South Africa has various laws pertaining to the management and 
protection of the environment.  South Africa’s climate change response is guided by the 
constitution of the country and the National Environmental Management Act of 1998 
(NEMA). Climate change is also supported and referenced in other legislation such as the 
White Paper on Integrated Pollution and Waste Management (2000) and the National 
Environmental Management: Air Quality Act of 2004 (DEA, 2004: 3). The National Climate 
Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) provides a number of frameworks for development of 
policy to enable the country to deal with challenges of climate change (Das, 2013). 
Additionally there is also a Long Term Mitigation Scenario (LTMS) study which was 
concluded in July of 2008, the NCCRP White paper which included a Flagship Programme, 
Mitigation Potential Analysis programme, Desired Emission Reduction Outcomes 
programme and the proposed Carbon Tax which according to the South African government 
is meant to manage and simplify South Africa’s obligation to the UNFCCC  (NCCRP WP, 
2011). 
1.3 Research problem 
There has been a perceptible increase of environmental agendas in the South African Foreign 
Policy, which has been visible in the country’s dominance in global environmental politics. 
Notwithstanding SA’s carbon intensive economy, SA made an ambitious announcement 
about reducing carbon emissions. On the 6
th
 of December 2009 the newly elected president of 
the Republic of SA Honorable Jacob Zuma announced that SA had committed itself to reduce 
carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. This foreign policy decision emerged 
after a ministerial committee sat at a climate change conference where the Long Term 
Mitigation Scenario (LTMS) project was initiated (Department of Environmental Affairs 
(DEA), 2004). In order to achieve this objective, SA would have to conceive innovative 
techniques to shape a climate robust environment which will have to lower the carbon intense 
economy substantially. Understanding that SA is a high carbon country whose economy is 
vastly dependent on coal, this announcement sent shocks both to domestic and international 
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parties. Although the LTMS was a consultative scenario process, the targets were not agreed 
through the project. 
Domestically, NGO’s, civil societies, academics and private sector reacted with shock and 
concern when the decision was announced in 2009. This response was based on the 
knowledge that SA has a carbon intensive economy and that SA didn’t have the capacity to 
meet such targets within that time. Therefore an inquiry was necessary to probe into the 
decision making process of the SA government particularly on international climate change 
obligations. SA foreign policy provides guidelines on how international climate change 
obligations are tackled. According to Landsberg (2014) SA’s foreign policy indicates that SA 
has a mandate to participate in the global system of governance. Consequently, climate 
change has become a foreign policy and diplomacy issue for SA prompting it to actively 
pursue global environmental politics to better respond to climate change challenges (Death, 
2011). SA voluntarily became a member of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) which it signed in 1994 and ratified in 1997. South Africa 
signed the accession to the Kyoto Protocol in 2002; both of which are global platforms for 
climate change negotiations so that South Africa could participate in these challenges (Death, 
2011).  
Previous research on South African Foreign Policy has focused on general developments 
since post 1994 where most analysts have been interested in the transition and continuity of 
foreign policy under the three democratic presidents. For instance, Landsberg (2014) focused 
on Jacob Zuma’s Foreign Policy objectives highlighting the absence of synergy between 
these objectives and the national interest. John Siko focused on South Africa’s foreign policy 
and influential actors from the time of Smuts to Thabo Mbeki which has helped to understand 
the players who influenced decision making in South Africa (Siko, 2014). Some analysts 
have also studied the growing interest of South African diplomacy in global environmental 
politics (Death, 2011). To some extent others have analysed the South African foreign policy 
decision making focusing on the decision makers and decision making processes of the new 
South Africa post 1994 (van Nieuwkerk, 2006). But there hasn’t been a study on foreign 
policy decisions and climate change in which analysts explain how decisions are made in 
climate change negotiations. There is a need to understand the process of South African 
foreign policy decision making particularly on climate change. A reduction in  carbon 
emissions might have a negative impact on the economy considering that South Africa is an 
energy intensive economy. Even if South Africa pursues renewable energy the cost of using 
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this energy poses a strain on South Africa’s financial resources which might also affect the 
economy, even though renewable energy costs are reducing slowly. 
Minimal research has been directed to analysing climate change and South African foreign 
policy decision making, particularly on the carbon emission reduction commitments. The 
decision to commit to reduce carbon emission is a demonstration that SA is taking 
responsibility for its contribution to climate change. However this decision requires that SA 
makes certain sacrifices in order to meet the 34% and 42% targets. There is therefore a need 
to explain how important foreign policy decisions on climate change are made, there is a need 
to know about those who makes and influences these decisions and there is also a need to 
know about those who advises the decision makers. This study will shed some light on the 
actors of SA foreign policy decision making on climate change, highlighting those who are 
involved in advising the President on decision making and those who make the final decision. 
SA is a carbon intensive economy due to its high use of coal energy. According to the 
National Development Plan (NDP) strategy, SA is one of the biggest emitters ranking number 
42
nd
 in the world. This has compelled South Africa to respond to the UNFCCC’s call to 
reduce carbon emissions together with other emitter countries (National Planning 
Commission (NPC), 2012). Being challenged with high poverty, high unemployment and 
high inequalities, required SA to set goals to improve the economy of the country and to 
promote sustainable development and economic growth. These goals are tabulated in the 
NDP vision 2030 (NPC, 2012). 
 A low carbon economy can be achieved through the use of renewable energy such as solar. 
However the use of solar and wind remains  capital expensive and will require SA to sacrifice 
some items in the fiscal budget to afford a smooth transition to renewable energy in order to 
achieve the set carbon emission reduction targets. This research aims to examine the South 
African foreign policy decision making process on climate change leading to the carbon 
emission reduction commitment made by President Jacob Zuma in 2009. The study will 
explore the factors and processes that led to this decision, the actors involved including the 
advisors and influencers and the rationale behind this decision. 
1.4 Research questions 
The study was guided by the main question: 
How does South African government decide on its international climate change obligation? 
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The following sub-questions are asked in order to gather the specific information required for 
this study: 
1)  How does foreign policy decision making work in the South African context? 
2)  Who sets the government’s foreign policy agenda particularly on climate change? 
3) Who advises the president and his cabinet on climate change?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1.5 Research purpose 
This study aimed at gaining on understanding of South African foreign policymaking in the 
field of climate change decisions. The broader decision-making context, foreign policy 
processes, the actors and the organisational structures is the bone of content in this study. The 
study will be centered on the announcement made by President Jacob Zuma on South 
Africa’s commitment to reduce carbon emission by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. However, 
the study is not interested in the private sector and how it prepares itself to deal with effects 
of carbon reduction in SA, but the focus of this study is on SA government foreign policy 
decision making process that led to the announcement being made.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The study is organised in the following manner: Chapter one contextualises the problem 
under study and present both the research questions and objectives of the study. Chapter two 
presents the literature review in two sections; the first part discusses the theory focusing on 
Allison and Zelikow’s three conceptual models of foreign policy analysis based on their 
study of the Cuban Missile Crisis and International Relations theory; the second part presents 
the conceptual framework of the study in which the concept of foreign policy and foreign 
policy analysis are explored. The SA public policy and influential actors are also discussed 
and the climate change concept and its politics are delved into. Chapter three presents a 
methodology that focuses on the application of Allison and Zelikow’s triple models; it also 
explores the case study assembly. Chapter four presents the findings from interviews and 
documents of foreign policy decision making on climate change. Chapter five presents the 
analysis and interpretation of findings. Chapter six contains the summary and conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
2.0 Introduction  
This chapter reviews the pertinent literature underpinning the study in order to establish a 
solid theoretical and conceptual framework of the study. The literature review chapter was 
organised into three broad sections. The first part consist of theory and concept section, 
which articulates the theories that underlies the study and also foreign policy concept which 
discusses different variables and concepts that helps to explain the social phenomenon and 
reality of the study. Secondly, the climate change concept is explored and the SA position on 
climate is discussed. Thirdly, Allison and Zelikow’s models are applied to the study. 
Theoretically, this study was informed by the triple models popularised by Alison and 
Zelikow’s (1999) namely; Rational Actor Model; Organisational Model; and the 
Governmental politics model respectively.  These models aided the study in providing a 
better understanding of decision making in foreign policy and how international climate 
change obligations are decided. Conceptually, different variables and concepts pertinent to 
the study were reviewed so as to view the research problem beyond its superficial overview.   
A typical example of these variables include, but is not limited to foreign policy as a subfield 
of International Relations focusing on foreign policy decision making; and climate change as 
an international obligation for which important decisions are taken.  
The study focuses on foreign policy decision making looking closer into decision analysis in 
order to explain how the decision was taken. Allison and Zelikow (1999) provide a window 
to look through this decision in three different models stipulated above. In the context of this 
study, the models are defined as instruments used to simplify problems we don’t understand. 
Further to this, Van Nieuwkerk (2006) opined that models can be understood as frameworks 
which can be used to explore the complexities of the social phenomenon. Therefore, using 
Rational Actor Model I, Organisational Behaviour Model II and Governmental Politics 
Model III for this study aided the researcher to approach the problem in three dimensional 
perspectives namely; national goals; organizational procedures; and governmental politics.  
Lastly, the literature review focuses on climate change as a global challenge and the global 
environmental politics associated with it.  
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Part One: Theory and Concepts 
Concepts were reviewed as a visual display of the models that underlie this study. Miles and 
Huberman (1994) define concepts as variables and a picture of what the theories or models 
say is going on with the phenomenon under review. Thus, below are the typical concepts 
reviewed in this study. 
2.1 International Relations (IR) theories 
Theories are potential sources of interpretation and explaining befuddling events. Foreign 
policy analysts spend a momentous amount of time evaluating their assumptions and that of 
others in order to achieve greater clarity on events and issues as they happen (McGowan and 
Nel, 2002). Different theoretical perspectives lead to different research focuses, different 
interpretations and understandings. McGowan & Nel (2002) define IR theories as sets of 
concepts, arguments and statements which analysts and scholars use to defend their 
assumptions in foreign policy. IR theories are important instruments in foreign policy as they 
offer theoretical approaches that are used to explain and understand foreign policy decisions. 
In foreign policy analysis analysts are influenced by IR theories such as realism, liberalism 
and institutionalism. Four IR theories have been identified which will be discussed below. 
2.1.1 Classical realism 
The predominant theoretic approach in the analysis of international affairs has been the realist 
school of thought. Realism became popular in the foreign policy analysis after the end of 
World War II (Hill, 2003). Realists assume that the state is a major actor in the international 
relations system. It assumes that states acts rationally and it is based on the assumption that 
power is a big factor for states (McGowan & Nel, 2002). Realists view the international 
system as an anarchy meaning even though the system is organised there is no central rule 
and accordingly it is perfectly fine for states to look after their own interests. Classical 
realism advocates include Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).   
2.1.2 Neorealism  
Members of this school of thought have distinguished themselves from earlier realists in two 
different dimensions: first, in the aspiration to be ‘scientific’ and second in the stress they 
place on systematic level of variables. According to Allison & Zelikow (1999) neo-realism 
assumes that the international system is anarchy where distribution of capabilities and 
balance of power are a means of survival. Neo-realist view that structural constraints cause 
some nations to behave in a certain way and avoid acting in the other way. A popular 
champion of neo-realism is Kenneth Waltz whose theory suggests that differences in the 
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aggregate power of states are measured in terms of military, GNP and capabilities which are 
the decisive variables. Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) attempts to yield a 
more rigorous theory of realism. According to Waltz (1979) ‘structural realism’ is the 
appropriate identification of the international condition in which states live. Waltz predicts 
that foreign policy can be used to exploit opportunities to enrich state capabilities and through 
alliances with other states, a state can restore its balance of power (Waltz, 1979). Hill (2003) 
criticises neo-realism for its limited abilities of failing to deal with foreign policy at different 
levels and therefore deems it unsatisfactory. 
2.1.3 Idealism 
Idealism also referred to as liberalism is another theoretical approach used in foreign policy 
analysis (McGowan & Nel, 2002). Liberalism states that a nation’s structure of domestic 
government, the values and views of citizens affect the behavior of nations in the 
international community (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). The liberal school of thought 
rediscovered that democracies never or rarely go to war with other democracies which is a 
significant development in the studies of international relations. Liberal theorists argue that a 
nation which reveres and promotes human rights, political and economic pluralism is more 
likely to reflect these values in its external behavior in the international community (Allison 
& Zelikow, 1999). One can regard Mandela as a liberal leader because he pursued peace, 
morality, promotion of human rights and cooperation. 
2.1.4 International institutionalism  
International institutionalism moves a further step above Neorealism focusing on system-
wide institutions and interactions as the major causal factor. This school of thought assumes 
that cooperation between states should be structured by institutions and that these institutions 
soften anarchy (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). International institutionalists started by focusing 
on the notable increase of important international institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Health Organisation and International Court of Justice. The 
leading champion of international institutionalism, Robert Keohane (1984), acknowledges 
that structural systems are important but further insists that institutions are also important 
when explaining behavior of nations. Keohane (1984) was also quick to criticise 
institutionalist theory for its incompleteness and insuffiency to provide adequate explanations 
of nation’s behavior. What has come out of this theory is that in areas of environmental 
degradation, health and humanitarian issues, nations are organised by international 
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institutions like the United Nations (UN)  to commit to agreements that benefit all the nations 
in the international system.  
2.2 Foreign policy  
Foreign policy may be approached in many different ways within International Relations 
which will be explored briefly below. The foundation of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is 
built on its reaction to the influence of realism (Alden & Alan, 2012: 3).  Realism is famous 
in International Relations as many scholars and analysts have used it to think about 
international relations. As indicated earlier in this chapter, realists recognise that states are 
important in the international community. Secondly, realists assume that all humans are 
driven by the desire to dominate and that the most powerful, will dominate the weaker. 
Thirdly, states pursue power and security and lastly it maintains that states act rational and 
make choices that will maximise their power (Allison & Zelikow, 199: 27). Realists believe 
that scholars should probe into international relations structures and the power of states in 
order to understand the outcomes of foreign policy decisions (Alden & Alan, 2012: 4). 
Realism had been criticised for its failure to allow a thorough analysis on decision making 
and its emphasis on power but this inadequacy was later purged and supplemented by 
Kenneth Waltz (1979) in the creation of Neo-realism, which emphasised the balance of 
power. Even so scholars like Hill (2003) have criticised the application of neo-realism in 
foreign policy analysis, citing that it is highly limiting as an approach and is barely discussed. 
Regardless, neo-realism is still relevant in IR. 
The core focus of FPA is the investigation into decision making, processes, decision makers 
and conditions that affect foreign policy. FPA is not only concerned about the primary actors 
within government who are involved in decision making but it also looks into other agencies 
outside government who influence policy. Two definitions came out from literature, the first 
one from Webber & Smith (2002) defines foreign policy as a set of goals and objectives set 
by the government as the main actor which administers and manages the state’s external 
relations with other nationals. The second one from Hill (2003: 3) defines foreign policy as ‘a 
sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor in international 
relations’. Therefore in the study of Foreign policy the focus is on understanding and 
explaining the processes and behaviors associated with decision making of actors in foreign 
policy and link it with the international world of politics they are part of. 
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In summary, it appears from literature that there is an ongoing interaction between the FPA 
and IR disciplines. FPA mostly looks deep into the behavior of actors in the international 
system and is an analyses of decision making processes. While the behavior of states 
internationally is important to understanding foreign policy, the behavior of a state in its 
domestic environment is also equally important and the interaction between international and 
domestic sources of behavior cannot be ignored. Looking at the realist paradigm and viewing 
FPA from this point of view, it suggests that we look into national goals and objectives to 
explain decision making. However the foreign policy decision making approach rejects this 
assumption but rather focuses on the behavior of international actors.  
2.2.1 Foreign policy actors 
In view with the notion that a nation’s decisions are not made by a nation but by a group of 
individuals or just individuals, one asks: who matters in foreign policy? Who makes foreign 
policy decisions? Allison and Zelikow’s third model Governmental Politics acknowledges 
that decision making in foreign policy involves different actors which are organised in 
concentric circles (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 255). Susan Booysen shares the same view but 
provides a different approach suggesting that we can view the public and foreign policy 
players in South Africa as clusters divided into primary, secondary and tertiary clusters 
(Booysen, 2001). This section will examine the key actors in foreign policy and the role they 
play in policy formulation or policy making.  
Webber and Smith also indicate that there are different layers of actors in foreign policy 
decision making pointing out that ‘there is a key distinction to be made between those who 
participate continuously and effectively – and those who shape and influence policies from 
time to time’ (Webber & Smith, 2002). John Siko identifies different groups of actors in 
South Africa such as the President, Government Departments, Ruling parties, Parliament, 
Academia, Press and Public Opinion (Siko, 2014). This section will discuss the key actors in 
foreign policy decision making using the approach offered by Allison and Zelikow (1999) 
and Susan Booysen (2001). 
2.2.1.1 Central circle of players 
President and office of the President 
According to Hill (2003) heads of state or presidents have a responsibility to make high level 
decisions as they are on top of the government hierarchy. The president has the responsibility 
to establish relationships with other countries and negotiate at the international community 
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level. President J. F. Kennedy was also dominant in the American foreign policy being very 
involved in decision making of many issues such as the Cuban Missile Crises where he 
became an important player in the decision making process (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). It 
therefore becomes significant to understand a president’s decision making in foreign policy 
analysis in order to get a better understanding. According to Siko (2014: 246) in South Africa 
leaders such as Thabo Mbeki and Verwoerd played a dominant role in making foreign policy. 
He was passionate and very involved in the South African foreign policy both as deputy 
president and president he was known for being the advocate for Africa and being recognised 
in the global economic governance. He advanced this commitment by creating the NEPAD 
and other structures aimed at addressing the continent’s underdevelopment. He pressed for 
solidarity with Africa and the global South or developing countries in an effort to bring about 
equity and prosperity.  
Above the ministerial committees and Presidential Coordination Council (PCC) Mbeki added 
Policy Coordination And Services (PCAS) structures whose mandate was to monitor and 
oversee progress in foreign policy delivery.  
Cabinet 
Allison and Zelikow are right to say ‘Government is not an individual. It is not just a 
president and his entourage, nor even just the presidency and Congress. It is a vast 
conglomerate of loosely allied organisations, each with a substantial life of its own. 
Government leaders sit formally on this conglomerate. But government perceives problems 
through organisational sensors. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences 
as their component organisations process information; governments act as these organisations 
enact routines’ (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 143). In government foreign policy formulation 
and decision making is an interactive process which involves departmental ministers, 
department principals and agencies. 
Ministers are not only involved in foreign policy implementation but they are also involved in 
foreign policy making. According to Booysen (2001) the South African cabinet is the core 
agency in policy making and policy implementation functioning through Cabinet Clusters. 
Siko (2014) argues that this arrangement has not been uniform with all South African 
presidents. For instance during Mandela, Malan and de Klerk’s tenures there was a lack of 
coordination and coherence between the presidency and different departments and agencies, 
whereas it was different with Mbeki and Botha who promoted coordination and interaction 
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with different government departments and principals on foreign policy processes. Mbeki 
was directly involved in foreign policy decision making but also encouraged 
interdepartmental coordination through a cabinet cluster system such as the PCAS which 
Mbeki created to link the Presidency with government departments. Booysen (2001) had 
earlier noted that the PCAS was not functioning optimally in that there was still a gap 
between the Presidency and government departments on foreign policy issues. Later Siko 
(2014) indicated that Mbeki worked towards closing this gap ensuring that PCAS was serving 
its purpose as a bridge between Presidency and government department. In SA, the  ministers 
of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Defence, Intelligence and Trade and 
Industry are major players in foreign policy (Siko, 2014: 8).  
2.2.1.2 Middle circle of players 
Ruling Party 
Ruling parties occupy a unique ground in foreign policy of a nation as they play a decision 
maker role in government decision making. However involvement of ruling parties in foreign 
policy is unique within a country and cannot be generalized. In South Africa post 1994 the 
African National Congress (ANC) played a significant role in influencing foreign policy 
decision making especially on issues such as the Zimbabwe human rights abuse and on 
acknowledging Western Sahara and acknowledging China (Siko, 2014). During Mandela’s 
term as president many foreign policy issues were discussed and debated in the ANC’s 
National Executive Committee (NEC) and its subcommittee which then informed decisions, 
however during Mbeki’s term the ANC’s impact on policy was reduced as Mbeki’s PCAS 
took over policy roles (Siko, 2014). This view suggests that ruling parties in their capacities 
play an important political role in influencing foreign policy decisions. 
Parliament 
Siko (2014) argues that even though legislatures are in a good position to influence foreign 
policy they still do not utilise the power to challenge and influence the government executive 
on its foreign policy priorities. Reasons cited include parliamentarians that are often 
concerned with retaining their offices and secondly parliamentarians rarely have 
competencies in foreign affairs and lack interest in foreign policy issues. Susan Booysen 
indicates that the parliamentary caucus in SA is not as effective as it is supposed to be 
highlighting that their role is often overshadowed by government executives (Booysen, 
2001). John Siko shares the same views with Booysen pointing out that in both pre and post 
1994 parliament had little impact on the South African Government’s foreign policy due to 
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executive eccentric trends (Siko, 2014). The taking over of executives on foreign policy 
process has deterred potential influence of parliament on foreign policy. 
2.2.1.3 Outer circle of players 
Academics and think tanks 
Academics add value to the policy debates through first- hand interactions, written products 
and training. They hold great potential to influence decision makers thinking over time if they 
are allowed to. One cannot ignore the contribution of academics in policy making since they 
provide policy thinking and analysis. Think tanks have helped to shape and device foreign 
policy; they also educate the public and empower leaders. During the 1994 transition and post 
1994 in South Africa a group of academics were organised by Thabo Mbeki to address 
foreign policy issues. This provided academics with an opportunity to get involved in 
government policy making, something they had been limited to do before the transition. The 
period during 1990 and 1994 granted academics access to government policy processes 
where they were actively involved in policy formulation drafting key documents and 
establishing frameworks for foreign and defense policy. Even during Mbeki’s tenure 
academics inputs was widely sought and exhausted, however their participation was limited 
to certain issues (Siko, 2014). 
According to Hunter (2000) in countries such as United States of America academics and 
think tanks play a role in generating ideas for foreign policy, they have an impact on power 
and they also bring people together to discuss policy options. The USA government has used 
academics and think tanks to build support for policies and to help create consensus about  
issues which are important. Both academics and thinks tanks have played a significant role in 
USA foreign policy through training of government leaders, shaping future policies and 
educating the American public. Academics add valuable insights through research, training 
and generating ideas which help shape policy, but the extent to which they influence foreign 
policy is not yet known. 
Business 
Both South African and international business have expanded their presence in the South 
African policy making. From Mandela’s time to Mbeki business people were given an 
opportunity to contribute by presenting their views during policy making. According to 
Booysen (2001), Mbeki had a group of ‘private tank thinkers’ who played an important role 
in policy development. Institutions such as Business Unity South Africa, South African 
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Chamber of Business and South African Chamber of Commerce were key players who would 
work closely with Mbeki and they had a large impact on emerging policy. However Siko 
(2014) later argues that business was ineffective in its participation in foreign policy 
development due to disinterest in government policy development and more focus on profit 
maximization of their business, and the absence of unity in the business community 
contributed to this ineffectiveness.  
2.3 South African public policy 
Booysen (2001) argues that to understand policymaking in South Africa one needs to focus 
the analyses on an array of interactive complexities of policy actors. Susan Booysen provides 
a perspective where policy can be assessed from an interactive policy cluster which is an 
approach that can be used to understand participation and trends in policymaking (Booysen, 
2001).  Policymaking between 1990 and 2001 in SA was based on the rules of consultation 
and participation. Indeed policy formulation, planning and implementation involved 
consultation with core institutions such as the Presidency, Cabinet, African National 
Congress (ANC), political civil servants and policy bureaucrats (Booysen, 2001). 
In the period between 1994 and 1999 the Presidency became a core cluster in policymaking, 
more particularly policy planning and coordinating, however there seemed to be less 
implementation and monitoring from this office once the policy was developed (Booysen, 
2001). According to Siko (2014), during Thabo Mbeki’s era there was more emphasis on 
policy implementation particularly in foreign policy than during Mandela’s era. The Cabinet 
also became a core agency in policymaking and implementation during this era working 
through inter-ministerial clusters together with the Presidency and the ANC. However this 
cluster could not yield sufficient results because there was still a need for strong policy 
coordination, monitoring and processing that needed to be done. According to Booysen 
(2001) the policy bureaucrats cluster which included policy advisors, top government 
employees, researchers and consultants had more influence on policymaking because of their 
involvement in policy planning, implementation and monitoring. This cluster was meant to 
pursue consultation with communities and stakeholders but it phased out in the late 2000 due 
to lack of consistency and commitment. 
 The ANC with its alliances COSATU and South African Communist Party (SACP) had 
minimal impact on policy but had influence in multiple policy domains (Booysen, 2001). The 
alliances pursued to ensure interest of the poor was protected in policymaking particularly 
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policies on issues of employment, economy and transformation. Other clusters such as 
business, NGO’s, parliament, provinces and local government had minimal influence while 
the Constitutional Court became a powerful policy stimulus enforcing legislation and 
policies.   
This cluster perspective provided by Booysen (2001) seem to indicate that during the 
transition period of 1994 to 2001 South African policymaking was centralised within a 
certain sphere driven by consultation and a need to deliver which involved selected clusters 
within and outside government’s political circles who influenced policymaking.  
2.4 Theoretical literature review 
As already been highlighted in the introductory section above, the triple model popularised 
by Allison in his first publication of 1971 which was analysing the decision making of the 
famous Cuban Missile Crisis, was updated in a consortium with Zelikow (1999).  This is the 
theoretical model that this study uses. These triple models are explained in detail in the 
subsequent sections. 
2.4.1 Allison and Zelikow’s conceptual models 
In order to analyse the South African foreign policy decision making on climate change, this 
study adopted Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) models. In Allison and Zelikow’s view the 
rational actor model is valuable for the explanation of government actions however it is still 
necessary to supplement this model with the other two models namely: the organizational 
behavior model and the governmental politics model to empower analysts to probe into 
government organisations and bureaucracies who get involved in the policy process. In this 
view, the approach for the analysis of this study is based on the three models.  However, 
these triple models are used as theory to explain the foreign policy decision made by SA to 
reduce carbon emissions. The model was used as a three-in-one model so as to appropriate 
the analysis of the multilayered social phenomenon under investigation in this study. 
This section provides an explanation on the multilayered models provided by Allison and 
Zelikow (1999). Most often when government action transpires we seek to understand why a 
particular government might have chosen that action. While most analysts may assume that 
such actions may be understood by analysing single individuals perceived as decision 
makers, the ‘decision maker’ of national policy is not an individual but rather a conglomerate 
of large organisations and actors (Allison and Zelikow, 1999: 5).  In this view, most of the 
foreign policy analysts and policymakers reflect on issues of foreign policy through 
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conceptual models. According to Allison and Zelikow (1999), conceptual models offer 
analyst direction of where to look for answers and how to find them in their attempt to 
explain government actions.  
Allison and Zelikow (1999) offer foreign policy analysts and policymakers with three 
different windows. This enables them to view on different angles so that they can respond to 
one question in three different dimensions. To reiterate what Allison and Zelikow had 
highlighted earlier, even though the Rational Actor Model I is favorable, it has proven to be 
more useful when supplemented by the Organisational Behavior Model II and the 
Governmental Politics Model II. In this case, the three models were found to be more suitable 
for this study to explain how decision making works within the South African government. In 
order to explain and demonstrate how nations make decisions for example in Model I, 
analysts would frame their question as: why did this nation act this way? The response to this 
question would precisely focus on goals and objectives of the nation.  
2.4.1.1 Model I:  Rational Actor Model 
The attempt to explain national events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations is 
the trademark of the Rational Actor model. This was Allison’s first model of foreign policy 
which was introduced after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. This model is grounded on 
rational action and rationality. The theory of rational action allows analysts to be in the shoes 
of the decision maker and develop a sense that they understand and are able to explain what 
happened. Accordingly, Allison & Zelikow, (1999: 16-17) asserts that, ‘rationality refers to 
consistent, value maximizing choice within specified constraints. The Rational Actor model 
swings between decision and choice where a decision assumes a decider and choice among 
alternatives with references to some goals’. At this level the assumption is that the state is a 
decision maker who speaks with one voice and is clear about its strategic objectives. Tayfur 
(1994: 130) summarises the assumptions of the rational actor model in this manner ‘those 
who act in the name of government get full information; take every opportunity into 
consideration and decide on the best policy’. 
Thus, Allison and Zelikow (1999: 18) identify four core concepts which validate the Rational 
Actor Model. They are:  
1. Goals and objectives are explained as the interest and values of the agent that are 
translated into a payoff or utility or preference function which represents the desirable 
utility of alternatives set of consequences. The agent is expected to be able to rank in 
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order of preference each possible set of consequences that might result from a 
particular action.  
2. An alternative is where the rational agent must select from a list of alternatives 
displayed before him or her in the situation.  
3. Consequences is the third core concept which simply means that for each alternative 
is attached a set of consequences that will follow, if a particular alternative is selected 
or chosen.  
4. Choice-rationality versions can be explained as a rational choice which consists of 
simply selecting that alternative whose consequences in the decision maker’s  
functions best. 
The four concepts presented above suggest that humans act rationally and that they apply 
rationality in decision making. Rationality plays a critical role in this model because the 
assumption of rationality adds a powerful explanatory principle that is if a person acts 
rationally his behavior can be explained in terms of what they are trying to achieve. 
According to Allison and Zelikow (1999: 25), the general principle which is central to the 
Rational Actor model: the likelihood of any particular  action results from a combination of a 
state’s (1) relevant values and objectives, (2) perceived alternative of actions, (3) estimates of 
consequences and (4) net evaluation of each set of consequences.  Further to this, Allison and 
Zelikow (1999:25) argued that this produces a powerful proposition: that ‘an increase in the 
perceived costs of alternatives reduces the likelihood of that action being chosen and a 
decrease in the perceived cost of an alternative increases the likelihood of that action being 
chosen’.  The assumptions of this model suggest that government acts as a unitary factor, 
which when faced with a policy challenge weighs carefully all the available options and 
calculates the cost of each, before they select the most suitable option. Alden and Alan (2012: 
16) further articulates that the state identifies, prioritises foreign policy goals and fulfils these 
goals by selecting the least costly option. 
Tayfur (1994) criticises the Rational Actor model in that the assumptions of rationality have 
serious setbacks. Firstly government people rarely act rational as suggested by the Rational 
Actor model but they struggle to attain information to consider all the alternatives. Secondly, 
the decision makers do not always review all the alternatives but only decide when they come 
across the acceptable choice. Later, Neack at al. (1995) also criticised the Rational Actor 
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model for not being adequate enough to assess the decision making process due its 
shortcoming on failing to provide information. Kafle (2015) as well criticised the Rational 
Actor Model’s assumption for being problematic in that it ignores the psychological factors 
which have an impact on a decision maker or an actor. Even so, the Rational Actor model 
still proves to be useful because it channels the analyst to find information about the actor’s 
objectives, their strategy and action in order to understand the actor’s behavior in foreign 
policy decision making. This model encourages analysts to establish a relationship between 
objectives and actions of the actor to be able to understand foreign policy decision making. 
Therefore it becomes important to approach decision making analysis through this model 
because it offers understanding of the state’s behavior in decision making processes.  
2.4.2.1 Model II: Organisational Behavior Model  
This model explains the behavior of organisations during decision making process. The 
Organisational Behavior model is based on these assumptions: Government behavior in the 
international community can be understood as outputs of large organisations operating 
according to standardised behavior. Governments comprise of existing organisations each 
with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and programs. In this model the focus is on 
organisational behavior not individuals, and therefore explanations are based on 
organisational practices and purposes. It is also significant to realise that organisations create 
capabilities which enable human members to achieve and perform tasks that would otherwise 
be impossible to achieve without these capabilities. Existing organisations and their programs 
and procedures reflects constraints on the decision maker’s choice because goals and 
objectives are well established;  therefore limiting choices based on the standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 145). 
Large organisations consist of large numbers of human resources whose behavior must be 
controlled and coordinated. Coordination requires SOPs which are an organisation’s rules to 
which things must be done. Any government makes use of fixed SOPs and programs which 
determines their behavior inside and outside their organisation. In decision making processes 
organisations follow rules, routines and norms to make a choice after generating alternatives 
through research and processes. These rules and routines are valuable to those who use them 
to get something done, yet may seem impractical to those who do not use them.  
According to Allison and Zelikow (1999: 143) this model considers Organisational Actor as 
not a monolithic nation or government but a constellation of loosely allied organisations on 
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top of which government leaders sit, each with a substantial life of its own. Secondly 
according to this model actions of international politics are outputs of organisational 
processes. Outputs structure the situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must 
make their decisions about an issue. Even though government leaders may decide to modify 
their output, behavior is influenced by previously established procedure and processes 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 164).  Kafle (2015) praises this model for its ability to allow 
government to emphasise all available options under difficult circumstances and that it allows 
decantralisation and power sharing. Further to this, the model proposes that in the analysis of 
decision making processes it is not adequate to assume that the outcome of an action is as a 
result of national objectives that the nation is pursuing. It encourages analysts and scholars to 
also consider the possibility of a decision as a result of set government procedures and 
processes producing outputs. This model highlights the important role domestic politics play 
in influencing the decision making process. 
2.4.2.2 Model III: Governmental Politics Model 
Model II’s grasp of government action as organised output enlarges the classical model’s 
efforts to understand government’s behavior as the choices of a unitary decision maker. But 
beyond model II analysis lie a further more refined level of analysis. The leaders who sit at 
the top of the organization are no monoliths. Rather, each individual in this group is, in his or 
her own right, a player in a central, competitive game. The name of the game is politics: 
bargaining along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within government 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 255). 
Government behavior in international politics can thus be understood according to the third 
model, not as choice and not as organisational outputs but as results of a bargaining game. 
Outcomes are formed and deformed by the interaction of competing preferences (1999: 255). 
Unlike the Rational Actor model the Governmental Politics model sees no unitary actor but 
rather many actors as players who have different goals and agendas. The players do not make 
a unitary rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics. This goes to reflect the 
name of this model, politics, which is a game where anything can happen anytime.  In this 
model analysts focus on the games and players to display bargains and compromises and also 
to display coalitions in order to explain why a particular government decision was taken. 
Allison and Zelikow (1999) argues that according to this model government is organised in 
successive concentric circles where political leaders who sit at the top of the apparatus of 
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national government together with their officials who occupy top position form a circle of 
central players. Lower level officials may be found in the middle layer and then NGOs, 
businesses and public citizens form an outer circle. Webber and Smith (2002: 40) share the 
same sentiment and add that the players are organised in a hierarchy with inner and outer 
circles of influence in decision making. Suzan Booysen has also employed a similar approach 
while analysing the South African public policy where she speaks of primary, secondary and 
tertiary clusters of role players (Booysen, 1991). Based on this model it is therefore important 
to understand the interchange of role players in order to understand a foreign policy issue. 
The ongoing struggles in the outer circles influences those who are directly involved in the 
government decision making process in the case at hand. So Model III focuses on those who 
are engaged in this interaction. Most players ‘represent’ different departments or agencies 
along with an interest and constituencies their organisation serves. People differ about what 
must be done and even though they are pulling in different directions they still produce a 
resultant. The chess pieces are moved not simply for the reasons that support the cause, nor 
because of the routines of organisations that enact an alternative, but according to the power 
and performance of proponents and opponents of the action in question. Everyday players are 
faced with issues which require their attention. The character of emerging issues and the pace 
at which the game is played converge to yield government ‘decisions’ and ‘actions’ as 
collages. To explain why a particular government decision was made or why one particular 
or why one pattern of government behavior emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and 
players to display the coalitions, bargains and compromises, and to convey some feel for the 
confusion (Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 256-257). According to Neack et al. (1995) the 
Governmental politics model tends to be problematic in that it uses a lengthy process which 
requires information on procedures and activities within government which indicates that it 
will be difficult to attain since governments have specific rules on internal information. 
This model has gone a level further suggesting that it is not adequate to focus on government 
as unitary actor who functions on a rational system or focusing on government procedures 
and processes which produces outputs but evaluation of individuals as agencies who compete 
for what they want to produce a resultant. As Allison and Zelikow (1999: 227) put it ‘a 
hauling a pulling’ game which is necessary not about the best outcome but about the best 
player. This model also considers the importance of individuals and the role they play in the 
decision making process.  
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Part Two: Climate Change, Policy Intervention and South African 
Position 
2.5 Climate change 
Human activities such as industrialisation, population growth and urbanisation have 
accelerated the increase of Greenhouse gases (GHG) namely: Carbon dioxide (CO2), 
Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (NO2), Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), Hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) which have contributed 
significantly to global warming commonly known as climate change (Winkler et al., 2011). 
Industrialisation has contributed immensely to the increase of concentration of GHG gases in 
the atmosphere exacerbating the climate change process. CO2 is the most contributing GHG 
due to the high use of its sources such as combustion of coal and oil which are economic 
strengths of most countries both in the North and South. Warming of the climate system is 
undeniable as is now evident from observations of global increases in average temperatures, 
melting of snow, the global rising of sea levels and the increase in drought especially in the 
African continent.   
2.5.1 The climate change international regime 
In 1988 The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) organized a panel of scientist to 
deliberate on climate change which then gave birth to the IPCC whose mandate was to put 
together scientific knowledge on climate change and outline possible responses (Paterson & 
Grubb, 1992; Berliner, 2003). According to Das (2003), this panel created a platform for 
discussion and negotiations which involved pursuing nations to reduce their Greenhouse Gas 
Emission contributing to climate change. 
The climate change talks began at the United Nations Conference on Human Environment in 
Stockholm in 1972 whose outcome produced the declaration encompassing a set of principles 
to encourage the international community in the preservation and enhancement of human 
environment (Das, 2013: 208). The United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 gave birth to United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) treaty whose mandate was to stabilize greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere (Das, 2013). The Kyoto Protocol was established in Japan in 1997 to pursue 
the UNFCCC objective of committing nations to reduce greenhouse gases coming into effect 
in 2005 (Moodley, Mabugu & Hassan, 2005). All climate change treaties and conventions 
takes place at the Conference of Parties (COP) which started in 1995 to serve as the Meeting 
of Parties under the UNFCCC where countries negotiate, agree or disagree on carbon 
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emissions reductions (Das, 2013). According to Moodley et al. (2005) South Africa is a 
signatory both to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. These international institutions aim 
to provide a platform for all nations to discuss climate change and its impacts and then 
negotiate so that they can reach agreements on how they can possible reduce emissions and 
prevent further rise in global temperatures.  However climate talks which have been going on 
since COP1 have not stemmed the increase in GHG emissions due to political struggles 
which produces hauling and pushing amongst players, over burden sharing responsibility 
over climate change. The divides between North and South are highly visible at the 
negotiations. The North and South divisions is discussed below.  
2.5.2 The Kyoto Protocol  
The Kyoto Protocol flows from the UNFCCC principles and objectives and is also driven by 
its own targets. The Kyoto Protocol was created to set targets that nations would adopt to 
reduce temperatures. First, it asked developed nations to reduce GHG emissions by 5.2 % by 
2008 and 2009 on average and then it also created the Emissions Trading, Joint 
Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism to allow developed countries to reduce 
GHG emissions (IPPC, 2007). The UNFCCC was heading in the right direction with the 
inception of the Kyoto Protocol, however the Protocol has failed to produce positive results 
towards emissions reduction globally. Since its endorsement in Rio de Jeneiro, the Kyoto 
Protocol has failed to make nations commit to reducing emissions. Das (2013) adds that 
Kyoto was a great disappointment because it allows nations to set climate change objective 
on their own pace, resulting in dragging of feet towards making tangible commitments. 
Partial participation has also been a setback of the Protocol leading to countries such as the 
United States of America (USA) not rectifying the treaty citing inequity in burden sharing 
(Das, 2013: 210).  Indeed disagreements and pointing of fingers is inherent to Kyoto Protocol 
perpetuating inequality resulting in a clash of interest and growing distrust among signatories. 
Despite clear goals and objectives of the Kyoto Protocol the failure to make countries agree 
on a binding climate change mitigation plan is indication that Kyoto Protocol was 
unsuccessful to achieve its goal until it expired in 2012. However the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol will still allow countries to continue negotiating even though 
other developed countries such as Japan, New Zealand and Canada refused to enter into a 
legally binding agreement.  
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In summary, it is clear that climate change summits in various conferences are dominated by 
politics especially the North and South divides and nations are always looking for their 
country’s best interest. Even though efforts are made to reach significant actions to combat 
climate change they have yielded no results to curb climate change. 
2.5.3 North and South divisions 
The burden of reducing emissions should be shared between the North and the South 
countries to ensure that in the process of resolving the climate change problem equality issues 
are not ignored. The divisions between North and South have been visible since Rio de 
Jeneiro (Paterson & Grubb, 1992; Barnajee, 2012). Barnajee (2012) is of the view that 
developed countries are pursuing protection of their wealth in these negotiations they even 
buy poor countries to lobby with them. Even so SA together with Brazil, China and India 
took a lead in negotiations since the COP15 in Copenhagen emphasising that developing 
countries should not be placed in the same category of commitment with developed countries 
(Das, 2013). It seems that politics and power remain at the centre of these multilateral 
environmental negotiations. It also seems that equality is being ignored which is 
disappointing because as a results progress is delayed. The reason behind all this is because 
countries seem to be interested in promoting their national interest. 
2.5.4 South Africa on climate change 
The impacts of increasing global temperatures are now visible in SA. The country is 
experiencing increased evaporation of water accompanied by tenacious droughts which are 
now becoming a norm. The biodiversity is also vulnerable to shrinkage in area if the warming 
persist and South Africa will feel a great pinch in forestry, fisheries and agriculture if 
adaptation plans are not implemented sooner (DEA, 2013). For this reason SA has been 
making efforts tackling climate change and even committed to reduce carbon emissions in 
2009 at Copenhagen.  
As a non- Annexure 1 country under the Kyoto Protocol, South Africa is not obligated to any 
legal binding commitment but is required to set its own carbon emissions target (Moodley et 
al., 2005). South Africa is responsible for an estimated 500 million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide emissions per annum which according to Shahbaz et al. (2013) contribute to 1% of 
the carbon emitted to the atmosphere. South Africa is an industrialising country with a 
growing economy whose production is dependent on energy with 77% of this energy coming 
from coal (Shahbaz et al., 2013). Based on these views it can be seen that carbon reductions 
will impact on the economy and economic growth will impact on the carbon mitigation plans. 
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South Africa could pursue renewable energy options such as solar and wind energy to 
achieve their target. However this option would be extremely expensive for SA and will 
require that they sacrifice some items on the fiscal policy in order to suffice for it.  
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal and has become one of the most unsettling and 
most critical challenges facing policy makers globally. The world’s environment, ecosystem, 
agriculture and human species are threatened by the effects of climate change. Even though 
climate change is a global issue the responsibility to save the world still lies with major 
emitters of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) like China, the (USA), Russia, Brazil and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development (OECD) countries (Shahbaz et al., 
2013). The United Nations Commission on Climate Change creates a platform for nations to 
negotiate and decide on how to abate climate change. 
2.5.5 Mitigation and adaptation in South Africa 
It is believed that the first action to address climate change is to deal with the root cause by 
reducing GHG instigated by human activities. A collective action required from all nations is 
to mitigate and adapt. Mitigation ‘refers to efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or 
enhance carbon storage’ and ‘adaptation refers to those actions that aim to minimise the 
negative effects or exploit the potential opportunities provided by climate change’ 
(Yulundhika & Nugrahanti, 2014: 66). Mitigation and adaptation is an approach that 
practitioners could adopt to respond to climate change impacts. 
 South Africa took action to resume the process to scrutinise the potential for mitigation of its 
GHG emissions in 2006. SA would do this by developing a Long Term Mitigation Scenario 
(LTMS) with the goal to provide scientific analysis that would inform Cabinet’s decisions on 
the long term climate change policy which would provide a clear and mandated position for 
South African negotiators at the UNFCCC (DEA, 2007). The LTMS group or Scenario 
Building Team (SBT) as it was called included strategic thinkers of government, business, 
NGO’s, academics, business and civil society which produced a LTMS document to inform 
climate change policy decision. The SBT worked on building scenarios which were based on 
the international climate change context. The first scenario was based on “Growth without 
Constraints”, In this scenario the group asked, what the South African economy would look 
like in 2050 with unabated greenhouse emissions? It would look at economic growth patterns, 
energy efficiency and coal substitutes to build this scenario. The second scenario was based 
on “Required by science” the group asked, what South Africa could achieve by 2050 if it had 
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all the resources and technology its needed to contribute to the global mitigation effort that is 
required to stabilise climate change? In this scenario South Africa would join the global 
community and negotiate a fair share target to contribute towards stabilisation of the GHG 
concentrations in the atmosphere (DEA, 2007).  
Both of these scenarios would later inform the 34% and 42% targets South Africa committed 
to in Copenhagen in 2009.  
Part Three:  Application of Allison and Zelikow’s Triple Models to SA 
Foreign Policy on Climate Change 
2.6 Application of Allison and Zelikow’s triple model 
This section will apply the three models explained above to the problem under study in order 
to answer the main research question: How does the South African government decides its 
international climate change obligations? 
In an attempt to understand how decision making works in government the researcher built 
the methodology of data collection  on these three conceptual models. With this approach the 
researcher attempts to provide an explanation of the decision without focusing on describing 
the event alone but also identifying factors that led to the event. As indicated earlier the study 
adopted the same approach used by Graham Allison (1971) on the Cuban Missile Crisis for 
his explanation of the event. The advantage of applying the three models is that they offer 
analyst the opportunity to look at one problem in three different lenses and at the same time it 
exposes the analyst to a wide range of actors who play role in government decision making.  
2.6.1 Level 1: Rational Actor Model I 
The South African government could be viewed as a unitary rational actor who made a 
foreign policy decision to pursue a national goal or objective. For this level of explanation the 
researcher examines official government documents such as communiqués, policy statements 
and reports which are intrinsic to this decision. At this level the study would want to 
understand the following critical areas: (i) why did the state make this decision? (ii) What 
international problem was the state trying to solve? (iii) What objective was the state 
pursuing?  Noting that government documents are not easily accessible the analysis goes a 
level down into the Organisational Behavior model in order to access specific information 
needed for this study. The second level is discussed below. 
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2.6.2 Level 2: Organisational Behavior model II 
In this level the researcher looked at how departments or agencies within the South African 
government arrive at a particular decision. Even though the assumption is that decisions are a 
result of established organisational procedures and pressures the focus at this level was the 
critical foreign policy decision which is the commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 34 % 
in 2020 and 42 % in 2025. At this level the analysis focused on actors within government 
departments and agencies who are involved in international climate change obligations. The 
researcher pursued to identify the departments, agencies and key actors who make the 
international climate change obligations decisions. The study pursued to establish: (i) from 
what organizational context, procedure and pressure did this decision emerge? (ii) What role 
did the organisations and agencies play in the making of this decision? (iii) What capabilities 
and constraints did the organisational procedures and pressures exert on the decision making 
process? 
Now that the literature has looked into the organizational behavior, it turns into reviewing the 
governmental politics. The researcher is aware that even within the departments and agencies 
there might be conflicts and competitions which require a more refined level of investigation. 
Therefore the analysis would go beyond the Organisational Politics model to the third level 
which is the Governmental Politics discussed below. 
2.6.3 Level 3: Governmental Politics model III 
The focus at this level is on politics of decision making within government departments and 
agencies where the researcher looked closer into the role of individual decision makers such 
as the president and his agency, ministers and their advisers looking closer the competition 
between them. As Allison and Zelikow (1999) states individuals in this group are players in a 
competitive game as such the decision is a resultant of bargaining amongst players. At this 
level the literature is interested in identifying the games and players to display the bargains 
and competitions.  Therefore the following questions were asked at this level: (i) what kind of 
bargaining among which players produced the foreign policy decision to commit to reduce 
carbon emissions? (ii) Who are the players? (iii) What is the game? 
2.7 Concluding remarks 
To this end, this Literature review chapter has attempted to articulate the theoretical 
underpinnings of the study, which was presented in the form of  Alison and Zelikow’s (1999) 
triple model that include the Rational Actor model, Organizational Behaviour model; and 
Governmental Politics model. The Rational Actor model revealed that foreign policy 
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decisions are results of calculated accounts and goals of a nation. Interestingly this model is 
based on the assumption that a nation is a unitary actor in decision making who speaks with 
one voice, pursuing one goal and fulfilling national interest. The Rational Actor model is 
built on the rationality principle suggesting that people act rationally when they make 
decisions. This point therefore validates the assumption of the Rational Actor model that 
when faced with a crisis, a nation selects one choice from a list of alternatives having 
calculated and weighs the consequences of each alternative. Therefore according to this 
model if we attempt to explain national events we should analyse the calculations and goals 
of a nation. Contesting these assumptions is the Organizational Behaviour model which 
revealed that foreign policy decisions emerge from organisational processes, procedures and 
culture. In other words this model suggests that in order to understand a nation’s foreign 
policy decision analysts should pay attention to SOP’s and organisational process. The 
emphasis is on organisations and not individuals. In contrast, Governmental Politics model 
puts more emphasis on individual actors than organisations. This model revealed that 
government action should not be viewed as choice or organisational outputs but as a political 
result. Players compete to achieve goals which serve their personal interest. The output is a 
result of bargaining amongst players and the most powerful wins. Linking these to the 
problem under study which is South Africa’s decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions 
by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025, the three conceptual models suggested that this decision 
can be explained in three different approaches using the themes offered by these models.  
The second attempt was the provision of the conceptual framework laid down in this 
literature review. Different themes ranging from foreign policy to climate change were 
identified. Firstly, it was revealed that foreign policy is a subfield of international relations 
and is built on realist assumptions. Foreign policy actors are essential in foreign policy 
decision making, however the level of influence is not similar to, for example the president 
and his ministers, are more involved in decision making than the other groups in the outer 
circles. Secondly, established climate regimes have provided a platform for nations to 
negotiate and commit themselves to addressing the climate change predicament. However the 
climate change regime system is surrounded by politics, inequalities and divisions between 
the South and North countries which have complicated the negotiations.  
The following chapter discusses the methods employed to conduct this study. The case study 
design is explained, the data collection methods are discussed and analysis of data is also 
explained. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Methodology 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research design adopted as well as the methodological foundations 
underlying the study. It focuses on the unit of analysis of the research and it describes the 
methodology of the study. The chapter begins by discussing the philosophical assumptions 
underpinning this study, it then discusses the unit of analysis and then restatement of the 
Allison and Zelikow’s models as a method of analysis. It also explores the case study design 
selected for the study. The researcher’s approach to data collection is also described as well 
as the selection of interviews and the interview process.  
3.1 Philosophical perspective 
Wagner et al. (2012) and Merriam’s (2009) discussion of philosophical perspectives have 
been helpful in determining this study’s qualitative philosophical underpinnings. Based on 
the philosophical orientation, Merriam (2009: 8) makes distinctions amongst three forms of 
research which is positivist, critical and interpretive.  
A study is considered a positivist research if it is able to prove what it proposes and able to 
quantify variables. Merriam (2009: 8) further emphasises that ‘knowledge gained through the 
study of this reality has been labelled scientific and included the establishment of laws’. 
Ritchie and Lewis (2003) seemingly argue that with positivist research, knowledge is 
developed through accumulation of observable facts. Examples of studies done from a 
positivist approach include the Higher Education HIV and AIDS (HEAIDS)  study,  a survey 
conducted on 23 public higher education institutions in SA to determine prevalence of HIV 
and AIDS in higher education institutions (Weberloff, 2014).  Ritchie and Lewis (2003:9) 
criticise positivist research because it limits a researcher from producing detailed 
explanations. Therefore the nature of this study could not allow for the positivist approach 
because positivism assumes that reality is visible and measurable and that the only acceptable 
knowledge is scientifically proven (Merriam, 2009). Besides, the positivism approach is more 
suitable for quantitative studies.  
A study may be categorised critical if its objective is to critique, challenges, empowers and 
transforms existing systems (Merriam, 2009: 10). Those who undertake critical research 
seeks to bring about change in the social setup. Critical theory assumes that people can 
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challenge their economic, equity and knowledge conditions. Critical research is emancipatory 
in nature in that it challenges oppressive social dominion. Wagner et al. (2012: 56) refers to it 
as “transformative or emancipatory paradigm” suggesting that this term encompasses a 
category of research design with a common theme of emancipating and transforming 
communities. Critical research is founded on the epistemological traditions that knowledge is 
true if it can practically empower and transform the lives of people and also on the 
ontological traditions that social reality is constantly changing (Wagner et al., 2012). This 
study is not situated in transformative paradigm or critical theory because it does not intend 
to challenge any system in the social domain but rather focuses on contributing to knowledge 
by understanding decision making process. 
 The study is located in the interpretive tradition due to its qualitative nature. This suggests an 
epistemological and ontological belief that reality is constructed through social interaction. 
Merriam (2009) earlier argued that interpretivism in qualitative research means the study 
views reality not as single reality but as multiple realities implying that there are multiple 
interpretations to a single event. The study’s approach is to understand the event through the 
world of others, using interviews to gather information. Wagner et al. (2013) supports this 
approach and argues that interpretivism is all about understanding the world as others 
experience it. Wagner et al. (2013: 56) further explains ‘Reality, in this sense, is limited to 
context, space, time and individual or group in a given situation and cannot be generalised 
into one common reality’. The approach of the study was also located on the epistemological 
assumptions that the truth lies with the human experience. Indeed, the assumption is that what 
people view as the truth is culture bound, context specific and historically dependent.   
3.2 Unit of analysis 
The study adopts a single case study design containing one single unit of analysis. According 
to Yin (2003: 22), unit of analysis is related to the way the initial research questions have 
been defined.  Analysis of this case study is centered on explanation of the process of 
decision making through the application of three conceptual models of foreign policy 
decision making. The analysis will focus on the South African foreign policy decision on the 
international environmental obligation to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% 
in 2025. The analysis of this unit provides a context from which a case study can be described 
and analysed to answer the research question: How does South African government decides 
its international climate change obligation? A case study approach was used to gain 
understanding and explain the decision making process that surrounded the event where 
46 
 
South Africa decided on a carbon emission target in 2009. Further to this, government 
officials have been key informants providing the most specific information which has enabled 
the study to answer the research question. Government officials had details such as actors, 
decision making processes and international environmental obligations amongst others. 
3.3 Allison and Zelikow’s models 
Allison (1969: 690) argues that ‘conceptual models both fix the mesh of the net that the 
analyst drags through the material in order to explain a particular action or decision and direct 
him to cast his net in select ponds, at certain depth in order to catch the fish he is after’. Since 
this study aims to explain a decision made by the South African government, it adopted 
Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) conceptual models as a method of analysis which allowed the 
researcher to probe into the problem in three different lenses. All three models- Rational 
Actor, Organisational Behavior and Governmental Politics provide a base for improved 
explanation. 
3.4 Research design: Case study  
A case study research design is popular in psychology, anthropology, medicine and 
sociology. According to Merriam (2009: 39) case studies gained popularity during the 1960s 
and 1970s. From this time going forward many writers have offered different approaches to 
conduct case studies, for instance Merriam (1998) provides a detailed account of how case 
studies can be used and Yin (2009) also offered a different approach suggesting that a case 
study can be used for both qualitative and quantitative methods. Creswell (2013: 99) 
distinguishes three types of case studies which include the intrinsic case study, instrumental 
case study and collective or multiple case studies. Similarly Merriam (2009) also identified 
historical and observational case study, intrinsic and instrumental and multiple case studies. 
An instrumental case study design is considered for this research. 
A case study is suitable for learning more about an inadequately understood situation (Leedy 
& Ormrod, 2014). Merriam (2009) defines a case study as a study of a particular case in a 
real life setting within a bounded system. Yin (2014) defines a case study as an in-depth 
investigation of a phenomenon within its real world context. Yin (2014: 16) further 
emphasises that ‘you would want to do a case study research because you want to understand 
a real world case and assume that such an understanding is likely to involve important 
contextual conditions pertinent to your case’. Both definitions enable a researcher to 
differentiate a case study from other methods. Further to this, the bounded system in this case 
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is signified by the focus on the decision that was taken in a particular event. The event itself 
is a boundary, because it fences in what will be studied (Merriam, 2009). Numerous foreign 
policy studies have adopted the form of a case study because it provides appropriate analysis 
of events. One very famous example of a case study was conducted by Allison and Zelikow 
in the Essence of Decision Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1999). A local 
example includes Prof van Nieuwkerk’s multiple case studies in the South African Post-
Apartheid Policy Decision-Making on African Crises report (van Nieuwkerk, 2006).  This 
study intends to understand the South African foreign policy policy decision made in 2009 to 
reduce carbon emissions by 34% and 42% in 2020 and 2025. The events that led to this 
decision are significant in order to understand how this decision was made for example to 
determine who the government members were, stakeholders, those who influenced the 
decision and lastly the rationale for this decision. The case study will allow the use of 
multiple sources of information in data collection which in this study will be interviews and 
documents. 
A case study design offers an in-depth understanding of the problem being examined and also 
produces a full account of a phenomenon (Merriam, 1998: 41). The intention of using a case 
study in this research is to gain understanding.  
The researcher has also considered limitations offered by the case study such as bias, 
generalizability, validity and reliability. As Merriam (1998) states,  the lack of rigor in case 
studies is linked to the problem of bias. Yin (2003: 9) is of the same view alarming that ‘... 
the greatest concern has been over the lack of rigor of the case study research’ citing the 
problem being the case study investigators who often allow bias views to influence the 
findings. To deal with these threats the researcher has focused on context specific knowledge 
to avoid generalizability, to be objective and discourage biasness. Further to this Yin (2003: 
33) suggested these four tests to be used to test the quality of research: 
 Construct validity: establishing the correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied. 
 Internal validity: establishing a causal relationship whereby a certain condition is 
shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships. 
 External validity: establishing a domain where a study’s findings can be generalized. 
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 Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study- such as the data collection 
can be repeated with the same results. 
The four tests tabulated above have been employed to ensure rigor of the study.  
3.5 Justification of a single case study 
Yin (2003: 5) identifies six types of case studies based on a 2x3 matrix. A case study research 
method can be based on a single case study or multiple case studies. A single case study 
consists of one case study only whose analysis focuses on one case. A multiple case study has 
more than one case investigated and involves collecting and analysing data from numerous 
cases (Merriam, 1998: 40). A single case study was used to address the research question for 
this study: How does the South African government decide which international 
environmental obligations to undertake and which ones not to? The methodology used to 
conduct this study  is the comparison of Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) three models on South 
African foreign policy decision making process which suits a single case study in that a 
single case study represent a substantial contribution in knowledge and theory building by 
challenging, confirming and extending the theory (Yin, 2014: 51). The multiple case study 
was not selected because it tends to be problematic and difficult to manage and could not suit 
the nature of this study as it investigates a single case. Merriam (2009:50) argues that data 
from different sites is too much to manage. Further, Yin (2014: 57) also cautions that ‘the 
conduct of a multiple case study can require extensive resources and time beyond a single 
student or independent research investigator’. Indeed the multiple case study method would 
not be suitable for this study since the study is conducted for an academic purpose which is 
required to be completed within a limited period of time. 
3.6 Types of case studies 
Yin (2003:2) discusses three types of case studies identifying them as exploratory case study, 
descriptive case study and explanatory case study. Yin (2003:5) further articulates; an 
exploratory case study (whether single or multiple case study) is aimed at defining the 
questions and hypothesis of a subsequent study (not necessarily a case study) or determining 
the feasibility of the desired research procedures. A descriptive case study presents a 
complete description of a phenomenon within its context. An explanatory case study presents 
data bearing on cause- effect relationship- explaining how events happen. An explanatory 
case study was considered for this research because the objective of the study is to explain a 
decision making process based on a particular event. Explanatory case study will allow the 
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study to explain how the event happened. Exploratory case study couldn’t be used because of 
the use of a pilot study which is not what this study is doing and lastly, it is also not a 
descriptive case study because it fails to express the causal effect relationship and only covers 
the scope of description of an object (Yin, 2003: 23). 
3.7 Selection criteria for case study 
Selection of the research question posed for the case study was based on three issues at the 
time which are discussed below.  
1. The opinion held by several stakeholders is that SA did not have the capacity or 
resources to achieve a 34% and 42% carbon emission reduction within the set time 
frames of 2020 and 2025. 
2. SA is a coal intensive economy meaning a reduction in coal use due to a strict 
national greenhouse gas emissions reduction target would harm the economy of SA. 
At the time of the announcement SA’s economy was expected to grow by 5% and a 
greenhouse target would subdue economic growth. 
3. SA had just come out of recession and needed significant economic growth to 
overcome the triple challenges of poverty, unemployment and inequity.  
3.8 Research approach   
A qualitative method has been followed in conducting this study because it suited the 
objective and purpose of the study. According to Leedy & Ormrod (2014) qualitative 
methods permit a researcher to attain insight about a particular phenomenon and provide an 
opportunity to evaluate effectiveness of particular policies and practices. Creswell (2007) 
adds that a qualitative method allows the researcher to understand the situation in its natural 
setting and also allows the use of multiple methods of data collection. This is what the study 
is trying to do, to understand the foreign policy decision making process in South Africa. A 
number of writers have attempted to capture the essence of qualitative research through 
definitions. Three of these definitions are discussed. Merriam (2009: 3) for example has 
defined qualitative methods as ‘the notion of inquiring into, or investigating something in a 
systematic manner’. Ritchie and Lewis (2003: 16) provide a more broader definition namely 
‘qualitative research is a naturalistic, interpretative approach concerned with understanding 
the meanings which people attach to phenomena (actions, decisions, beliefs and values) 
within their social worlds. A more specific definition was offered by Wagner et al. (2012: 
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126) saying that qualitative research is concerned with understanding the process and 
understanding both the social and the cultural context which shapes different behaviors. 
Wagner’s definition is much closer to what the study is intending to do; namely 
understanding the decision making process in the setting of South African foreign policy.  
Wagner et al. (2012) argues that the advantage of using qualitative methods is that it is rich 
and deep in explorations and also rich in data descriptions. The research question for this 
study could not allow the use of quantitative methods because the focus in quantitative 
research is on numbers rather than description. The focus of this study is to understand and 
explain a phenomenon. Merriam (2009: 13) validates this approach reporting that ‘… 
qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, 
that is, how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world’. 
3.9 Data collection instrument and procedure 
The researcher has considered multiple methods of data collection to explain the foreign 
policy decision making process relevant to this case. The main data technique employed in 
this study is semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Semi-structured interviews 
were used together to gather information. Interviews have proven to be the most valuable 
source of information for this study. As indicated earlier the study adopts Allison and 
Zelikow’s foreign policy models to explain the foreign policy decision making in three 
different levels (Rational Actor model, Organisational Behavior model and Governmental 
Politics model). The study seeks to collects data guided by these levels using interviews and 
documents as instruments of data collection. Yin (2014: 110) reports that interviews in case 
study evaluation can be semi-structured or open ended. Yin further explains that the 
researcher is confronted with two tasks when conducting interviews; first to follow the 
questions in the interview guide; second to ask follow up questions in an unbiased manner. 
Documents are important to substantiate interview information. The study used both 
approaches recommended by Yin.  
3.9.1 Primary data 
The case study relied on interviews conducted with key individuals who have been closely 
involved in the case and could provide specific information. The study pursued semi-
structured and open ended interviews as a primary source of information. According to 
Merriam (2009: 90) with semi- structured interviews specific information is desired from the 
respondents. The investigator makes use of an interview guide with a list of questions. Yin 
(2014) argues that ability of semi-structured interviews to be able to guide a researcher to 
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focus on the case study topic and be able to provide explanations as well as personal views is 
beneficial. Merriam (2009: 90) further commends semi-structured interviews in that they 
allow a researcher to respond to the current situation at hand and to new ideas. The study 
itself could not allow the use of formal or structured interviews since the study intends to 
understand and explain decision making processes. The nature of structured interviews would 
impede this objective in that it uses predetermined questions which limit access to the 
participant’s perspective and understanding of the world (Merriam, 2009: 90). 
For Level 2 (Organisational Behavior model) explanations, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with department officials within government who were involved in the making of 
this particular decision. Lastly for explanation in Level 3 (Governmental Politics model) the 
researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with key individuals central to the decision 
making of this case. Leedy and Ormrod (2014) encourage the use of interviews for data 
collection in qualitative studies in that interviews yield ample amount of useful data. Semi- 
structured interviews allow flexibility while being guided by a set of questions (Merriam, 
2009). The researcher used a tape recorder and a notebook to ensure all the details of the 
interviews were captured. The study will pursue mining of data from government official 
documents for explanation in Level 1 (Rational Actor model). The researcher will seek 
insights from documents such as policy statements (white papers), cabinet minutes, 
government reports and speeches made by members of the cabinet and the president. 
3.9.2 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with informants from Department of 
Environmental Affairs (DEA), Department of International Relations and Co-operations 
(DIRCO), civil society groups, analysts and academics. The interview process was met with 
constraints due to unavailability of some interviewees who were in Paris for the COP21 
meeting at the time, and as a result these interviews were done via email. Even though the 
researcher was guided by listed protocol questions, probing techniques were applied in order 
to dig deeper into answers and thoughts provided by the respondents. Probes are questions or 
comments that follow up on something already asked. Probing questions were the “who, 
when, what and where” questions (Merriam, 2009: 101). To provide a more accurate version 
of the interview, a cellphone was used to record all interviews and a notepad was also used to 
capture notes during the interview.  
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3.9.3 Secondary data 
Secondary documents were also considered for analysis. According to Wagner et al. (2013: 
141) secondary documents are documents written after the event that the author has not eye 
witnessed. Secondary data was gathered from published articles and reports on the South 
African climate change target decision made in 2009 in Copenhagen. The opinions and views 
gathered from these sources were corroborated with primary data to augment evidence. Yin 
(2014: 107) adds that documents are able to provide other specific details to corroborate 
information from other sources.  
3.10 Sampling  
A purposive sampling technique was considered for selection of interview participants. Out 
of the 15 participants who were selected for semi-structured interviews, only 10 were 
available. According to Merriam (1998) purposive sampling is most suitable for qualitative 
studies because it is based on the assumption that the researcher wants to gain insight and 
understanding. Wagner et al. (2013: 92) further explains ‘with probability sampling the 
researcher relies on his or her own experience, previous research or ingenuity to find the 
participants in such a manner  that they can be considered  to be representative  of the 
population and usually uses specific selection criteria to identify the most suitable 
individuals’. Based on this view the researcher considered the interview participants carefully 
ensuring that all the participants have knowledge and details of the case study being 
investigated. The selection criterion that was used for the sample is in this manner: all the 
participants selected for semi-structured interviews have been involved in the climate change 
talks and negotiations for the past 8 years. This was in the period between 2008 and 2015 
where most climate change policy developments and target announcement activities took 
place in South Africa.  
Snowball sampling was employed most often to find a network of participants who were 
involved in the foreign policy decision making of carbon emission reduction. Most key 
government respondents were found using this technique which allowed the researcher to 
access the responders with the rich information needed for this case.  
3.11 Data analysis 
This section discusses the analysis method adopted by this study. It first discusses analysis of 
documents and then discusses analysis of interviews. 
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3.11.1 Documents analysis 
Analysis of government documents was done in order to mine data needed to address the 
research question. Concerning documents Wagner et al. (2013: 141) advises that ‘the focus 
should be on the meaning of the document, the situation in which it emerges and the 
importance of the interaction that results from the document’. The researcher focused on 
documents that are intrinsic to the study especially those that emerged from the event. This 
approach is endorsed by Wagner et al. (2013) arguing that documents can be conceived as 
symbolic representations of the event. The main documents that were analysed included the 
White Paper on Climate Change, Climate Change Response Policy, Long Term Mitigation 
Scenario document and Financial Mail article. These documents were obtained from the 
Department of Environmental Affairs archives. Content analysis was adopted for the analysis 
of documents. Bryman (2012: 556) describes content analysis as a process that involves 
searching out of underlying themes in the documents. Later Wagner et al. (2013: 141) 
advised that the analysis should be a critical examination of material rather a description. The 
documents mentioned above were gathered from DEA, they were then analysed, coded and 
themes were extracted from each document. Meanings were also created from themes to 
construct sentences. Ritchie and Lewis (2003: 201) identifies nine different types of analysis 
approaches and praises content analysis due to its emphasis on capturing and interpreting 
common sense and meaning making in data whereas others such as discourse analysis, 
narrative analysis and conversation analysis focus on language and structure of talk. 
According to Merriam (1998) content analysis focuses on the communication of meaning and 
it puts an emphasis on themes to emerge from data. 
3.11.2 Interviews 
What came out from discussions with other researchers is that data analysis is the most 
challenging stage due to the voluminous data that must be processed. Ritchie and Lewis 
(2003) further explain that a researcher needs to demonstrate creativity, enthusiasm and 
systematic searching when doing data analysis. A common procedure in the analysis of 
qualitative data is the identification of themes and categories which is achieved by subsuming 
data into categories. The study adopted the qualitative thematic analysis in order to get 
meaning from interviews. Thematic analysis is defined by Wagner at al. (2013: 231) as a 
general approach to analysing qualitative data that involves identifying themes or patterns in 
the data. Qualitative thematic analysis suits this case study in that the researcher aims to 
understand the process of decision making in South African foreign policy. The aim is 
therefore to construct meanings from themes. In a case study analysis the researcher 
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catogorises the data and seeks patterns in hope that case relevant meaning will emerge 
(Creswell, 2013). The researcher adopted the data analysis of a case study tabulated by Leedy 
& Ormrod (2014) in the following process: 
1. Organizing of details about the case which will be done on completion of each and 
every interview to ensure the researcher is not overwhelmed by the volumes of data 
2. Coding or categorization of data which encompasses aggregation of data into small 
categories to produce detailed descriptions 
3. Themes will be produced from aggregated codes where the researcher will be looking 
for detailed descriptions and 
4. In the interpretation process the researcher will organize themes in order to get 
meaning from the data. 
3.12 Ethical considerations 
Ethics is a critical aspect when conducting research because it ensures that the participants 
are not exploited but protected during and after the study is completed. According to Wagner 
et al. (2013: 70) it becomes a researcher’s responsibility to ensure a participant is aware of 
what the study is about and what they are supposed to do. The researcher also needs to inform 
the participants on how issues of anonymity and confidentiality will be addressed. Merriam 
(2009: 230) argues that pre-established guidelines are not adequate to address ethical 
dilemmas alone but should be supplemented with the researchers own sensitivity and values. 
This view is vindicated by Yin (2013) in his book highlighting that a researcher is an 
important instrument in qualitative methods. Merriam (2009: 230) further argues that ‘ethical 
dilemmas are likely to emerge with regard to the collection of data and in the dissemination 
of findings’. To deal with such ethical discrepancy in this study during data collection and 
analysis the researcher ensured that participants were protected throughout the duration of the 
study and that the participants were well informed. Further to this, the study followed four 
guidelines suggested by Christians (2000: 144) in order to deal with ethical dilemmas. They 
are discussed below: 
1. Informed consent: proper respect for human freedom generally includes two 
necessary conditions. First, subject must agree to voluntarily participate- that is 
without physically or psychological coercion. Second, their agreement must be based 
on full and open information; 
55 
 
2. Deception: in emphasizing informed consent, social science codes of ethics uniformly 
oppose deception. The straight forward application of this principle suggests that 
researchers design different experiments free of active deception; 
3. Privacy and confidentiality: codes of ethics insist on safeguards to protect people’s 
identity and those of the research locations. Confidentiality must be assured as the 
primary safeguard against unwanted exposure; and 
4. Accuracy: ensuring that data are accurate is a coordinal principle in social research. 
3.13 Concluding summary 
In this chapter the research design and the methodological foundations were discussed. In 
addition unit of analysis, research approach, data collection, data analysis and ethical issues 
were also discussed. The chapter has provided a structure of the study and how data was 
collected.  
The following Chapter four presents data gathered from interviews and documents. 
Interviews were conducted with different stakeholders who participated in the decision 
making process. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Data Presentation 
4.0 Introduction  
This chapter provides a detailed presentation of research results relating to the South African 
government’s decision-making on international climate change obligations. The study’s 
research objectives focused on an understanding of foreign policy decision making; 
government’s foreign policy key actors regarding climate change; and determination of the 
president’s advisors on climate change issues. Thus the research is orchestrated on the 
political and socio-economic driver in SA which dates back to 2009. Findings indicated that 
consultations driven by government departments with different stakeholder on climate change 
are highly inclusive, however critical decision making processes is an internal process that 
involves cabinet and the president. As a result respondents such as NGO’S, business, civil 
society and academics believed the process is overly fenced. 
In this study data were presented as follows: the first part presents data gathered from semi-
structured interviews and open-ended interviews; the second part presents data collected from 
documents. Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) triple models namely Rational Actor model I, 
Organisational Behavior model II and Governmental Politics Model III are presented. 
Thematic analysis was used to extract themes from the data. Thematic analysis is defined by 
Wagner et al. as a general approach used to analyse qualitative data that involves identifying 
themes and patterns in the data (2013: 231). Thematic analysis allowed the researcher access 
to understand foreign policy decision making processes from a participant’s perspective. 
Fifteen people were interviewed from the following categories: Government officials, 
academics, analysts, civil society and business. Initially 15 respondents were selected but 
only 10 could be reached for interviews. All the participants had been involved in the case 
study under investigation and had provided prominent information. The case study is based 
on the South African decision to commit to reduce Greenhouse Gas emissions  by 34% in 
2020 and 42% in 2025. Subsequently, themes were also extracted from three documents 
obtained from the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) using content analysis. 
Therefore this chapter is organised in this manner: First, interviewees are coded and divided 
into the following categories; Government officials- category 1, Civil society- category 2, 
Academics- category 3 and Analysts- category 4. Interviewees were coded in order to address 
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ethical issues such as confidentiality. Second, data is presented according to the questions 
based on the three models in the following manner; firstly findings responding to the Rational 
Actor model I are presented according to four questions; secondly, findings responding to 
second model Organisational Behavior model II are presented according to four questions; 
and lastly findings are also presented based on Governmental Politics model III using the five 
questions. Third, findings of data mined from documents are presented as follows; first data 
from governments is presented and discussed; and secondary data from a journal article is 
also presented and discussed.  Below Table 1 illustrates categories and codes of participants. 
Presentation of research findings Part 1: Interviews 
Table 1 Matrix of respondents and the three models 
Respondents  Codes Model I Model II Model III 
Government officials INT1M-1 
INT1M-2 
INT1M-3 
INT1M-4 
X X  
Civil society INT2M-1 
INT2M-2 
X   
Academics INT3M-1 
INT3M-2 
X  X 
Analysts INT4M-1 
INT4F-2 
X  X 
 
Table 1 tabulates the respondents who participated in the semi-structured interviews. As 
indicated in the table, there were four different categories of respondents who were 
interviewed and the codes were created based on the categories. For instance the code for 
government official is INT1M-1 which means INT- interview, 1- of the first category on the 
table, M- male respondent and 1- respondent number 1, as well as for Analysts INT4F-2 
which is translated in this manner; INT- interview, 4- of the forth category, F- female 
respondent, 2- respondent number 2 in the category. Data from interviews is presented 
according to the interview questions, this was intentionally done to provide a clear picture of 
how data was gathered. Data mined from documents is presented thereafter. Three documents 
were analysed, interpreted and presented.  
4.1 Rational Actor Model I 
Questions drawn for this model were answered by all categories as indicated in Table 1. 
These questions relate to the national goals and national interests governments pursue in their 
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foreign policy decision making processes (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). The focus in this model 
is on SA’s goals and objectives on international climate change obligations. The intention 
was to determine national goals and objectives SA was pursuing when the Copenhagen 
decision was made. Data is presented in the following manner: data is presented according to 
four sub-headings which are; government decision to tackle climate change, SA trying to 
solve an international problem, other options available and best choice under the conditions. 
Responses from government officials, civil society, academics and analysts are discussed. 
Direct quotations from respondents are presented as data for each question.  
4.1.1 Findings on government’s decision to tackle climate change 
The focus on this question was to determine why the SA government made the Copenhagen 
decision. Respondents from all four categories provided different explanations for the 
Copenhagen decision.    
4.1.1.1 Responses of government officials on government’s decision to tackle climate 
change 
Government officials suggest that the South African government’s decision was motivated by 
different reasons. According to the respondents in this category South Africa was trying to 
make a contribution on addressing climate change. An explanation given by one respondent 
was that SA was acting in good faith considering the threats the country and other countries 
in the continent are faced with. Moreover SA considered the negative impact of climate 
change would have on the island countries which are more vulnerable due to sea level 
increase. As a member of the global community SA wanted to make its fair contribution. 
Secondly, respondents also indicated that SA was also strengthening its partnership with 
different groups such as the Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC) group, the G77 and 
China. Even though SA worked more with the BASIC group than the Africa group in 2009; 
their focus was on encouraging more South –South cooperation. Thirdly, SA was sending a 
positive signal to other parties particularly developed countries saying “look we are a 
developing country but we are willing to play our part”. So it was a way to demonstrate that 
SA took mitigation serious and to also encourage others to do so. Lastly, it was indicated that 
SA wanted to play a national role to ensure its citizens understand the threat posed by climate 
change. So it was also about reaffirming to South Africans that they are protected.  
All the respondents in this category indicated that SA had a reputation of a bridge builder, 
and so it was important to take the lead and voluntary commit to reducing carbon emissions 
with the hope that others would follow.  
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Table 2 Responses of government officials on government’s decision to tackle climate 
change  
Participants Why did South Africa make the decision to tackle climate change? 
INT1M-1 Politically it was a very interesting stand as most countries would 
keep this at their back pocket and leverage this until they are able to 
reduce carbon but SA went up front as a developing nation it was 
powerful and well received as well. With that done the climate change 
policy was easy. 
INT1M-2 We have our personality in the UNFCCC and it’s very complex and 
it’s really several levels to it that… you know we are a developing 
country, we are member of Africa group G77, member of BASIC but 
we are also… and we have a national role. We have a kind of a 
personality of being a bridge builder problem solver and being 
progressive because we want to be part of the multilateral system. So 
at that time we were one of the so called progressive ones, we still are. 
We would have wanted to send a positive signal to say we are 
prepared to take mitigation seriously, because if you look at 
Copenhagen we were more ambitious at the time.  
INT1M-3 If you look at SA’s foreign policy of Ubuntu and all of that, they 
make an analysis of the international system broadly such as socio-
political and otherwise and in there they capture climate change as one 
of those factors that face us not just as SA but as a globe and which 
has a very negative impact significantly felt especially amongst 
developing countries. The FP indicate to us we need to take the lead 
and making certain that we preserve the environment such that we 
bequeath it to future generations in better condition so we are focusing 
on the immediate challenges but we also focusing on the long term 
kind of horizon. This is a sustainable development issue in order that 
sustainable development is prevailed and can be sustained this is one 
of the key factors that requires to be addressed. It has economic 
implications bearings, it has political and various other social aspects. 
We were contributing, and we still do contribute.  
INT1M-4 Well legally speaking we were not in a commitment and all sort of 
things but it wasn’t mandatory it was a voluntary commitment to take 
action in 2009 and that has now changed but at that time in 2009 and 
SA was trying to make a contribution addressing the problem with 
climate change both in terms of mitigation in terms of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Table 2 above present responses from government officials indicating that government’s 
decision to tackle climate change was based on their act of good faith to motivate others to 
respond climate change mitigation, to play a national role, to foster South-South cooperation, 
to strengthen partnerships with BASIC, Africa group and to establish new partnerships with 
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BRICS. Further, responses indicate that South Africa takes climate change mitigation 
seriously and are willing to play their part as a global citizen. This view is supported by 
INT1M-2 in their response: 
We have a kind of a personality of being a bridge builder problem solver and being 
progressive because we and to be part of the multilateral system. So at that time we 
were one of the so called progressive ones, we still are. We would have wanted to 
send a positive signal to say we are prepared to take mitigation seriously, because if 
you look at Copenhagen we were more ambitious at the time. 
Both respondents emphasised that SA’s decision was motivated by political desires to pursue 
multilateral system participation and also to motivate others to pledge. This was indicated by 
INT1M-2 respondent: 
Politically it was a very interesting stand as most countries would keep this at their 
back pocket and leverage this until they are able to reduce carbon but SA went up 
front as a developing nation it was powerful and well received as well. With that done 
the climate change policy was easy. 
INT1M-3 presented a slightly different view on why SA made the decision to tackle climate 
change. According to this respondent SA was fulfilling the SA Foreign policy when they 
made the decision to tackle climate change. One of the SA objectives specifies that SA has 
lead in preservation of the environment in order to save it for future generations. SA was also 
pursing sustainable development. This view is narrated by INT1M-3 below: 
The FP indicate to us we need to take the lead and making certain that we preserve 
the environment such that we bequeath it to future generations in better condition so 
we are focusing on the immediate challenges but we also focusing on the long term 
kind of horizon. This is a sustainable development issue in order that sustainable 
development is prevailed and can be sustained this is one of the key factors that 
requires to be addressed. It has economic implications bearings, it has political and 
various other social aspects. 
4.1.1.2 Responses of civil society on government’s decision to tackle climate change 
Responses from civil society indicated a more diverse interpretation of the government 
decision to tackle climate change, than that of government officials. Civil society in this 
context represents a group of people who lobbies and advocates for climate justice, who also 
put pressure on government to commit to reduce emissions  and ensure that SA’s natural 
heritage and people are protected from the threats of climate change. Response form this 
group indicated mixed views about government’s decision to tackle climate change for 
instance a member of the INT2M-1 highlighted that:  
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In terms of the decision making context South Africa was being constructive and 
trying to help solve the problem and that’s why it was very important that we put the 
commitment as a condition so we were always saying this is what we will do if we get 
the finance and technology support. 
The member of INT1M-2 had this to say: 
All they were doing is emissions reduction from some future pathway, which was 
unlikely to ever happen. So it wasn’t an emission reduction offer, it was nothing but 
spin. So the fundamental that’s our critique of the process. But run the math yourself 
and you will see. The irony is that we are now ahead, that offer when it came out, it 
basically took them by surprise but President Zuma just made it. I think the rest of the 
government including the negotiating team was scrambled at the time. 
Table 3 below provide narratives of civil society discussing their views on SA government’s 
decision to tackle climate change: 
Table 3 responses of civil societies on government’s decision to tackle climate change 
Respondents Why did South Africa make the decision to tackle climate change? 
INT2M-1 
 
 
South  Africa by stepping out early was creating momentum and 
comfortability for others because South Africa is a developing country 
this move created a comfortability for others to do the same. In terms 
of the decision making context South Africa was being constructive 
and trying to help solve the problem and that’s why it was very 
important that we put the commitment as a condition so we were 
always saying this is what we will do if we get the finance and 
technology support. 
INT2M-2 All they were doing is emissions reduction from some future pathway, 
which was unlikely to ever happen. So it wasn’t an emission reduction 
offer, it was nothing but spin. So the fundamental that’s our critique of 
the process. But run the math yourself and you will see. The irony is 
that we are now ahead, that offer when it came out, it basically took 
them by surprise but President Zuma just made it. I think the rest of 
the government including the negotiating team was scrambled at the 
time. That led to the process led by Peter Lukey of the DEA to try and 
make that presidential offer and somehow manage it into the LTMS to 
the targets that’s where peak plateau and decline scenario came from. 
So the process of trying to take what the president was saying and sort 
of like run it towards the official bureaucratic process and a bit of 
reality and tries to make it work. That Copenhagen offer wasn’t 
supplemented by peak plateau decline which is kind of enshrined by 
the white paper and that has provided for SA’s INDC’s this year.  
INT2M-3 The decision not to tackle climate change properly can be seen as a 
rational response to power in society, and the class bias of South 
Africa’s ruling party. The basic problem is what can be termed the 
Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC): a very powerful network of 
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corporate and state interests whose accumulation of profits and power 
rely upon not addressing climate change. 
 
The table above illustrates responses from civil society which indicates diversity in their 
reaction to the government decision to tackle climate change. WWF welcomed the SA 
decision viewing it as an important step to solve the climate change problem. The respondent 
shared a similar view with both INT1M-2 and INT1M-1 that SA action was to motivate 
others to do commit to reducing carbon emission. INT1M-2 further added that: 
South  Africa by stepping out early was creating momentum and comfortability for 
others because South Africa is a developing country this move created a 
comfortability for others to do the same. 
Contrary to this response, INT2M-2 provided a detailed background to explain why SA made 
the decision to tackle climate change. INT2M-2 indicated the following; the percentages 
(34% and 42%) were taken from an unrealistic scenario called Business As Usual (BAU) 
contained in the LTMS which was a policy created for economic expansion, the worst case 
scenario was not properly calculated but someone made it up in the heads, it wasn’t emission 
reduction but a spin, and lastly the peak plateau and decline projections were never planned 
for. These views are supported by the respondent’s comments below: 
I think you need to do the math on the decision because prior to the decision in 2009 
there was a policy process called a Long Term Mitigation Scenario, the offer that was 
given at Copenhagen was a reduction from the Business As Usual scenario pathway 
in the LTMS. Now if you look at what that BAU entail it was something like 3 to 4 new 
coal plants a whole bunch of new coal power stations, it was massive expansion of the 
economy… things that were totally unrealistic at the time.  
In summary, responses from civil society presented above indicate different views about 
government’s decision, some civil societies welcome government’s action while others 
criticised it.  
4.1.1.3 Responses of academic on SA government’s decision to tackle climate change 
Academics provided a brief view on why SA made the decision to tackle climate change. 
Their views put more emphasis on climate change and SA economy. The views indicate that 
SA emits more emissions than other countries because of the economy which is highly coal 
intensive. Table 4 below present views provided by academics. 
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Table 4 responses of academics on SA government’s decision to tackle climate change 
Respondent Why did the South African government make the decision to 
tackle climate change?  
INT3M-1 The South African economy is highly dependent on fossil fuels 
and coal in particular; much more so than benchmark and 
competitor economies and countries. As a result the South 
African GHG emissions are disproportionately high when 
expressed per unit of economy like GDP, or per unit of energy 
consumed, or per capita. The risk is the South African economy 
is not internationally competitive in a carbon constrained world.  
 
The view from the academic is that SA was taking the responsibility by making a 
contribution to reduce carbon emissions. Further, SA is one of the biggest carbon emitters in 
the world being a carbon intensive economy and therefore it was important to display 
willingness to participate in tackling climate change. INT4M-2 also indicated that carbon 
reduction and elimination puts SA at risk since the economy is highly dependent on coal. 
4.1.1.4 Responses of analysts on SA government’s decision to tackle climate change 
The analysts that were interviewed are foreign policy analysts who have been watching and 
following climate change negotiations since 2009. Findings from analysts indicated a number 
of possible reasons that could have motivated the government’s decision to tackle climate 
change which highlights the following: SA was setting a tone for developed countries SA, 
needed to raise its profile and to establish its case as host country for the Durban COP17 
which was to take place in 2011, the BRICS was in its developmental stage and SA was to 
join it the following year, SA was strengthening its relationship with BASIC and pressure to 
commit to reduce carbon emissions. Responses from analysts were not contradictory, but 
their perspectives seemed to be suggesting that SA’s decision was rather strategic. Table 5 
below provides an illustration of responses by analysis of SA’s decision to tackle climate 
change. 
Table 5 responses of analysts on SA government decision to tackle climate change  
Respondent Why did the South African government make the decision to 
tackle climate change?  
INT4M-1 You look at other people perspective, for example there was a view 
that said politically it was decided that SA needed to indicate a 
higher ambition in order to saddle with pace for Denmark. As the 
host and chair UNFCCC needed SA to raise its profile and establish 
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its case as a country in climate change mitigation at Copenhagen. 
Copenhagen’s biggest challenge was low ambitions, they were very 
few ambitions from key players many were just talking about 
accepting the idea of carbon, reducing carbon emissions. Just bought 
the idea of technology transfer, just bought the idea of financing 
mechanism. They had low ambitions, they were merely accepting 
the idea not making the actual commitment. But we noticed that 
around the same time BRICS had started to assert itself globally as 
an important voice and it takes up development issues around that 
time as well, from political issues to development issues as well. 
Statement the nation feels something valuable, I guess that is part of 
the calculations. 
 
INT4F-2 
At COP15 this is what came to the fore: you had the Africa group 
walking out at talks. You had a lot of pressure on the Kyoto and 
what it would mean and SA was pursuing… put it in the context of 
their own foreign policy. We were pursuing gender, we were 
pursuing South-South cooperation put it in that context what was 
South Africa pursuing in partnerships? So it 2009 this was just ahead 
of the BRICS you got to remember the time frame. COP15 was 2009 
SA only joined BRICS in 2010 at the very end of 2010 and formally 
started the first meeting in 2011…..But there is …there was a 
formation of BASIC and emerging powers looking at South-South 
cooperation and promoting the Africa agenda. But it’s kind of gone 
outside this African focusing by isolating itself from the African 
group by going along with the BASIC countries.  
 
As indicated in Table 5 both INT4M-1 and INT4F-2 emphasise SA’s decision to tackle 
climate change was motivated by political desires to foster and strengthen partnerships, to 
motivate others to act on climate change and also to prepare for the COP which was to take 
place in Durban in 2011. This was emphasised by INT4M-1: 
But we noticed that around the same time BRICS had started to assert itself globally 
as an important voice and it takes up development issues around that time as well, 
from political issues to development issues as well……So I think there was a bit of an 
edge to show higher ambitions in the hope that would stimulate similar behaviour by 
other key actors especially emerging powers so that you could have a good deal 
coming out between Copenhagen and Durban. 
This view was reiterated by INT4F-2: 
 So it 2009 this was just ahead of the BRICS you got to remember the time frame. 
COP15 was 2009 SA only joined BRICS in 2010 at the very end of 2010 and formally 
started the first meeting in 2011…..But there is …there was a formation of BASIC and 
emerging powers looking at South-South cooperation and promoting the Africa 
agenda. 
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Further to this INT3M-2 hinted that the decision was also public relations oriented 
highlighting that “There was Public Relations sense about it making this bold statement the 
nation feels something valuable, I guess that is part of the calculations”.   
4.1.2 Findings on South Africa’s decision as part of solving an international problem 
The finding on SA’s decision as part of solving the problem indicated different views from 
all the categories (refer to Table 1). For instance Government category respondents indicated 
that SA government was solving a problem, academics also shared the same view whereas 
civil society were divided in their views. 
4.1.2.1 Responses of government officials on South Africa’s decision as part of solving an 
international problem. 
Findings in this category indicate that SA was trying to solve the climate change problem by 
deciding to commit to reduce carbon emissions. Respondents in this group were directly 
involved in the preparation for Copenhagen and decision making processes and so they were 
very clear on what government’s intention were when this decision was made. They 
emphasised that SA’s intention was to be part of the solution. Findings in this category can be 
summed up as follows, SA was addressing the climate change problem, demonstration of 
good faith, climate change is a serious threat for SA, SA government has an obligation to 
protect the vulnerable poor people in rural areas from the threats of climate change, SA has to 
make a fair share contribution as per UNFCCC and lastly SA wanted other parties to commit 
too so they could all make a significant contribution to carbon reductions.  All these views 
are presented in Table 6 below.  
Table 6 responses of government officials on South Africa trying to solve an 
international problem 
Respondent What international problem was South Africa trying to solve? 
INT1M-1 The reality is that even if we became climate angels overnight say 
for instance we stop using fossil fuel tomorrow but the rest of the 
world didn’t we will still suffer it so it is a negotiation for the 
world we have to rely on other people to do the right thing. So in 
order for other people to do the right thing we need to do the right 
thing. Our commitment (in Copenhagen) was a show of good 
faith and that’s what it is it’s a show of good faith. We were 
saying we will do this because it’s a good thing you must also do 
the same. So SA in terms of the international environmental 
justice has to make a fair share contribution, that’s why the two 
objectives of the policy are really important: South Africa will 
make a fair contribution same with the world: we will do this we 
want you to do the same. 
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INT1M-2 Climate change is one of the greatest threats facing the planet and 
can only be addressed collectively by the international 
community. Recent years show increasing temperatures in 
various regions, and increasing extremities in weather patterns 
which are irreversibly changing our world. 
INT1M-3 So this is a climate change issue with economic implications, for 
instance look at the drought that is currently felt around the 
country various provinces the output that is compromised. You 
look at the region Sub-Saharan Africa also drought issues, water 
shortages and climate change issues, how economies are 
impacted. Because this is rooted on emissions that accumulate 
over a period of time and as a result the climate system is 
distorted and has these effects and we have to adapt to these 
conditions. And we look as well into such factors as the fossil fuel 
that you have access to and largely in our case its coal, we are a 
coal based economy, we are ambitious enough that we would 
shift towards renewables, we were ambitious enough to indicate 
even in Copenhagen that we would reduce our emissions by 34% 
BAU by 2020 and 42% BAU 2025 that they would plateau in 
2025 before they decline. Even the current economic performance 
is not well you have seen reports even from such entities as 
World Bank and IMF indicating the reduction in growth. 
INT1M-4 Well legally speaking we were not in a commitment and all sort 
of things but it wasn’t mandatory it was a voluntary commitment 
to take action in 2009 and that has now changed but at that time 
in 2009 and SA was trying to make a contribution addressing the 
problem with climate change both in terms of mitigation in terms 
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
In the table above respondent INT1M-1 indicates that SA was trying to solve the problem of 
climate change by committing to reduce carbon emission. INT1M-1 still emphasised that SA 
government’s commitment was a demonstration of good faith. This particular respondent led 
the LTMS team in 2008 and 2009 that created the BAU scenarios which were later converted 
into the 34% and 42% figures included in the commitment pledge by SA. INT1M-1 was also 
part of the government negotiating team. Concerning this, INT1M-1 provided this 
information: 
Our commitment (in Copenhagen) was a show of good faith and that’s what it is it’s a 
show of good faith. We were saying we will do this because it’s a good thing you must 
also do the same. And you know this is true, unlike the countries like Saudi Arabia 
with massive oil wealth who kind of believe that because if their wealth… if people 
suddenly stop buying oil because of climate change or if it becomes too hot they will 
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have enough money to build up defenses against climate change so they will build 
houses with air conditioning because they have enough money to defend themselves. 
Further to this, INT1M-3 also highlighted that SA was contributing to solving the climate 
change problem: 
Superficially it’s the climate change problem to which we contribute to its solution, 
we can only contribute, no one party can solve it which is why we put an emphasis on 
the idea of multilateralism. We are one of those contributors and we want to shape the 
world. Like I indicated if you look at various reports like IPCC it will point at some of 
the disproportionate impact that significantly compromise economies of many 
developing countries which I said has economic implications. 
The popular view from this category is that SA was taking action against climate change and 
contributing to addressing the problem because it was the ‘right thing to do’ not only for SA 
citizens but also for other vulnerable countries. 
4.1.2.2 Responses of civil society on South Africa trying to solve an international problem 
Civil society indicated different views on the question of whether SA was trying to solve an 
international problem when the decision to reduce carbon emissions was made. For instance 
respondent INT2M-2 indicated that SA was not trying to address climate change but instead 
it is failing to take responsibility for their contribution to climate change. This is supported by 
the text below by respondent INT2M-2:  
Here is a developing country, especially a BRICS category country, you have a 
certain amount of carbon, and SA is higher. So in fact SA has been taking carbon 
space from other developing countries like Malawi. So SA is actually really part of 
the problem and viewing more from the European and American side of the problem 
rather than being a victim or a solution to the problem. So it is a big equity debate 
which gets lost in the rapture of poverty.  
Table 7 below provides a detailed discussion on civil society responses. 
Table 7 responses of civil society on South Africa trying to solve an international 
problem 
Respondent What international problem was South Africa trying to solve? 
INT2M-1 
 
I don’t know if there was any pressure but it is possible that there 
might have been pressure coming from developed countries 
especially when they insisted for equality or pressure from less 
developed countries who wanted to do something because they 
are more in danger. But don’t think the announcement was 
because of international pressure but it was to put SA out there it 
a little bit of prestige and also try and get things moving, leading 
by example. 
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INT2M-2 No, no one is trying to address climate change. The COP process 
was now been held 21 times, you know not quite but roughly 21 
years. The idea is that we would provide a global solution in line 
with very much of CFC’s convention. That would then provide a 
pathway for the globe to peak reduce and decline, its carbon 
emissions in line with keeping warming under 2 degrees. So now 
at 21 attempts to this and they are nowhere close to getting any 
kind of agreement that is even remotely close to a 2 degrees 
pathway. Here is a developing country, especially a BRICS 
category country, you have a certain amount of carbon, SA is 
higher. So in fact SA has been taking carbon space from other 
developing countries like Malawi. So SA is actually really part of 
the problem and viewing more from the European and American 
side of the problem rather than being a victim or a solution to the 
problem. So it is a big equity debate which gets lost in the rapture 
of poverty. 
INT2M-3 The simple problem for the South African MEC is how to assure 
that an alliance of high-polluting BRICS countries with the 
United States (“the Copenhagen Accord”) can be greenwashed so 
as to make it appear that the government is joining the responsible 
members of the international community to solve a deadly 
problem: climate change. So the ‘problem’ that Pretoria was 
trying to ‘solve’ was simple: how to ‘talk left’ (against climate 
change) but ‘pollute right’ (causing more). 
 
As indicated in Table 7, respondent INT2M-1 indicates that SA‘s decision didn’t come out as 
a results of international pressure but instead SA displayed strong leadership when they made 
the announcement.   
4.1.2.3 Responses of academic on South Africa trying to solve an international problem  
Response offered by respondent INT4M-1 indicates that this decision was as a result of 
political pressure for countries to set targets for carbon emission reductions, moreover he 
reiterated what INT5M-2 indicated that SA was positioning itself for the COP17 in Durban 
(see Table 3). Respondent INT4M-1 was also quick to highlight that SA is one of the biggest 
carbon emitters and they wanted to be part of the solution. Table 8 below provides direct 
quotations from academics respondents. 
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Table 8 findings of academic in South Africa trying to solve an international problem 
Respondent What international problem was South Africa trying to solve? 
INT3M-1 Of the 200-odd countries that signed the UNFCCC, South Africa 
features in the top dozen to emissions expressed in any of these 
emission intensity units mentioned in 1.1. In addition, South 
Africa (President Zuma) attended COP15 in Copenhagen where 
there was significant political pressure to announce a country 
target, plus two years later Durban was hosting the COP17 in 
Durban and launched the National White Paper on Climate 
Change Response a month before the event.  
 
4.1.2.4 Responses of analysts on South Africa trying to solve an international problem  
Findings of analysts on SA trying to solve an international problem indicate expanded 
reasons which explain whether SA was trying to solve an international problem when they 
made the decision to reduce carbon emissions or not. For instance respondents indicated that 
SA had intended to speed up the negotiation process and get all the countries to commit; that 
their decision was a build-up for Durban; SA was playing a geopolitical international game; 
and again to encourage others to do the same. 
Table 9 Response of analysts on South Africa trying to solve an international problem 
Respondent What international problem was South Africa trying to solve? 
INT4M-1 Low ambition and to avoid the prospect of failure. Climate 
change negotiations have been warbling from point to point like 
the negotiations they have been very slow and non-outcomes 
outcomes. Outcomes that are just declarations but they are not 
binding, they are legal they are not implemented. That would 
have been part of it. Second politically for me, politically they 
had aspired a more ambitious response from others so that we 
have strong decisions taken by critical countries in the run-up to 
Durban. They were thinking about the next COP, and if you are 
host you are worried what would happen when I host. It must be 
also there were domestic issues in terms of alleviating SA 
standing in the eyes of the South Africans on this matter about 
which we are so much into. 
INT4F-2 What problem were they trying to solve? By doing what? By 
negotiating? By making the decision? I’m not sure if they were 
trying to solve a problem I think they were playing the…like I 
said they were playing two level game and they were focusing 
them on the international level. Eeh… it could be because we 
don’t know behind closed doors how these decisions are made. 
But like I said it could be on the one side trying to demonstrate 
SA commitment to being part of the multilateral negotiations to 
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say “look developing countries are taking an active role in 
reducing emissions therefore we also require developed countries 
to take more of a role, look what we are doing, look at what India 
is doing and look at what China is doing they are committing to 
these reductions 
 
Table 9 above tabulate responses of analysts indicating different views on whether SA was 
trying to solve an international problem. According to INT4M-1 SA government was trying 
to solve an international problem when they came forward with the targets for emission 
reductions by speeding up the process of climate change negotiations and also building up for 
Durban COP to ensure there would be a tangible outcome. In this view INT4M-1 remarked:  
Low ambition and also to avoid the prospect of failure. Climate change negotiations 
have been warbling from point to point like the negotiations they have been very slow 
and non-outcomes outcomes. Outcomes that are just declarations but they are not 
binding, they are legal they are not implemented. That would have been part of it. 
Second politically for me, politically they had aspire a more ambitious response from 
others so that we have strong decisions taken by critical countries in the run-up to 
Durban. 
Further to this INT4F-2 indicated that this decision was not well received domestically 
because of the negative implications it was feared to impose on the South African economic 
and its impact on SA citizens. INT4F-2 shaped their views in this manner: 
But at the domestic role level it was… it had implications and people were not 
pleased to hear that there was going to be serious emission cuts and how that was 
going to play out and you’ll see the discussions on carbon tax. And carbon tax … I 
mean they were talking about it then already. 
4.1.3 Findings on other options available for South Africa to address this issue 
Findings on this question indicate diversified views from all categories of respondents. 
Government respondents indicate that SA government didn’t have any other options available 
to address the climate change issue. Contrastingly, civil society, academics and analysts 
indicated that there few other options which could have been explored. Possible options 
highlighted by respondents included energy efficiency, transport emissions reduction, 
adaptation commitment and renewable energy. Government respondents emphasised that this 
was the only option based on what SA government was aiming to achieve which was to 
pursue a multilateral solution.    
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4.1.3.1 Responses of government officials on other options available for South Africa to 
address this issue. 
Some government respondents have emphasised that SA government didn’t have any other 
option available at the time than to commit to reduce carbon emission by 34% and 42%, 
while other respondents have indicated that government had many other options available. 
Government had initial weighed and calculated other options such as energy efficiency and 
nuclear energy through the LTMS process and finally decided on carbon emissions reduction. 
This view is supported by respondent INT1M-3: 
Well of course there are always other options they could have had other numbers but 
eventually there had been a process on the mitigation side which is mainly where I 
worked having LTMS for SA the LTMS process which … and out of that many other 
specific options be it renewable energy or nuclear energy for that matter or transport 
options many technical options were examined and then that was done a couple of 
years before Copenhagen met. 
Respondent INT1M-3 indicates that government had other options to choose rather than the 
commitment. Further to this, the final decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions was 
informed by a rigorous process which involved building of future scenarios. Table 10 below 
contains findings of government officials. 
Table 10 Responses of government officials on other options available for South Africa 
to address this issue. 
Respondent What other options did it have to address this issue? 
INT1M-1 No I don’t think so because South Africa is a large emitter per 
capita, it depends on how you look at it someone says we are 
number 14 in terms of carbon emission so we are way up we are 
with the forces of darkness and evil when it comes to climate 
change. so  if we didn’t make the commitment we would become 
a paraya, that’s the last thing you want I mean if for instance you 
have a situation in terms of your global standing and suddenly the 
people in Vanuatu Island are beggars in the state and they say SA 
you caused to be this way I mean we can put up with that sort of 
situation its good enabling us in one hand but it’s about thing of 
global ethics as well we have to play our role 
INT1M-2 South Africa is committed to tacking climate change and has 
already been implementing various national policies and 
regional/sub-regional approaches to reduce emissions and adapt 
to climate change. However one country cannot tackle this 
challenge alone, as all nations have to take on their fair share of 
the global effort. South Africa therefore had no option but to 
pursue a multilateral solution under the UNFCCC. 
INT1M-3 We could only pledge, remember part of these negotiations are as 
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a results of not only climate change. I indicated earlier economic 
dynamics but also significantly political imperatives they come 
into play. I will not talk much into that, maybe somebody at 
DIRCO responded in more political undertones than I can. But 
the other option we would have had, but at the time I would want 
to think it had not reached a certain level of maturity. We had an 
option to say we want to put forward assistance on the adaptation 
side because looking at the nature of that pledge its more 
mitigation centric it’s about reducing GHG emissions by certain 
percentages that are stated and the pledge does not address the 
side of adaptation. In comparison with the policy that we later 
adopted in 2011 you will see that it does have two legs; 
mitigation component and adaptation component.  
INT1M-4 Well of course there are always other options they could have had 
other numbers but eventually there had been a process on the 
mitigation side which is mainly where I worked having LTMS for 
SA the LTMS process which ehm… and out of that many other 
specific options be it renewable energy or nuclear energy for that 
matter or transport options many technical options were examined 
and then that was done a couple of years before Copenhagen 
meted. Some of those options that were looked at technically 
were put together by the presidency you know. But those 
particular numbers of 34% BAU and 42% by 2025 came, of 
course the presidency could have chosen other technical options 
but they chose what they chose it was a political decision. 
 
In the table above INT1M-1 and INT1M-2 indicate that SA government didn’t have other 
options either than committing to reduce carbon emissions. This view is expressed by 
INT1M-1 below. 
No I don’t think so because South Africa is a large emitter per capita, it depends on 
how you look at it someone says we are number 14 in terms of carbon emission so we 
are way up we are with the forces of darkness and evil when it comes to climate 
change. 
This was validated by INT1M-2: 
South Africa is committed to tacking climate change and has already been 
implementing various national policies and regional/sub-regional approaches to 
reduce emissions and adapt to climate change. However one country cannot tackle 
this challenge alone, as all nations have to take on their fair share of the global effort. 
South Africa therefore had no option but to pursue a multilateral solution under the 
UNFCCC. 
And INT1M-4: 
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We could only pledge, remember part of these negotiations are as a results of not only 
climate change. I indicated earlier economic dynamics but also significantly political 
imperatives they come into play. 
 INT1M-4 was also quick to highlight that another possible option would have been adaption 
According to the two respondents SA didn’t have any other choice than the one it settled 
with. There is also an indication that SA was making its contribution by choosing the option 
to reduce carbon emissions. 
4.1.3.2 Responses of civil society on other options available for South Africa to address this 
issue. 
This section presents responses of civil society on other options available for SA. Findings in 
this group indicate that like many other countries that had different options to choose from, 
SA government also had different options available. However SA government opted for an 
economy wide option which was based on the Business As Usual scenario created from the 
LTMS process. Further, civil societies have indicated that SA government contrasted itself 
when it announced to reduce carbon emissions but later decided to build two coal electricity 
generating plants (Medupi and Kusile) to support power provision in SA. This view is 
narrated by INT2M-2 below:  
The then Minister of Environment Minister van Schalkwyk went to the Bali COP and 
gave an rousing speech about how we must do staff and he was widely lauded as 
being a great example of being a good example of climate justice and he said all the 
right things and he gave a very strong speech at the COP, you know quite a lot of 
garbage. He comes back to SA and incredible shocking afterwards gives 
environmental authorisation for the Medupi and Kusile power station. So on one hand 
government wants to do something about it and believe in climate change, on the 
other hand they still pursue high carbon climate change. 
The excerpt above indicates that in 2007 before SA the commitment in 2009, SA was already 
demonstrating an attitude of willingness and energy to tackle climate change. However their 
behavior at international climate change meetings was contradicting goals of the country back 
home and therefore for INT2M-2 what SA government was implementing was not aligned 
with what they demonstrated at COPs meetings. Table 11 below tabulate responses from 
civil society groups. 
Table 11 Responses of civil society on other options available for South Africa to 
address this issue. 
Respondent What other options did it have to address this issue? 
INT2M-1 Basically SA had other options. So some countries didn’t even 
talk… so we call it BAU like we have an economy wide target 
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 because it’s what you will do across economies. So some 
countries made pledges like in the transport sector they would 
reduce emissions by this much or they would roll out a certain 
amount of renewable energy etc. so there was a lot of different 
options that SA could put forward, in the end they elected to go 
for an economy wide target for  . China had efficiency targets, so 
they basically said they would increase their efficiency by this 
much. 
INT2M-2 People know these things but they act contrary towards these 
things. And if you look at what we are doing at the moment; we 
have a renewable energy programme, Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) that has got good results 
prices have been falling. If that programme is not dramatically 
expanded, there is a lot of carbon. Instead we now have a base of 
coal hiring people around. People have been chosen on it, we will 
hear in the next month who they were and then will have another 
round to further develop the coal infrastructure, we want to do 
natural gas which is one of the things we should be doing that are 
not theoretical. Policies are there, processes are there, 
infrastructure is there but we are not doing them because we 
prefer automatic development. They are implementing the staff 
they want to do.  
INT2M3 It could have immediately cut back on all the activities above, and 
shifted all available state subsidies towards renewable energy 
(solar, wind, tidal), public transport, compact urbanisation, 
cleaner production, lower conspicuous consumption, ‘zero-waste’ 
disposal strategies, and genuinely green finance, with Public-
Public, Public-People and Public-Proletarian partnerships. 
 
4.1.3.3 Responses of academics on other options available for South Africa to address this 
issue. 
Responses of academics indicate a different range of other options that respondent INT3M-1 
believes SA government should have pursued instead of the commitment that was made. 
INT3M-1 highlighted that SA government could have considered options such as 
implementation national and internal decarbonisation strategies. Further to this, INT3M-1 
also advises that SA government could have avoided hosting a COP meeting in Durban 
because this put the country on the spotlight. The lack of implementation of policies and 
programmes by SA government also came out from the academics responses. This was 
highlighted by INT3M-1 in this response: 
The country is already renowned for not implementing policies in other spheres of 
international commitments. The 2020 and 2025 targets promised in Copenhagen will 
not be met, which was known to be an unattainable target at the time with Medupi 
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already being built, economy growing and population expanding and no 
technological solutions available at the time and very unlikely to be fully implemented 
within a decade later. 
INT2M-2 had earlier shared the same sentiments about SA government’s challenge in 
implementation of policies and programmes, this is illustrated below: 
Policies are there, processes are there, infrastructure is there but we are not doing 
them because we prefer automatic development. 
Based on these comments academics believe that implementation of climate change policies 
and programmes are still a challenge for SA government. This challenge inhibits SA 
government to make significant progress in tackling climate change. 
Table 12 Responses of academics on other options available for South Africa to address 
this issue. 
Respondent What other options did it have to address this issue? 
INT3M-1 South Africa could have ducked the issue by sending lower level 
attendees to the UNFCCC COP meetings (like Australia and 
Canada have done before by sending a Minister or even lower 
representative, instead of the head of state) which will not easily 
result in commitments. South Africa could have decided not to 
host a COP, as Australia, Canada and the US have done in the last 
decade. South Africa could have focused on national and internal 
implementation of decarbonisation strategies and implementation 
of the National CCRWP, instead of hanging big promises on the 
international clock of COP negotiations in Warsaw. The country 
is already renowned for not implementing policies in other 
spheres of international commitments. The 2020 and 2025 targets 
promised in Copenhagen will not be met, which was known to be 
an unattainable target at the time with Medupi already being built, 
economy growing and population expanding and no technological 
solutions available at the time and very unlikely to be fully 
implemented within a decade later. 
 
4.1.3.4 Responses of analysts on other options available for South Africa to address this 
issue. 
Responses of academics on other options available for South Africa to address the climate 
change issue either than committing to reducing carbon emission by 34% and 42% indicates 
that there were other available options which could have been explored by SA government at 
the time such as committing to adaptation, committing to technology and capacity. What also 
came out is that the percentages which were used as targets had been calculated and so it was 
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easy for SA government to use what was already there than starting a process of calculating. 
In short, they chose the easy way out. 
Table 13 Responses of analysts on other options available for South Africa to address 
this issue. 
Respondent What other options did it have to address this issue? 
INT4M-1 It was an ambitious decision, they had an option of being like 
everybody else of just having a policy commitment. Like commit 
to adaptation, commit to technology, commit to capacity.  
INT4F-2 Look the commitments had already been made, remember the 
stats were already there. Zuma Just announced what was in the 
LTMS which was from a team that had researched it for 5 to 6 
years in advance. So that’s merely where the fact of figures came 
from… was from that discussion and scientific evidence which 
has been subsequently disputed, most people actually didn’t agree 
with the LTMS especially if you go speak to guys at WWF things 
like that they… you can even talk to them about those decisions 
but this is a LTMS. So he was just relaying something that was an 
output policy well it wasn’t a policy document it was a scenario 
document. And I think that was based on that particular time and 
context where those figures came from. 
 
In Table 14 data indicate that analysts were divided in their views. INT4M-1 seem to indicate 
that SA government had other options to pursue such as: 
It was an ambitious decision, they had an option of being like everybody else of just 
having a policy commitment. Like commit to adaptation, commit to technology, 
commit to capacity.  
This view was earlier underlined by INT2M-1(see Table 12) suggesting examples of other 
option that SA could have explored as indicate below: 
So some countries made pledges like in the transport sector they would reduce 
emissions by this much or they would roll out a certain amount of renewable energy 
etc. So there were a lot of different options that SA could put forward 
4.1.4 Findings on South African government’s best choice under the conditions 
Findings in this category indicated different views and different interpretation of SA 
government’s decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions. There is an indication that it 
was the best choice for what it was intended to achieve which was pursuing to be part of the 
multilateral system. Others indicated that if the decision’s intention was to stimulate 
commitment from other parties then it was a good choice. Further to this, information 
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provided by respondents also indicated that it was a conditional decision which clearly stated 
that SA is willing to commit provided there is technology, funding and capacity support from 
developed countries. There was also an emphasis on what SA wanted to achieve when the 
decision was made, for instance it was indicated that SA government had been working on 
the LTMS for years which was its plan to tackle climate change but also acknowledging that 
tackling climate will require all parties to commit. So the intention was to encourage 
everyone to act by submitting substantial pledges to reduce carbon emissions. 
4.1. 4.1 Responses of government officials on South African government’s best choice under 
the conditions 
Findings of government officials on South African government’s best choice indicated that 
government’s decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions was the best choice even 
though it shocked and displeased most South Africans it was still the best choice. 
Government officials responded highlighted that the process of making the targets was not a 
‘thumb suck’ but a well calculated scientific process. This view is narrated by INT1M-1: 
Well the thing is…. And the nice thing is as you can see there’s a lot of research 
behind those numbers as well it wasn’t a thumb suck, it was a little bit of a thumb 
suck about the percentages, percentages were calculated based on a whole bunch of 
science that was done before so in that essence I mean… even though there was a 
push back from the industry to say ‘you sold this LTMS thing purely as a piece of 
research now you making international commitments based on this piece of research’. 
INT1M-1 further revealed that the process started in 2005 when SA realised that climate 
change was not a fantasy but a reality.  
Table 14 Responses of government on South African government’s best choice under 
the conditions 
Respondent What was the South African government’s best choice under 
the conditions? 
INT1M-1 Well the thing is…. And the nice thing is as you can see there’s a 
lot of research behind those numbers as well it wasn’t a thumb 
suck, it was a little bit of a thumb suck about the percentages, 
percentages were calculated based on a whole bunch of science 
that was done before so in that essence I mean… even though 
there was a push back from the industry to say ‘you sold this 
LTMS thing purely as a piece of research now you making 
international commitments based on this piece of research’. The 
reality is that it’s a political decision, it’s the president who makes 
those decisions, so…. But it’s an informed decision it wasn’t like 
waking up in the morning and saying “ah what do I feel like 
today?” they were properly informed. You can see it was years of 
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information which started right in 2005 to, 2006, 2007 all the way 
up to 2008 so it was a well-informed position. 
INT1M-2 Under the conditions as an African and developing country that 
faces socio-economic challenges and both developmental and 
environmental imperatives, South Africa’s choice has been to 
help construct and further develop a multilateral approach to the 
climate change challenge. South Africa believes that only a 
multilateral rules-based system will build confidence that all 
Parties are taking on their fair share of the global effort, given 
their common but differentiated responsibility and respective 
capabilities (CBDR&RC) and the principle of equity. It is 
important for us as a developing country that the multilateral 
process on climate change be respected and that decisions and 
agreements adopted by the UNFCCC, such as the Paris 
Agreement, should serve our twin objectives/choice of ensuring 
environmental integrity, whilst protecting the development space 
of developing countries. To be successful, the new legal 
agreement must be fair.   
INTM-3 Ja it’s what we pronounce the country under the circumstances. 
It’s the best choice it was rationalised by those who were there 
before me. So it was the next best option at the time, it was 
cautionary captured to have the safe guards that I have alluded to. 
So we were not exposing our economies our developments you 
know, without putting in place checks and balances against this. 
So it was not recklessly done it was wisely, you know, captured 
and done. The pledge itself in terms of technical mechanism its 
informed by what is referred to as the LTMS that goes back to 
about 2005 in terms of its research well consulted at the time 
based on the information, with some information gaps that 
existed. That’s what could be arrived at for Copenhagen. 
INTM-4 Those particular numbers of 34% BAU and 42% by 2025 came, 
of course the presidency could have chosen other technical 
options but they chose what they chose it was a political decision. 
  
In Table 14 above INT1M-2 also indicated that it was important for SA as a developing 
country to build a multilateral approach to the climate change issue and so SA believes that 
all parties should participate in their fair share of the global effort.  
4.1.4.2 Responses of civil society on South African government’s best choice under the 
conditions. 
Civil society provided different views on SA government’s best choice under the conditions. 
First they seem to indicate that SA was not under pressure to make the announcement but 
they decided to do it for a particular reason.  But the views also indicate that it was not the 
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best choice based on the contradictory that SA seems to say one thing while they do 
something of the opposite. 
Table 15 Responses of civil society on South African government’s best choice under the 
conditions 
Respondent What was the South African government’s best choice under 
the conditions? 
INT2M-1 
 
At the point in Copenhagen they didn’t have to say anything. It 
was a choice to say something at all. And then in terms of what 
they said, what they put forward, they are very much at a very 
very broad range. If you go look at ehm… if you google 
Copenhagen pages you will find the documents which list all the 
different pledges the countries made subsequently. You can 
actually Google Copenhagen or Cancun and you will see there the 
different. 
INT2M-2 Well let me give you a practical example, I mean in… the Bali 
COP, can’t remember which COP it was. The then Minister of 
Environment Minister van Schalkwyk went to the Bali COP and 
gave an rousing speech about how we must do staff and he was 
widely lauded as being a great example of being a good example 
of climate justice and he said all the right things and he gave a 
very strong speech at the COPE, you know quite a lot of garbage. 
He comes back to SA and incredible shocking afterwards gives 
environmental authorisation for the Medupi and Kusile power 
stations. So on one hand government wants to do something about 
it and believe in climate change, on the other hand they still 
pursue high carbon climate change. So even at the time, we are 
talking about prior to that, those dynamics were pretty much 
there. So I don’t believe that government believe in climate 
change but they are not like denialist but they are not doing 
actions in a manner that is believable which is very weird because 
it’s not just a SA carbon it’s a global carbon people do that all the 
time. 
INT2M-3 The government’s choice was to continue to promote the status 
quo power structure – including the mining industry – so that its 
main clientele’s policies would remain intact and so that the 
existing ruling party could stay in power. 
 
As indicated in Table 15 above INT2M-2 highlighted the contradiction in the behavior of SA 
at the international community and the behaviour domestically which seems to suggest that 
making the announcement was not the best option for SA under those conditions since their 
actions seem unbelievable:  
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So on one hand government wants to do something about it and believe in climate 
change, on the other hand they still pursue high carbon climate change. So even at 
the time, we are talking about prior to that, those dynamics were pretty much there. 
So I don’t believe that government believe in climate change but they are not like 
denialist but they are not doing actions in a manner that is believable which is very 
weird because it’s not just a SA carbon it’s a global carbon people do that all the 
time. 
INT2M-2 indicates that SA government is not denialist but their actions seem to indicate 
minimal seriousness when it comes to addressing climate change. 
4.1.4.3 Responses of academics on South African government’s best choice under the 
conditions 
Findings from academics on SA government’s best choice under the conditions indicated that 
it would have been a better choice if the approach was communicated and debated by 
different ministers and stakeholders before the announcement was made. According to 
INT3M-1 most South Africans mostly business, civil society and some government officials 
who had been actively involved in the policy development process on climate change were 
taken aback when the announcement was made. INT3M-1 further illuminates there hasn’t 
been any implementation since the announcement was made in 2009. This view is articulated 
by INT3M-1 below 
A better choice would have been better cross-ministerial buy-in to the targets and 
plans from the beginning-when the strategy was set in 2005 and the targets were 
carefully reviewed by each department before announcement in Copenhagen in 
2009....since each target assigned to other departments is slipping already and target 
dates passed years ago. 
These views are well tabulated in Table 16 below. 
Table 16 Findings of academics on South African government’s best choice under the 
conditions 
Respondent What was the South African government’s best choice under 
the conditions? 
INT3M-1 A better choice would have been better cross-ministerial buy-in to 
the targets and plans from the beginning-when the strategy was 
set in 2005 and the targets were carefully reviewed by each 
department before announcement in Copenhagen in 2009. 
Climate is not an environmental problem only. It would have 
resulted in much accelerated implementation of the NCCRWP 
plans, since each target assigned to other departments is slipping 
already and target dates passed years ago. 
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4.1.4.4 Responses of analysts on South African government’s best choice under the 
conditions 
Analyst provided a different perspective to view SA government’s decision. According to 
this group of respondents SA government made a good choice by committing to reduce 
carbon emissions based on the following reasons; climate change is a serious threat to 
mankind and nature and therefore SA was addressing it; climate change is a global issue and 
SA cannot solve it alone and therefore the decision was meant to stimulates other parties to 
act; it was a good choice because SA also attached conditions; and the LTMS was a good 
strategy which was well calculated. Table 17 below provides responses from analysts. 
Table 17 Responses of analysts on South African government’s best choice under the 
conditions 
Respondent What was the South African government’s best choice under 
the conditions? 
INT4M-2 Personally I think it was a good choice to stimulate the ambitions. 
We should all be concerned that climate change issue is a real 
issue. So it’s a real issue… you can see the draught right now, 
there are many consequences of climate change. It can be that 
countries everywhere they need more. So it was good if it was 
designed to stimulate greater commitment around the table, then 
in that way it was good. It was risky though because you are 
committing to commitment that might require a lot of funding but 
of cause people must remember that SA commitment was big, 
40%, but at the end it says this is all dependents on technology 
transfer, finance and adaptation support. It is saying developed 
countries “if you produce this, produce this, we will do these” … 
because you are saying I will produce this if…in a way then it’s a 
last resort. 
INT4F-2 I don’t think there was an alternative discussion or strategy or 
anything else on the table except the LTMS that went with then to 
Copenhagen. Eehm… but no I wouldn’t know if there was an 
alternative it was a use of an existing scenario which would have 
been presented to him I suppose. 
 
As indicated in the table above analysts agree that the commitment was a good choice. They 
also indicated that it was only a good choice if the intention was to stimulate ambitions from 
other parties. This view is narrated by INT4M-1 below: 
It was risky though because you are committing to commitment that might require a 
lot of funding but of cause people must remember that SA commitment was big, 40%, 
but at the end it says this is all dependents on technology transfer, finance and 
adaptation support. It is saying developed countries “if you produce this, produce 
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this, we will do these” … because you are saying I will produce this if…in a way then 
it’s a last resort. 
INT4M-1 indicates that SA’s commitment had conditions which stated that the commitment 
was only attainable provided there was support. INT4F-2 emphasised that SA’s decision was 
a good choice if it was their goal from the beginning. SA had been working on the LTMS 
since 2000 which was designed with the intention to forecast economic growth while 
addressing climate change. 
4.2 Organisational Behavior Model II 
This model focuses on governmental processes and procedures which could have produced 
the decision being analysed. Subsequently, questions for this model were answered by 
government officials only (see Table 1). The purpose is to develop an understanding on 
whether SA’s decision to commit to reduce climate change by 34% and 42% was as a result 
of decision making by organisational departments and agencies that exist within the SA 
government.  As advised by Allison and Zelikow (1999: 5) the focus on this model was on 
existing organisational concepts, their functions and their standard operating procedures used 
to attain information. Three government officials were interviewed to respond to the 
questions formulated based on the assumptions of the Organisational Behavior model.  Four 
questions were developed based on the Organisational Behavior model, these questions were 
used to gather data related to governmental processes and procedures which contributes to a 
government foreign policy decision making process. 
4.2.1 Responses on role of departments in preparation for Copenhagen and setting of 
targets 
First, it is imperative to shed light on the arrangement of respondents before conferring their 
responses. There are four respondents who were interviewed in the category of government 
officials one of which is a consultant permanently working with SA government on climate 
change under the following tracts; preparation, research and negotiations. This respondent 
(INT1M-3) has worked with government on climate change since 2005 leading the LTMS 
process, producing the 34% and 42% target numbers and further co-leading negotiations at 
COP meetings. As such, respondent INT1M-3 could only respond to questions related to the 
climate process itself but could not respond to internal departmental processes. Proceeding 
further to the findings in this category, findings on the role of departments in preparation for 
Copenhagen and setting of targets indicate that different government departments participated 
during the preparation process when government was building the LTMS from 2005 until 
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2010. DEA was leading the LTMS process and also leading negotiations at Copenhagen 
COP15. The department of environment (DEA) leads in climate change issue as they 
specialize in technical environmental issues from policy development to implementation. 
Even though DIRCO play a supporting role the department also takes political lead in 
negotiations. Other departments such as Energy, Trade and Industry and Water and Sanitation 
participate but don’t have any leading role.  
4.2.1.1 Findings of government officials on role of departments in preparation for 
Copenhagen and setting of targets 
Findings of government officials on role of departments in preparation for Copenhagen and 
setting of targets indicate that DEA was leading the process of preparation and co-negotiated 
with DIRCO. During the LTMS development process DEA led consultation with different 
stakeholders such as business, government agencies, civil society and other government 
departments. The policy that was developed from these consultations informed the 
president’s Copenhagen decision. The LTMS scenarios were later used to build the 34% and 
42% which was announced as SA’s carbon emissions targets at Copenhagen. This view is 
validated by INT1M-1 below: 
However the LTMS from which the 34% and 42% came from was developed by DEA 
with the involvement of ESKOM and other stakeholders. DEA, in this case the 
minister, advised the president on the decision. 
Even though DIRCO lead in negotiations, findings have indicated that  DIRCO was not 
involved in Copenhagen but only the Minister had been part of the political decision making 
team which is the ministerial committee. This view was further emphasised by INT1M-2 
Well in Copenhagen days The Minister (DIRCO) was consulted and was part of the 
political decision making process. We don’t know the specific details, we don’t know 
how the pledge came about. This team (DIRCO) only became more prominent after 
Copenhagen and specialised in negotiations when SA was hosting Durban COP in 
2011. 
According to respondent INT1M-2, DIRCO works with the Chief State Advisor who plays 
the role of chief negotiator for the South African government at COPs meetings and 
negotiations. Table 18 below consists of findings of government officials. 
Table 18 Responses of government officials on role of departments in preparation for 
Copenhagen and setting of targets 
Respondent What role did your department play in preparation for 
Copenhagen and setting of targets 
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INT1M-1 The final decisions, the 34% and 42%, those were the numbers we had 
never seen before, they were from a discussion of very high level 
cabinet I guess. However the LTMS from which the 34% and 42% 
came from was developed by DEA with the involvement of ESKOM 
and other stakeholders. DEA, in this case the minister, advised the 
president on the decision. 
INT1M-2 And we have a very good coordination with multiple stakeholders 
particularly environmental affairs because environmental affairs is the 
lead national actor national implementation but DIRCO is the lead for 
the negotiation  as part of the foreign policy thing so we work with 
Advocate de Wit who is the Chief state advisor International Law. She 
is SA’s lead negotiator. And we also have Deputy Director General 
Global Governance and Continental Affairs Ambassador Diseko she 
oversees multilateral brunch but she also was last year the Chair of 
G77. So our personal role is really to support the lead negotiator and 
last year our focus was on G77.  
INT1M3 Remember we are an environment department and when it comes to 
negotiations part of the mandate is that we coordinate SA’s position in 
preparation for each of the COPs. Now that requires of us that we 
liase with different… we don’t have all the expertise within because 
there might be some Water and Sanitation issues, there might be 
issues that lead to Agriculture that might require of us to draw from 
DAF, there are issues that has to do with DIRCO because DIRCO is 
the coordinator that go out you know internationally. So we draw 
from those and various other departments, hence I even included 
Department of Energy. So ours is more of a coordinating role, a 
facultative role and we lead the delegation as well.  
INT1M-4 well before Copenhagen we at ERC and others who had been 
involved in the LMTS we did a lot of technical analysis. But 
immediately in terms of setting the, some numbers emerged the 
proposed immediately for Copenhagen, that wasn’t, weren’t directly 
involved. It was a process run by the DEA and then the final stage by 
the Presidency. So it was a political process and as academics we 
wouldn’t have been involved in a political process. 
 
4.2.1.2 Responses on the role played by organisations and agencies in the making of this 
decision, that is setting of the 34% and 42% targets. 
Responses on the role played by organisations and agencies in the setting of 34% and 42% 
targets indicates that different government departments and agencies such as government 
departments, civil society, business, NGO’s, FBO’s and academics participated in the process 
that led to the development of the LTMS which produced the targets. DEA led the LTMS 
sessions together with the Energy Research Centre at UCT which was consulted by 
government to provide research and advice on climate change. Other departments such as 
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Energy, Water and Transport provided support. It also emerged that these organisations 
actively participated in a cross-cut consultation as part of COP meeting preparations where 
they are encouraged to comment on what government would have prepared for negotiations. 
Table 19 Response on the role played by organisations and agencies in the making of 
this decision, that is setting of the 34% and 42% targets. 
Respondent What role did organisations and agencies play in the making of 
this decision? That is setting of the 34% and 42% targets? 
INT1M-1 We thought before having a policy we needed to have a conference so 
we decided to have two conferences at once a climate change 
conference and policy conference. Outcome of the conference is that 
climate change was accepted and its dangers were realised. So 
government believed that climate change was real and happening. The 
conference gave government a mandate to write policies on climate 
change. it was a very participatory conference with deputy president 
attending it was high profile. What came out of the conference was 
that we are a coal base economy there’s little we can do but that 
wasn’t accepted because we had to do something so we started to do 
the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS). It was agreed that we 
would do the LTMS which has been repeated around the world. UCT 
was employed to run with the process. We had an NGO called North 
North-South. We put together a scenario building team with national 
government, private companies, provincial departments, 
municipalities and NGOs. We started by estimating the emission 
projections by sector like transport, water, energy etc.  
INT1M-2 Well when we developing our negotiation positions of course we have 
brainstorming sessions with key stakeholders from DEA and from 
other departments and it depends on what the topic is of course and 
then we develop our position. Under DEA there is a whole series of a 
committee which are there to mmmh stakeholder …… stakeholder 
consultation and for getting views and that’s eeh….they have IGCCC 
and NCCC so they have multiple established structures and we would 
go there and give briefings on….. you know on whatever session just 
happened and give briefing on our position and to hear views. 
INT1M-3 There were number of sessions that were held during the LTMS 
development and there was a number of stakeholders that participated 
in that space that are crosscutting like the one I have indicated before. 
The current practice which has been there, it’s a practice that has been 
ongoing. In terms of the current procedure and process is that we 
consult with different departments and we consult with businesses. 
They even make written representations like when we were doing the 
INDC, they would put forward the views, they would point out it 
shortcomings. Businesses like BUSA critiquing and making 
suggestions.  
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Table 19 above indicates that the process of producing targets was consultative and inclusive 
cutting across most government departments and different organisations. INT1M-1indicated 
that the process of target setting begin with building of scenarios through the LTMS process 
which was led by ERC at UCT. This view is presented below: 
What came out of the conference was that we are a coal base economy there’s little 
we can do but that wasn’t accepted because we had to do something so we started to 
do the Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS). It was agreed that we would do the 
LTMS which has been repeated around the world. UCT was employed to run with the 
process. We had an NGO called North North South. We put together a scenario 
building team with national government, private companies, provincial departments, 
municipalities and NGOs. 
INT1M-3 further elucidates on this point: 
There were number of sessions that were held during the LTMS development and 
there was a number of stakeholders that participated in that space that are 
crosscutting like the one I have indicated before. The current practice which has been 
there, it’s a practice that has been ongoing. In terms of the current procedure and 
process is that we consult with different departments and we consult with businesses. 
They even make written representations like when we were doing the INDC, they 
would put forward the views, they would point out it shortcomings. 
Drawing from this information, the targets were not produced by government alone behind 
closed doors but there is consultation that takes place which allows for different agencies to 
be involved. The setting of targets was also a consultative process which allowed 
participation of different agencies which are mentioned above. 
4.2.1.2 Responses of government officials on capabilities and constraints did organisational 
procedures and pressures exert on the decision making process 
Responses of government officials on capabilities and constraints exerted by organisational 
procedures and pressures on the decision making process indicate that  sometimes 
government departments  are constrained by certain aspects that hinders them from producing 
the optimum  results especially on climate change. There was also an indication that 
consultations led by DEA with different stakeholders provide valuable technical information 
that inform cabinet decisions. The information produced from these sessions become useful 
for the president and the cabinet when making decisions relating to climate change Table: 20 
below tabulate findings of government officials. 
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Table 20 Responses of government officials on capabilities and constraints that 
organisational procedures and pressures exert on the decision making process 
Respondent What capabilities and constraints did organisational 
procedures and pressures exert on the decision making 
process? 
INT1M-1 It was guided by participation processes and science so it 
participation with stakeholders up until the final decision, the 
final decision no one knew, it was government governing I mean 
that’s what government does government governs because it can’t 
please everybody but it tries, the idea is it can’t please everybody 
all the time to get as much participation as possible but eventually 
government has to make a decision. Importantly is that LTMS 
conferences informed that decision but the final decision and the 
numbers are basically a decision made by presidency. 
INT1M-2 Well when we developing our negotiation positions of course we 
have brainstorming sessions with key stakeholders from DEA and 
from other departments and it depends on what the topic is of 
course and then we develop our position. Under DEA there is a 
whole series of a committee which are there to mmmh 
stakeholder …… stakeholder consultation and for getting views 
and that’s eeh….they have IGCCC and NCCC so they have 
multiple established structures. There’s an established structure 
for getting our national position approved at that level approved 
by cabinet you know there is the president and there’s a pool of 
cabinet level committee you know it’s not….. It goes through 
multiple levels so by the time we get there we have a national 
negotiating position. Of course last year… we also a member of 
Africa Group, member of the BASIC and we are G77 so G77 
positions of course are developed by the membership  so 
whatever national position we forge has to be consistent with the 
Africa positon and the G77 position. 
INT1M-3 Key among the constraints is the research capability internally. 
We don’t have sufficient research capability which is why it can 
be outsourced to other entities. You look at the research on 
LTMS, it was led by ERC. How we have done our INDC we have 
used ERC again but we have used CSIR. So in terms of research 
that’s part of the limitation there, but they do the technical 
analysis and we convey the political message that comes out of 
that. They provide backing in terms of the technical support side 
because there would be questions even after you submitted your 
INDC. The other aspect in terms of constraints is capacity, within 
the branch climate change and air quality there are chief 
directorate, ours that focus on international. So capacity issues, 
research aspects and money.  
 
88 
 
INT1M-3 indicates that DEA is mostly constrained due to insufficient technical support, 
financial support and capacity support which sometimes hinders the department on certain 
deliveries. DEA leads on the technical aspects of climate change and it also leads 
domestically. However it becomes imperative that the department outsources some technical 
skills and research due to insufficient capacity to offer these aspects when preparing for COP 
meetings and negotiations. INT1M-3 further explains: 
Key among the constraints is the research capability internally. We don’t have 
sufficient research capability which is why it can be outsourced to other entities… So 
finance remains a constraint, capacity and research. You go to negotiations countries 
like USA have researchers there, they have economists, they have scientists, they have 
linguists a whole lot of technicians within their delegation. 
Research, finance and capacity seem to be the main constraints during decision making on 
climate change issues. These three constraints hinder government from handling information 
that is used to make climate change decision. 
4.2.1.3 Responses of government officials on organisational context, pressure and 
procedure from which the Copenhagen decision emerge 
Responses in this category indicate that organisational context, pressure and procedure didn’t 
have much contribution on the outcome of the decision. The decision making process was 
aligned with cabinet procedures. Minister of DEA advised the president based on the 
information which was produced from the LTMS consultation process. The Minister of 
DIRCO was invited to be part of the decision making process but the minister and DIRCO 
were not involved from the preparation and negotiation process. The 34% and 42% were 
decided by the ministerial committee even though they were produced by a scientist 
specialist. Table 21 below present findings from government officials 
Table: 21 Findings of government officials on organisational context, pressure and 
procedure did the Copenhagen decision emerge? 
Respondent From what organisational context, pressure and procedure did 
the Copenhagen decision emerge? 
INT1M-1 It was completely aligned with the cabinet’s procedures, as it is 
stated in the white paper, cabinet agreed on peek plateau and decline. 
Those numbers were very pretty much cabinets decision from 2008 
so this is a reflection of that. 
INT1M-2 DIRCO was not involved, from the process, last year DEA was more 
involved doing road shows, business was more involved and NGO 
so it was much more. but the one thing which is very important to 
understand though with the UNFCCC is that developed countries 
have … had a legal obligation to report whereas developing 
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countries such as SA have not up to now. 
INT1M-3 The process is that we convene delegation meetings for instance and 
then we would ask the various departments to… and we would guide 
to what the key country priorities are sustainable development 
issues, poverty eradication, reducing unemployment, improving 
literacy and all of those contributing towards economic growth. So 
we give that guidance in terms of the broader picture and we would 
expect them to provide inputs to each of the negotiating items under 
the various subsidiaries coding of the UNFCCC in preparation for 
our overall position. So there would be a position for each item 
contributed by the team. That is what we would then take and 
circulate through the structures of IGCCC comprises of various 
departments. We would consult on that through other structures like 
your NCCC that comprises of NGO’s, private sector entities you 
name them and also government departments but we go beyond that 
to various other forums as requested and required to table that out. 
So that’s part of the process that we embark upon. Part of the 
process as well is to go to Africa, Africa group of negotiators. There 
is such a structure where we try and align some of these issues.  
 
4.2.1.4 Responses of government officials on government departments’ decision making 
process 
Findings of government officials on government departments’ indicated there are existing 
processes that must be followed when a climate change decision has to be made. Specialists 
inform their respective directors who discusses information with the Director General who 
then informs and advises the minister on which direction to take. INT1M-1 provided this 
information on government departments’ decision making process: 
You only inform decisions so for instance if you putting a decision for your minister, 
you put forward recommendations. Only officials make decisions, top officials make 
policy decisions, policy is politics by its nature…Minister would then simply say well I 
disagree or come give me some more briefings or I want to hear someone else or I 
want to have a meeting on my own and then she will make a decision so that’s how it 
works. 
Further to this respondent INT1M-2 reported that their department follows a similar process 
where a proposal with recommendations is sent to the DG to the Minister who then advises 
the President. 
Table 22 Responses of government officials on government department’s decision 
making process 
Respondent How does decision making work in your department? 
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INT1M-1 You only inform decisions so for instance if you putting a 
decision for your minister, you put forward 
recommendations. Only officials make decisions, top 
officials make policy decisions, policy is politics by its 
nature. Typical decision is when I want have… looking 
for a policy decision from minister we would put together 
recommendations the minister with as much information 
and we would make recommendations to say minister we 
would like you to consider this, we would like you to 
consider this. Minister would then simply say well I 
disagree or come give me some more briefings or I want 
to hear someone else or I want to have a meeting on my 
own and then she will make a decision so that’s how it 
works. 
INT1M-2 In this department... well we were restructuring recently, 
first the ADP this is the specific project we’re talking 
about it’s a four year. Because the state attorney is the 
advisor our team is established around her in normal times 
we would just be part of the environment department chief 
directorate. The decision making would still be from the 
multilateral branch. We report to the Chief Director 
multilateral who report to the DG and then the Minister 
sign off. Deputy Minister stands in if the Minister is not 
available. 
INT1M-3 The decision making process, it will sometimes be bottom 
up, when the political stance and information is taken it 
will come from the top, it’s what the cabinet requires of 
us. In terms of process, you are to put proposals by way 
of, because administrative justice has to be done, you 
write down either a proposal which you would refer to as 
a submission and justify it in terms of the analysis, it must 
be justified in terms of key options, whether it does take 
into account interest of the country at the forefront. But 
now because the organisation is hierarchical in nature it 
will have to move from my level, director level. Either in 
relation to the position or implications of the decision 
taken that yielded from negotiations. He can either 
recommend that or not recommend that. He has powers to 
recommend then it move to the DDG level. Where the 
DDG can support the recommendation of the Chief 
Director if she feels properly rationalised but if not it have 
to come back you review you incorporate some of the 
suggestions it will move on to the DG level and then the 
Minister can approve, he’s got approval powers.  
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Table 22 above indicates that decision making process at DIRCO and DEA is similar. There 
is a line of report that is being followed for instance at DIRCO specialists and technical 
personnel would report information to multilateral directorate who report to Director – 
General who will then advice the minister on a particular decision. This is narrated by 
INT1M-2:  
The decision making would still be from the multilateral branch. We report to the 
Chief Director multilateral who report to the DG and then the Minister sign off. 
Deputy Minister stands in if the Minister is not available. 
The statement above corroborates with INT1M-1 view that climate change decisions are 
made by top officials such as minister and president. INT1M-3 provided a broader 
explanation of the internal decision making process in the following manner: 
Either in relation to the position or implications of the decision taken that yielded 
from negotiations. He can either recommend that or not recommend that. He has 
powers to recommend then it move to the DDG level. Where the DDG can support the 
recommendation of the Chief Director if she feels properly rationalised but if not it 
have to come back you review you incorporate some of the suggestions it will move on 
to the DG level and then the Minister can approve, he’s got approval powers. 
4.2.1.5 Responses of government officials on the government’s foreign policy agenda on 
climate change 
Findings in this category indicated that cabinet set government foreign policy agenda on 
climate change. Recommendations are submitted to the cabinet who advises the president 
who then makes the decision. The minister at DEA plays a major role in technical and policy 
advise while the minister at DIRCO would advise on multilateral issues. The process is the 
same as the one narrated by INT1M-1 earlier (see Table 21) which indicates that cabinet and 
the president set the foreign policy agenda even though ground work is done by specialists 
and technical personnel. 
Table 23 Responses on the government’s foreign policy agenda on climate change 
Respondent Who sets the government’s foreign policy agenda on 
climate change? 
INT1M-1 No once again, it’s the cabinet that makes those decisions, 
we would make recommendations and cabinet make 
decisions, that’s how government policy works. There’s 
no…especially on climate change because it’s cross 
cutting so in this department its environmental department 
has a strong role to play. 
INT1M-2 When we were negotiating these past few years we were 
negotiating under the ADP. In a technical COP, technical 
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department lead if it’s a political COP it becomes 
important to have political leaders. Division of labor is 
quite clear that when it comes to national implantation its 
DEA, the national focal point of the UNFCCC is also 
DEA. So they are the lead national department and we are 
the lead in foreign policy, the other departments are part 
of the national team. 
INT1M-3 Our mandate is to lead when it comes to climate issues 
and climate change is one of those but we cannot do that 
because our scope is more domestically focused as the 
department. We do that now when it comes to climate 
change in partnership with DIRCO because they are sort 
of some kind of overlapping mandate. Remember their 
focus is international and their focus is outward whilst we 
do work domestically and we have the technical capacity 
to be able to negotiate more in depth in climate change. 
They are the political arm because this climate change 
needs to be reconciled with other developments and other 
forums and in fact if you look at the negotiations DIRCO 
would be leading in terms of some of the major 
negotiation tract.  
 
4.3 Governmental Politics Model III 
This model focused on internal politics and bureaucracies involved in decision making 
processes. The questions were created to determine the interactions and behaviour of the 
political players who were involved during the decision making that resulted in SA 
committing to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. Referring to 
Allison and Zelikow (1999: 6) the focus here is on the players whose interest and actions 
impact the issue in question, the factors that shape players perception and the performance of 
the players. Questions of this model were intentionally directed to analysts who followed the 
process of decision making concerning the announcement that was made thereafter. These 
analysts watched the behaviour of political actors from a distance and were able to provide an 
account of their views in making the decision on the 34% and 42% targets. The questions for 
this module were directed to analysts only, however only one respondent from  the analysts 
category was able to provide information as the other respondent indicated their interest is on 
SA behaviour in the international system and not domestically.  
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4.3.1 Findings on the players, views and values that count in shaping the choice and 
action 
Responses on the players and values that count in shaping the choice and actions refers to 
those who participate in the political decision making process and their views which shape 
the outcome of a decision, in this context, on climate change. The focus is how the actor or 
the players behave during the decision making process in order to determine whether they 
were able to influence the outcome of the decision. 
4.3.1.1 Responses of analysts on the players, views and values that count in shaping the 
choice and action 
Responses of analysts on the players, views and values that count in shaping the choice and 
action seem to indicate that different types of ministers and political parties, particularly the 
ruling party, and trade unions participate in the political decision making on climate change 
obligations. 
Table 24 Findings on the players, views and values that count in shaping the choice and 
action 
Respondent Who are the players? Whose views and values count in 
shaping the choice and action? 
INT4M-1 It depends on issues, with climate of course the concerns 
of labour, the concerns of environmental, the concerns of 
the ANC and the concerns of the international level on 
climate change then there could be others as well they are 
secondary but for me primarily; the ANC; trade unions 
especially COSATU; business, organised business so a 
combination of those interest must inform what is being 
said and decided. 
 
In Table: 24 Above indicate that other parties such as business, COSATU and ANC also 
inform decision making on international climate change obligations. This is validated by 
INT4M-1:  
 ..the concerns of the ANC and the concerns of the international level on climate 
change then there could be others as well they are secondary but for me primarily; 
the ANC; trade unions especially COSATU; business, organised business so a 
combination of those interest must inform what is being said and decided. 
4.3.2 Findings on actors who advise the president 
Responses on who advises the president are focused on those who offer advice to the 
president on climate change issue particularly when a decision has to be made. The president 
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is often surrounded by individuals who support him in terms of advice on many issues but the 
focus in this study is on international climate change obligations.  
4.3.2.1 Responses of analysts on who advises the president 
Findings on who advises the president indicates that the president is advised by the DEA 
minister and DIRCO minister on issues of climate change obligation. These two ministers are 
informed by their departmental technicians through the DG’s as indicated earlier by INT1M-
4 (see Table 21): 
… He can either recommend that or not recommend that. He has powers to 
recommend then it move to the DDG level. Where the DDG can support the 
recommendation of the Chief Director if she feels properly rationalised but if not it 
have to come back you review you incorporate some of the suggestions it will move on 
to the DG level and then the Minister can approve… 
Staff within the two departments inform the ministers for international climate change 
decisions that need to be taken. Table 25 below presents the details of responses from 
analysts. 
Table 25 Responses of analyst on who advises the president 
Respondent Who advises the president? 
INT4M-1 For climate change the president is advised by two 
ministers; the minister of DEA and minister of DIRCO 
and of course his international advisors. But it seems to 
me those are the critical one and it is meant to be so. The 
minister and his advisors… those two departments have a 
lot to do with what the president decides on international 
climate change issues. 
 
INT4M-1 indicates that ministers of the two departments; DEA and DIRCO both advise the 
president on international climate change issues: 
For climate change the president is advised by two ministers; the minister of DEA and 
minister of DIRCO and of course his international advisors. But it seems to me those 
are the critical one and it is meant to be so. The minister and advisors. 
It also came out that ministers have their own advisors who assist them in decision making 
especially when the president has to be advised. 
4.3.3 Findings on what the process is all about 
This question was intended to determine what the process of decision making is about, at the 
political level. The focus is on the president and the cabinet that make international climate 
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change decisions. It also focuses on other parties that get involved in climate change decision 
making. 
4.3.3.1 Responses of analysts on what the process is all about 
Findings on what the process is all about indicate that ministers decide fist and present those 
decision to the cabinet. The cabinet then recommends the best decision to the president which 
would produce a desirable outcome. They would also present available option that could be 
exploited. INT4M-1 further explains the process: 
So the president has to follow the cabinet committee’s conceded proposal which says 
“these are conceded, calculations have been made, and implications have been 
calculated” and staff like that because you can’t thumb sucks something that could 
cost us. 
The findings are presented in Table 26 below. 
Table 26 Responses of analysts on what the process is all about 
Respondent What is the process all about? 
INT4M-1 I’m not sure but what I know is that I participated in the 
national process developing the national edition (audition) 
on climate change and it was huge, it was something like 8 
different meetings, civil society side, and regional side.  
And then there is also an inter-departmental one that 
happens internally. So when the president has to decide, 
the ministers would have decided, the cabinet that would 
have been put together would have put before him the 
options to him and say these are the options and then they 
would say we recommend these ones. So the president has 
to follow the cabinet committee’s conceded proposal 
which says “these are conceded, calculations have been 
made, and implications have been calculated” and staff 
like that because you can’t thumb sucks something that 
could cost us. Because its international negotiations they 
would have been advised on what your actions trigger and 
what your action do not trigger.  
 
Findings further indicate that when the cabinet decided on international obligations their 
decision has to either trigger or de-trigger something. Even on this decision under study the 
cabinet should have been advised on what this decision would trigger in climate change 
negotiations.  
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4.3.4 Findings on what kind of bargaining among which players produced the decision to 
commit to reduce carbon emission 
This question was intended to attain information about actors or players and their behavior in 
the decision making process. Since this is a political decision it is imperative that the players’ 
behavior is analysed in order to discover how their behavior and actions shaped the outcome 
of the decision. 
4.3.4.1 Responses of analysts on what kind of bargaining among which players produced 
the decision to commit to reduce carbon emission. 
Findings in this section indicate that ministers who form part of the cabinet committee to 
pursue their departmental agendas or garner support from other cabinet members. There is 
also a sense of competition present amongst cabinet members during the process of decision 
making. Below is a detail presentation of findings from analysts. 
Findings of this question indicate that competition exist amongst ministers issues of climate 
change. However all these tensions and disagreements are managed and harmonised in the 
cabinet committee before recommendations are presented to the president. This view is 
narrated by INT4M-1: 
But my own sense is the system works as I know all these tension get up to the cabinet 
committee and then takes an institutionalised position now it’s no longer a discipline 
of DIRCO, DEA or Water Affairs but it integrates all their interests and then its 
harmonises everything the country then decides. I remember the news report about 
these two ministers fighting but I guess it was talking about the processes trying to 
influence what the cabinet committee is going to decide. Once the Cabinet Com 
decides it’s too hardy to want to still go solo. 
Table 27 Responses of analysts on bargaining among players that produced the decision 
to commit to reduce carbon emissions 
Respondent What kind of bargaining among from which players 
produced the decision to commit to reduce carbon 
emissions? 
INT4M-1 By virtue of the fact that you are saying there are these 
various politicians. There is competition amongst them at 
a lower level, in the entire process there is a lot of 
contestation because there are different concerns that 
comes in. Department of water affairs wants to use this 
climate change thing to garner more support for its water 
plans and staff. Similarly the country’s cabinet committee 
there is a lot of competition in cabinet committee and that 
is where… that’s why we have the cabinet committee to 
exhaust this tension so that when it comes to the president 
the committee has found a consensus position. So its 
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Presentation of research findings Part 2: Document data 
This section presents data gathered from documents which were analysed in order to answer 
the question; How does South African government decide which environmental obligations to 
tackle and which ones not to? Data was mined from government documents such as; National 
Climate Change White Paper, LTMS; and secondary documents form journal articles. Data 
extracted from each document will is presented below: 
4.4 National Climate Change Response White Paper (NCCRWP)  
Topic: Mitigation 
Scope: The White Paper presents the South African Government’s vision for an effective 
climate change response and the long-term, just transition to a climate-resilient and lower-
carbon economy and society. 
Objectives: (i) Effectively manage inevitable climate change impacts through interventions 
that build and sustain South Africa’s social, economic and environmental resilience and 
emergency response capacity. (ii) Make a fair contribution to the global effort to stabilise 
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that avoids dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system within a timeframe that enables 
economic, social and environmental development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
Outcome: NCCRP is used as guideline for SA’s response to climate change. 
The White paper sets out South Africa’s climate change response strategy by outlining 
mitigation and adaptation approach. The process of developing the White paper began after 
SA had announced its commitment targets at the Copenhagen COP15. According to the 
NCCRWP South Africa’s approach to mitigation is informed by its contribution as a 
responsible citizen to the international effort to curb global emissions and its management 
limits the amount of competition that gets to the president 
himself. There is a lot of competition especially between 
DIRCO and DEA these two departments that lead they are 
very important. But my own sense is the system works as I 
know all these tension get up to the cabinet committee and 
then takes an institutionalised position now it’s no longer 
a discipline of DIRCO, DEA or Water Affairs but it 
integrates all their interests and then its harmonises 
everything the country then decides 
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and development of poverty eradication challenges. SA’s commitment to reduce carbon 
emissions by 34% and 42% was motivated by its commitment as a responsible global citizen. 
This is reported in the NCCRWP (p 25):  
As a responsible global citizen and as a global citizen with morals as well as a legal 
obligations under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, SA is committed to 
contributing its fair share to global GHG mitigation in order to keep the temperatures 
well below 2 degrees Celsius, in this regard, on 6 December 2009, the president 
announced that South Africa will implement mitigation actions that will collectively 
results in a 34% and 42% trajectory below its Business As Usual emission growth 
trajectory by 2020 and 2025 respectively. 
The NCCRWP further illuminates on this statement highlighting that this commitment was 
conditional, it will materialise if SA receives technology, capacity and financial support from 
developed countries. This view is supported by the passage below:     
In accordance with Article 4.7 the UNFCCC, the extent to which this outcome can be 
achieved depends on the extent to which developed countries meet their commitment 
to provide financial, technology and capacity-building support, this level of effort will 
enable South Africa’s GHG emissions to peak between 2020 and 2025, plateau for 
approximately a decade and decline in absolute terms thereafter. 
Further, this announcement was motivated by SA’s desire to make a fair contribution to the 
global mitigation efforts under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol as a global citizen. It 
was also based on the peak plateau decline trajectory which means that emissions were 
expected to peak during 2020 to 2050, remain stable for a decade and decline thereafter.  
Cabinet fully considered the Long Term Mitigation Scenario study of the country’s 
mitigation potential. This led to the announcement that South Africa’s emissions 
should peak in the period from 2020 to 2025, remain stable for around a decade, and 
decline thereafter in absolute terms. The President confirmed this strategy policy 
direction at the 2009 National Climate Summit and further and further detailed this 
as a South African undertaking in the context of legal obligations under the UNFCCC 
and Kyoto Protocol of all legal to the UNFCCC Climate Change Conference in 2009. 
According to NCCRWP SA is one of the highest carbon emitter per capita amongst 
developing countries. This is translated by SA’s energy intensive economy dominated by 
significant processing of minerals, mining and a coal intensive energy system. NCCRWP (p 
26) further reports that: 
In terms of South Africa’s latest Greenhouse Gas Inventory (base year 2000), the 
majority of South Africa’s energy emission arose from electricity generation, which 
constituted around half of SA’s energy emissions and just under 40% of total 
emissions in 2000. Transportation and energy in industry contributed just fewer than 
10% each of total emissions and industrial process emissions constituted around 14% 
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of total emissions. Emissions from agriculture and land use in South Africa constitute 
only around 5% of emissions, compared to an average of 44% in developing countries 
as a whole. 
The excerpt above indicates that SA contributes a lot more in carbon emissions than its 
developing country counterparts. Moreover it also reveals that coal generated electricity is the 
biggest contributor to SA’s carbon emissions. In terms of mitigation, the NCCRWP indicates 
that SA has other mitigation options available even though they are limited. In 2009 SA opted 
for a carbon reduction option and committed to reduce carbon emissions by offering targets 
in numbers. Other options that could be looked at such as energy efficiency, renewable 
energy and demand energy were available, however SA opted for emissions reduction from 
energy generation since it is the biggest carbon contributor. In addition to this the NCCRWP 
states: 
While opportunities for mitigation of emissions from non-energy sources do exist, 
large mitigation contributions will have to come from reduced emissions from energy 
generation and use. The main opportunities for mitigation and moving to a less 
emission-intensive energy mix, with consequent economic benefits of improved 
efficiency and competitiveness as well as incentivising economic growth in sectors 
with lower energy intensities. 
4.5 Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) 
Topic: Long Term Mitigation Scenarios strategic options for South Africa 
Scope: Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) is designed to provide a sound scientific 
analysis from which Cabinet could draw up a long-term climate policy. Such a policy would 
give South African negotiators under the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) clear and mandated positions for their negotiations. It would also ensure 
that South African stakeholders understood and committed to a range of realistic strategies 
for future climate action. 
Objectives: To determine possible ways of mitigating greenhouse gases, to explore 
mitigation options available, to determine to which extent they can reduce carbon and to what 
cost. 
Outcome: Two scenarios were created; Growth Without Constraints; and Required by 
Science. Later 34% and 42% targets were developed for COP15. 
LTMS is a process that was produced by a group of scientists, government officials, business 
and civil society which was designed for Cabinet to later draw a long term climate policy. 
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Such a policy was intended to provide clear and directed negotiations when they negotiate 
under the UNFCCC. Indeed conclusion of the process produced a Scenario Document (SD) 
of the LTMS process which is analysed to respond to the research question of this study. This 
document was later used by the Cabinet to develop the 34% and 42% targets which were 
committed in Copenhagen. According to the SD two scenarios that informed the targets were 
developed as part of the LTMS namely; Growth Without Constraints; and Required by 
Science scenario. In the ‘Growth Without Constraints’ scenario the scenario team asked; 
what would the SA economy and its greenhouse emissions look like in 2050? In other words 
this scenario focused on SA’s economic performance in 2050 if carbon emissions reduction 
were not considered. In the ‘Required by Science’ scenario the question was asked; if SA had 
all the resources and technology at its disposal to contribute to the global mitigation efforts 
that is required to stabiles the climate, what could it achieve by? Table 24 below present the 
characteristics of both scenarios.  
Table 28 Long Term Mitigation Scenarios 
Scenario Description 
Growth Without Constraints  SA’s emissions in the base year 2003 stand at 440 
megatons of CO2-eq. By 2050 our emissions have 
quadrupled to around 1600 Mt per year. 
 Overall fuel consumption grows more than five-
fold, mainly in the industry and transport sectors 
there is no incentive for (and therefore no uptake of) 
energy efficiency, despite the potential net savings 
over time, demonstrating the typical market pattern 
of not taking up no-cost strategies. 
 New coal-fired electricity generating plants use 
supercritical steam technology (23 GW, or 7 new 
plants, by 2050) or integrated gasification combined 
cycle (IGCC) 13 (68 GW, or 21 new plants, by 
2050). IGCC becomes attractive as it is only slightly 
more expensive but significantly more efficient than 
supercritical coal technology. Since no carbon 
constraints are imposed, no electricity plants have 
carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
 A total of 9 new conventional nuclear plants are 
built, mostly between 2023 and 2040, adding15 GW 
of new capacity. Twelve modules of PBMR (Pebble 
Bed Modular Reactors) are built for domestic use. 
 Very few renewables enter the electricity mix in this 
Scenario. No electricity is generated from solar, 
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thermal, or wind, with the only significant addition 
being 70 MW of landfill gas. 
Required by Science 
Scenario 
 In this scenario, called the Required by Science 
scenario, South Africa joins the world community in 
taking action to stabilise GHG concentrations, and 
negotiates a target as its fair contribution to this 
shared vision. 
 The IPCC15 tells us that to stabilise GHG 
concentrations, global reductions of between -60% 
to -80% from 1990 levels must be achieved 2100.  
The burden of sharing this target between nations is 
the subject of the international negotiations. 
 For South Africa, emissions would still rise at first, 
but they would have to peak at an appropriate level, 
and sufficiently early, to guarantee the required 
decline to the target range of this scenario. This 
implies large emissions reductions achieved through 
a coordinated mitigation programme at the national 
level with appropriate international assistance. 
 New technologies dominate the electricity 
generation and transport sectors, and the renewable 
and nuclear technologies encountered in the Growth 
without Constraints Scenario are taken up much 
earlier, and at a much larger scale. 
 
 
4.6 Secondary data 
4.6.1 Financial Mail (FM), July 30, 2010 
Topic: Global Warning: Climate change targets too steep for SA economy 
Scope: the article was reviewing SA decision which was announced by the president on the 
6
th
 of December 2009 that SA had committed to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 
and 42% in 2025. The main focus was to reflect the response of business sector, civil society 
and the views of government officials, civil society and business. 
Objectives: to determine whether the targets can be met, to determine what it means for the 
economy, for the cost of energy and state-owned and private companies which will have to 
reduce carbon emissions. 
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Outcome: SA emissions targets chosen in a rush, heavy cost burden for the economy. 
Information presented on this document indicates that amongst other groups, business was 
flabbergasted by the president’s announcements. Civil societies and NGO’s were also amazed 
by the announcement having been involved in the consultation for COP meeting preparation. 
This information has indicated that the decision making was exclusive hence other 
stakeholders were surprised. According to FM President Zuma’s announcement came as a 
surprise to South Africans, SA negotiating team and the international community. SA 
delegates in Copenhagen were also not aware of the decision and they had a different agenda 
going to the negotiations. FM reported: 
But the bigger surprise was that Zuma committed to a numerical target, which 
throughout the pre-Copenhagen consultation process had not been mentioned. Most 
of the local delegates were already in Copenhagen when the statement was issued and 
were shocked that, even before the negotiations had begun, SA had committed to a 
numerical target. 
South Africa was under pressure to commit to targets in order to get other parties from 
developed countries to commit, moreover developing countries were also putting pressure on 
developed countries to make a commitment. As a results China, India and Brazil made 
pledges to mitigate climate change. There was a concern that SA’s commitment might have a 
negative impact on the economy, however FM reports that the commitment was dependent on 
provision of support by developed countries.   
Government officials say SA’s surprise commitment to a numerical target isn’t as 
much of a problem as it looks. In line with the Copenhagen convention, the extent to 
which the action of developing countries will be implemented depends on the 
provision of financial resources, the transfer of technology and capacity building 
support by developed countries. 
Even so private sector’s disagreeable response is an indication that decision making process 
excluded them and other external actors.  This is further reported in the FM. 
Business involved in a pre-Copenhagen consultation process through Business Unity 
SA and state utility Eskom were the most stunned. 
Interview respondents had earlier indicated that the decision making process excluded 
external actors at the political level which only includes cabinet and the president. 
FM admitted that SA’s ambitious targets had a potential to motivate other parties to commit 
to mitigate and play their role, however this commitment appeared to be more of a fantasy 
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when matched with macroeconomic and commercial reality. Unlike China, Brazil and India 
whose economy was blooming at the time, SA didn’t have such confidence economically.  
FM reported that percentages of the targets numbers were developed by the Energy Research 
Centre (ERC) from the LTMS process which involved consultation with government and 
business. The targets were based on the peak plateau decline trajectory which was decided by 
the cabinet. FM further reports that: 
In mid- 2008 cabinet agreed that emissions would peak by 2020, plateau and then 
decline in absolute terms. The ERC reworked the scenarios, taking into account 
government’s decision to build two new massive coal-fired power stations of Medupi 
and Kusile, each expected to emit an additional 30 Mt of CO² . 
The peak plateau decline trajectory was based on the BAU which the climate change scenario 
built on economic growth. The 34% of the 2020 target was calculated per sector as indicated 
by FM below: 
“Industry could take responsibility for 8% of the 34% reduction (23% of the total effort); 
electricity generation 6,6% (19% of the total effort); and the liquid fuels sector 7,9% (23% of 
the total effort) by 2020”.    
According to FM SA business was not only shocked but they were also aggrieved by this 
announcement because of these two reasons: business had always stressed even during the 
LTMS consultation that scenarios cannot be used to set a policy because they are based on 
assumptions and estimations; and even if SA was to reduce carbon by 34% there was no 
technology in place for capturing of carbon up to the amount the scenario had estimated. 
In accordance with the 34% and 42%, wind energy, solar thermal plant and nuclear plant 
were considered as alternatives to coal generated energy. According to FM both wind energy 
and solar thermal energy could not generate 100 MW compared to Eskom’s 42 000 MW 
capacity when estimated. Moreover both wind and solar thermal energy proved to be much 
more expensive than coal which is another challenge for the SA economy. In contrast with 
this belief, FM reports that civil society was convinced that existing renewable energy and 
solar thermal power plants provide alternatives. The overall view of the FM was that  SA’s 
approach to achieving the 34% was very vague and unclear. 
Findings from the FM document indicates that government’s decision making is exclusive to 
top officials and that government viewed the LTMS as sufficient consultation with 
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stakeholders and therefore decision making on climate is an internal process that excludes 
external actors.    
Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter presented findings of the study from data collected through 
interviews and documents. Data was presented in this manner: part one resented all the data 
from interviews, and part two presented data from documents. The following chapter 5 
present the analysis of the data that was presented in chapter 4. It begins with repetition of the 
research question and re-statement of research objectives, it then presents data according to 
the six major themes that emerged during data analysis and lastly it connects the themes with 
Allison and Zelikow’s models. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Analysis 
5.0 Introduction 
In recent years there has been a conspicuous increase of climate change obligations in the 
South African foreign policy agenda. As such South Africa (SA) has also been highly visible 
in the climate change multilateral system. In 2009 at the COP15 in Copenhagen SA made a 
startling announcement, they were committing to reduce carbon emission by 34 % in 2020 
and 42% in 2025. This announcement seemed implausible to both domestic and international 
audiences considering that SA is a developing country with a high carbon intensive economy 
which is also faced with multiple social and economic challenges such as poverty, 
unemployment and equality. Taking into account that this was a foreign policy decision, it is 
imperative to understand how foreign policy decision making on international climate change 
obligations function in SA. The study then pursues to answer the main research question 
stated as follows: How does South African Government decide on its international climate 
change obligations? 
In an attempt to answer this question, the study then followed the guidelines of the following 
objectives: (i) to understand how foreign policy decision making works; (ii) to determine 
government’s foreign policy key actors particularly on climate change; and (iii) to determine 
who the president’s advisors are on climate change. 
The study’s literature review was informed by Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) triple models 
namely; Rational Actor model I; Organisational model II; and Governmental Politics model 
III (see chapter 2). These three models were reviewed in order to understand foreign policy 
decision making process in SA in the context of international climate change obligations. The 
application of these three models in this study was intended to explain the decision making 
process of the SA government as suggested by Allison and Zelikow (1999) in the following 
manner. Explain the decision by recounting the aims and calculations of the nation; to explain 
the decision as an output of large organisations operating according to standardised behavior; 
and lastly to explain the decision as a result of bargaining games among players in the 
national government. Allison and Zelikow (1999) have used the triple models to examine 
decision making process by applying these models to the historical seminal event of the 
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Cuban Missile Crisis. The conceptual models provided allowance for Allison and Zelikow 
(1999) to explain the central riddle of the crisis by combing out different important factors. 
As a member of the United Nations Framework for Climate Change (UNFCCC) and as a 
responsible global citizen, SA is expected to make a substantial contribution towards climate 
change mitigation. This obligation is also reflected in the National Climate Change Response 
Policy (NCCRP) (White Paper) and the South African Foreign Policy document. Literature 
has revealed that as a non-Annexure 1 country, SA is not obligated to a legally binding 
commitment but is required to set its own carbon emission targets (see chapter 2). It is 
against this background that SA voluntarily committed itself to reduce carbon emissions by 
34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. Findings have revealed that SA is one of the biggest emitters 
due to its carbon intensive economy dominated by energy based productions. As such SA is 
responsible for an estimated 500 million metric tons of carbon dioxide per annum to the 
atmosphere (see chapter 2 page 22).  
In the previous chapter (chapter 4-data presentation) findings from different informants were 
presented and in this chapter analysis data is presented, analysed and theoretical implications 
are discussed. Thematic analysis was used for interviews and Content analysis for documents 
was also used. Wagner et al. (2012: 231) describes Thematic analysis as a general approach 
used to analyse qualitative data by creating themes or patterns in data. In Content analysis 
raw data is coded and categories are constructed which capture the relevant characteristics of 
the content of the document (Merriam, 2009: 205). Thematic analysis suits this case study in 
that the researcher aims to understand the process of decision making in South African 
foreign policy. The aim is therefore to construct meanings from themes. Content analysis was 
also favored because it afforded the researcher the opportunity to extract meaning from the 
selected documents (see chapter 4). 
The three main objectives were used as a foundation to support major themes which emerged 
from the research findings. Accordingly the findings were interpreted and analysed in the 
following manner. Themes were extracted from understanding the functions of foreign policy 
decision making in South Africa; themes were also extracted from government foreign policy 
key actors in South Africa; and lastly themes were extracted from the president’s advisors on 
climate change. Subsequently main themes were also extracted from the following 
documents: the National Climate Change Response Policy (White Paper); the Long Term 
Mitigation Scenario; and Financial Mail article. A critical analysis of theoretical implications 
107 
 
of this research was done using the Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) triple models namely 
Rational Actor model I, Organisational Behavior model II and Governmental Politics model 
III. 
Allison and Zelikow (1999) offered this study a window through which the decision could be 
looked at, in three different dimensions. While the authors praise the Rational Actor model 
for its effectiveness in the analysis of decision making process, they also emphasize the 
application that the three models allow the analysts to penetrate not only individuals but large 
governmental organisations and political actors. As such Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) 
conceptual models were adopted for theoretical consideration for SA foreign policy decision 
making on climate change.  
5.1 Understanding the functions of foreign policy decision making in 
climate change 
This objective of the study sought to establish the understanding of the functions of foreign 
policy decision making in climate change from the informants. Whilst the responses and 
views of people in this regard were copious, the political decision and conditional 
commitments in climate change were singled out as major recurring themes after the open 
and axial coding system for analysis in this study. However, it is also important to mention 
that national goals, developing country, progressive leadership and higher ambition in climate 
change were some of the views that came out from different informants. Thus, in this section, 
the political decision and conditional commitments are going to be interpreted and analyzed 
as the major areas that came out of the informants. 
5.1.1 Theme 1: Political decision 
Informants of the study indicated that South Africa’s decision to commit to reduce carbon 
emissions was a political decision. This view seems to suggest that SA was pursuing its 
international political objectives when deciding to make the announcement of committing to 
reduce carbon emissions. Consequently, this view can be linked with two SA Foreign Policy 
objectives namely; to participate in the Global System of Governance; and Strengthening 
South-South Cooperation (Landsberg, 2014). The Global System of Governance objective 
was said to be met through ‘continuing active engagement within global governance political, 
economic and sustainable development issues’ and Strengthen South-South Cooperation 
would be achieved by building relationships with regional and sub-regional groups in the 
South (Lansberg, 2014: 164). Both these objectives were reiterated by different informants 
108 
 
from different categories (see chapter 4, table 1). For instance when asked why SA made the 
decision to tackle climate change, INT4M-1 indicated: 
You look at other people’s perspective, for example there was a view that said 
politically, it was decided that SA needed to indicate a higher ambition in order to 
paddle with pace for Denmark. As the host and chair UNFCCC needed SA to raise its 
profile and establish its case as a country in climate change mitigation at 
Copenhagen. But we noticed that around the same time BRICS had started to assert 
itself globally as an important voice and it takes up development issues around that 
time as well, from political issues to development issues as well. 
And INT4F-2 shared the same view: 
We were pursuing an agenda, we were pursuing South-South cooperation put it in 
that context what was South Africa pursuing in partnerships? So it 2009 this was just 
ahead of the BRICS you got to remember the time frame. COP15 was 2009 SA only 
joined BRICS in 2010 at the very end of 2010 and formally started the first meeting in 
2011…..But there is …there was a formation of BASIC and emerging powers looking 
at South-South cooperation and promoting the Africa agenda. 
Both informants indicate that SA’s decision to commit to reducing carbon emissions was not 
literally meaning they were taking actions to reduce carbon emissions but it was a political 
decision intended to drive SA foreign policy agenda of strengthening sub-regional and 
regional relationship particularly with emerging economies such as BRICS, BASIC and 
Africa. It appears that SA assumed a directional approach when making the decision: first, 
SA’s decision was driven by a particular motive to stimulate other parties of the UNFCCC to 
commit to reduce carbon emissions by taking a national position that would indicate the 
country’s willingness to tackle climate change while ensuring that the country’s economy is 
not exposed to detrimental effects of climate change decisions, second SA had to position 
itself with emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil for the country’s economic 
enhancement. However this explanation still fails to explain the low levels of participation of 
external stakeholders such as business, NGO’s, civil society and academics in the decision 
making process. 
 The decision making process didn’t consider the implications the decision would have on 
development and the economy of the country. The justification provided by government 
officials for this approach was that decision making evolves in two phases: the first phase 
involves internal and external actors and the second phase of decision making involves the 
cabinet and president only (see chapter 4). Concerning participation in the decision making 
process, Allison and Zelikow (1999: 326-328) do not provide a standard structure, however 
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they do make a comparative distinction between the American decision making actors and 
the Soviet decision making actors, highlighting that the Soviet decision making group is 
exclusive and smaller while the American is inclusive and larger. Thus decision making 
processes differ within countries and the South African process is highly exclusive. It can be 
deduced that SA political decisions on climate excludes external actors limiting participation 
to ministers and the president. 
As already been projected from chapter one the problem of the study is to explain why SA 
committed to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025. It is therefore 
concluded that political considerations were the rationale behind South Africa’s decision to 
commit to reducing carbon emissions and excludes external decision makers. This political 
decision has its background in South African foreign policy. The SA decision to commit to 
reducing carbon emissions can be explained as a political decision to fulfil SA foreign policy 
objectives. 
5.1.2 Theme 2: Conditional commitments 
According to the informants, SA’s commitment to reduce carbon emissions was conditional. 
This view suggest that SA’s decision was merely a display for  recognition in climate change 
governance and most importantly to trigger and encourage others to take action by making 
significant commitments to reducing carbon emissions. Hence the statement by the President 
Jacob Zuma on the 6 December 2009 (National Climate Change Response Policy, 2011: 25): 
 South Africa will implement mitigation actions that will collectively result in a 34% 
and a 24% deviation below its ‘Business As Usual’ emissions growth trajectory by 
2020 and 2025 respectively. In accordance with Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC, the 
extent in which the outcomes can be achieved depends on the extent to which 
developed countries meet their commitment to provide financial, capacity- building, 
technology development and technology transfer support to developing countries. 
Indeed this statement is heavily conditional in that SA indicated its willingness to actively 
participate in addressing climate change but immediately attached a condition indicating this 
action will only be implemented if developed countries actively participate by providing 
support. Consequently, this approach compels one to look deeper into what SA was 
anticipating by proposing a conditional commitment. An analyst would ask; what was SA 
triggering by putting forward a conditional commitment? And what was SA de-triggering? In 
this instance SA was aiming to trigger vigorous participation from developed countries in 
order to address climate change challenges by committing to support developing countries in 
their mitigation efforts. Informants had indicated that negotiations had been going on for 21 
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years without any substantial agreement between the parties and SA took the lead by putting 
forward a conditional commitment in order to encourage parties to commit to addressing 
climate change. This view was relayed by INT4F-2: 
But like I said it could be on the one side trying to demonstrate SA commitment to 
being part of the multilateral negotiations to say “look developing countries are 
taking an active role in reducing emissions therefore we also require developed 
countries to take more of a role, look what we are doing, look at what India is doing 
and look at what China is doing they are committing to these reductions” 
And then INT1M-2: 
So at that time we were one of the so called progressive ones, we still are. We would 
have wanted to send a positive signal to say we are prepared to take mitigation 
seriously, because if you look at Copenhagen we were more ambitious at the time. 
Subsequently, in the absence of direction and significant commitment by developed 
countries, SA grabbed the opportunity to provide direction that all parties could follow by 
announcing the commitment itself and challenging others to participate. Not only did SA 
volunteer to act but it also provided areas of opportunity for developed countries to 
participate by supporting SA to meet their targets. Contrary to this explanation, other scholars 
have argued extensively about SA’s leadership personality at the COP15 in Copenhagen. For 
instance Death (2011) in her article extensively discusses SA’s budding interest in global 
environmental issues specifically looking at the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable 
Development in 2002, COP15 in 2009 and COP17 in 2011. Death (2011) offers an interesting 
yet intriguing explanation for this growing interest in which she argues that this kind of 
leadership displayed by SA in Copenhagen is grounded on symbolic and opportunistic 
leadership. Even though the commitment is conditional, the decision making process was 
treated with high secrecy.  
5.2 The Government’s foreign policy key actors on climate change in South 
Africa 
The other objective of the study was to determine key SA government’s actors on climate 
change from the information provided by the informants. Numerous themes emerged from 
collected data, but only two themes were selected based on their frequency of their 
occurrence. Internal Process and Climate Negotiations emerged as two major recurring 
themes under this objective. In the same manner, other themes that emerged in this category 
such as decision making and developing country were also noted. Therefore Internal Process 
and Climate Negotiations will be analysed as emerging themes of this objective. 
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5.2.1 Theme 1: Internal process 
Informants of the study indicated that internal process was a critical aspect in the outcome of 
the decision for SA to commit to reduce carbon emissions. This theme suggests that several 
governmental processes produced this decision. Meaning, governmental procedures and 
processes were a build up to the outcome of the decision. It emerged from the informants that 
this decision was a process which started through a process called LTMS which was 
explained earlier. The process led by Department of Environmental Affairs was characterized 
by vast consultation with different stakeholders such as government departments, business, 
academics, unions and civil society. Subsequently, two scenarios were produced from this 
process namely; Growth without Constraints; and Required by Science. Informants indicated 
that these scenarios were accepted and approved by the Cabinet and thereafter presented to 
the President. It is from these two scenarios that the 34% and 42% were generated and was 
later presented as SA’s negotiating position in Copenhagen. Even though this was a 
consultative process the final decision of the targets was made at a political level with an 
exclusion of the stakeholders as it only involves ministers and the president.  
Informants indicated that in climate change international and domestic issues both DEA and 
DIRCO lead the process. The ministers of these departments inform and advise the president 
on technical climate change issues and a negotiation position that SA could pursue. DEA 
would lead in domestic processes and provide technical expertise for international 
negotiations and DIRCO would lead in political positioning of the country’s negotiations. 
Empirically, the process procedurally starts with research by DEA, consultation with 
different stakeholders and then recommendations are presented to the President. President, 
ministers and government official become the core actors in climate change decision making 
process whereas others such as business, civil society, academics and unions are participating 
actors in the consultation process. Earlier in chapter 2 (Foreign policy actors) two South 
African scholars namely; Susan Booysen (2007) and John Siko (2014) provided a cross-cut 
structure of South African foreign policy actors. Both authors confirm what has been 
indicated by informants that the process is quite consultative. 
Findings indicated that government officials, civil society, business and academics don’t 
exert much influence on climate change foreign policy decision issues as they are excluded 
from top level decision making. Internal processes limit participation of external actors to 
technical discussion but exclude them from political decision making processes. However 
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these stakeholders were consulted in the development of LTMS policy which informed the 
decision. INT1M-3 provided a glimpse of the process:  
The decision making process, it will sometimes be bottom up, when the political 
stance and information is taken it will come from the top, it’s what the cabinet 
requires of us. In terms of process, you are to put proposals by way of, because 
administrative justice has to be done, you write down either a proposal which you 
would refer to as a submission and justify it in terms of the analysis. 
And INT1M-1earlier indicated: 
You only inform decisions so for instance if you putting a decision for your minister, 
you put forward recommendations. Only officials make decisions, top officials make 
policy decisions, policy is politics by its nature. Typical decision is when I want 
have… looking for a policy decision from minister we would put together 
recommendations the minister with as much information and we would make 
recommendations to say minister we would like you to consider this, we would like 
you to consider this. 
Therefore it can be deducted that the internal process in foreign policy decision making in 
climate is exclusive of multi-stakeholder participation. However it does encourage 
consultation at lower level which doesn’t exert significant influence on the decision making 
process.  
5.2.2 Theme 2: Climate negotiations 
Informants of the study indicated that deciding on a country’s position for climate change 
negotiations evolved in two phases: first, intense consultation was done with the multi-
stakeholders producing the LTMS which was to guide SA delegates when negotiating for 
climate. Two, contributions from multi-stakeholder consultation were presented to the cabinet 
for decision making at political level which excludes all the other external actors. This 
process lead us to the conclusion that stakeholders who were involved during the 
development of LTMS were not involved in the development of 34% and 42% targets which 
were committed in Copenhagen during the climate change negotiations which explains the 
shock and surprised reaction from stakeholders. The FM reported about the response of 
business when the decision was announced. 
Business involved in pre- Copenhagen consultation process through Business Unity 
SA and Eskom, on which the burden may fall, were most stunned. 
This statement indicates that external stakeholders were excluded from high level decision 
making process. One informant mentioned that even the SA delegates who were already in 
Copenhagen were surprised by the President’s announcement stating that government 
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officials at lower levels were also excluded from the decision to set the 34% and 42% targets. 
The informant was also quick to indicate that process doesn’t allow lower level officials to 
decide but their role is to inform decision making. In this case DEA informed the minister 
and cabinet however they didn’t have an idea of the final decision. 
The 34% and 42% targets were presented as SA’s negotiating position in Copenhagen, 
however SA couldn’t achieve their intended goal to get other parties to commit to reduce 
carbon emissions at the climate negotiations due to resistance from major economies. To 
fulfil with eagerness the requirements of the UNFCCC, the study revisited the International 
Relations theories (see chapter 2). The realist behavior and approach is visible in the 
negotiations particularly amongst the developed countries such as the USA whose hegemonic 
characteristics dominates and influence the outcome of the COP meetings. As Allison and 
Zelikow (1990) report it, realist pursues power and therefore protection of their countries’ 
interest. And later McGowan and Nel (2002) argued that for realist’ power is a major factor. 
USA’s negotiation position contradicts that of developing countries, because of how these 
parties interpret equality. USA has always maintained that countries with emerging 
economies should receive the same treatment as developed countries which have resulted in 
non-agreement outcomes of COPs meetings. Furthermore, the failure of climate change 
negotiations to produce a tangible deal on climate change mitigations can be explained by the 
institutionalism failure. Institutionalist assumes that cooperation of states should be structured 
by international institutions (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). The UNFCCC regime has not been 
successful in coordinating a collaborative platform to encourage nations to address the 
climate change problem, instead countries like USA seem to take over and want to shape the 
outcome of negotiations and resist committing to supporting developing countries in their 
mitigation responsibilities. It is under this view that SA took a lead and announced their 
commitment in order to encourage others to do so. 
5.3 The President’s advisors on climate change in South Africa 
The last objective of the study was to determine those who advise the president on climate 
change issues. Two major themes were selected even though there were numerous other 
themes. Decision making and Internal Politics are the two major themes which are as two 
emerging themes under this objective.  
5.3.1 Theme 1: Decision making 
According to the informants, decision making is a critical aspect of the decision making 
process on climate. Each country has its own unique process of making international 
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decisions. Hill (2003: 52) put forward a plausible proposition for foreign policy analysis that 
in order to fully understand what a state does it is necessary to do a comparative assessment 
between their domestic context and international position and between the problem faced and 
the nature of the decision making process employed to handle it. Indeed, decision making of 
a country on foreign policy issues is very much influenced by what the country intends to 
achieve in the international system. As indicated by informants, political decision making on 
international climate change issues is highly exclusive in SA with only ministers and the 
president as actors. Therefore other parties such as businesses, civil societies, unions, 
academics and official government official do not influence decision making on international 
climate change. However ministers are afforded the opportunity to influence the outcome 
since they are mandated to advise the president; particularly the minister of DEA who is a 
champion on climate change issues. DIRCO minister is also a prominent advisor on 
international climate change negotiations. According to Hill (2003) the minister of foreign 
affairs is the chief of foreign policy operations. 
 Based on the information provided by informants, the process leading to Copenhagen 
decision can be narrated in this manner. The decision making process was launched with an 
intensive consultative process which involved government officials, business, civil society, 
unions and academics, all contributed by providing input on SA’s negotiating position.  
However it failed to include other stakeholders when the 34% and 42% decision was made.  
5.3.2 Theme 2: Internal politics 
Informants of this study indicated that internal politics in the form of competition was present 
in decision making process. It was indicated that ministers may differ in opinion and may try 
to influence a decision that would favour their departmental agendas. However this influence 
doesn’t have a significant impact on the outcome of the decision as it is managed within a 
ministerial committee. Having said that, one cannot deny the existence of political actors in 
foreign policy decision making process, these political actors are ministers who advice and 
inform the president. Alden and Alan (2012: 33) argue that political actors consider 
implications of a foreign policy decision on their departmental portfolio, further 
‘bureaucracies also derive influence over foreign policy from their positions in the power-
sharing compromising state and government, in which these large organisations and political 
actors have individual interests’. Interest might be a political actor’s departmental goals and 
objectives. INT4M-1 had indicated that ministers compete and influence the process to 
produce an outcome that will favour their departmental activities, this is narrated below: 
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There is competition amongst them at a lower level, in the entire process there is a lot of 
contestation because there are different concerns that comes in. Department of water affairs 
wants to use this climate change thing to garner more support for its water plans and staff. 
Similarly the country’s cabinet committee there is a lot of competition in cabinet committee 
and that is where… 
5.4 Document analysis on climate change in South Africa 
Supplementary to interviews, documentary analysis was also conducted to respond to the 
research question: How does South African government decide its international 
environmental climate change obligations? Three documents were perused namely NCCRP, 
LTMS, and a secondary document – a Financial Mail article. According to Wagner et al. 
(2012) documents can be primary, secondary and tertiary. Documentary data for this study 
was gathered from primary and secondary data, primary data included the NCCRP and also 
the LTMS policy. Secondary data was gathered from an FM article titled: “Global Warning: 
Climate change targets too high for SA economy” which discussed a recollection of how the 
decision to commit, was made. The following section analyses the findings of the three 
documents. 
5.4.1 Document 1: National Climate Change Response Policy (White Paper) 
The NCCRP was created after the 34% and 42% was announced in Copenhagen. As the 
NCCRP states that it was develop in order to promote mitigation and adaptation measures 
that will make development to be sustainable and in socio-economic and environmental 
terms. The policy presents the South African government’s vision for an effective climate 
change response and the long-term, just transition to a climate resilient and lower-carbon 
economy and society. The NCCRP was analysed for this study and two major themes 
emerged; Mitigation Process; and Carbon Emissions which are discussed below. 
5.4.1.1 Mitigation process 
Mitigation process emerged as one of the major themes of the study. The NCCRP indicate 
that mitigation was the main reason SA made the decision to commit to reducing carbon 
emissions 34% and 42% in 2020 and 2025. The NCCRP plainly state that ‘South Africa is 
committed to contribute its fair share to the global GHG mitigation efforts in order to keep 
temperatures increase well below 2 degrees Celsius’ (NCCRP, 2011). It was against this 
background that the president made the announcement that SA was committing to reduce 
carbon emissions as part of SA’s fair share. However the 34% and 42% has not yet been 
implemented even though six years have passed since the announcement was made; instead 
government has since built two coal generated electricity plants Medupi and Kusile which 
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generate more tons of carbon. Consequently, SA is now faced with a dilemma of balancing 
economic growth and carbon reductions. Triangulating this information to the Copenhagen 
decision, it indicates that mitigation of climate was not the main rationale behind the decision 
to commit to reduce carbon emissions. This view was also highlighted by INT3M-1: 
It would have resulted in much accelerated implementation of the NCCRWP plans, 
since each target assigned to other departments is slipping already and target dates 
passed years ago. 
This statement support the view that the commitment was not meant to be implemented but a 
statement to indicate that SA is serious about climate change. It also seems that these targets 
have been abandoned considering the fact that South Africa submitted Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution (INDC) which basically contains SA intended mitigation and 
adaptation goals based on the peak plateau decline trajectory and NCCRP principles (INDC, 
2015). Even though SA is a responsible global country who is serious about climate change 
mitigation, the Copenhagen commitment was not solely intended for this reason only.    
5.4.1.2 Carbon emissions 
Carbon emission emerged as one of the major theory under this objective. Most respondents 
indicate that there is an urgent need to stabilize global carbon emissions which can be 
achieved through a global effort from all nations. Government officials emphasised that SA 
as a responsible global citizen was responding to the call by the UNFCCC to reduce carbon 
emissions when the decision was made. According to the NCCRP (see chapter 4) it was on 
this ground that the President announced SA’s position to reduce carbon emission and 
committed to numbers. Carbon reduction alone cannot be accepted as the explanation for the 
decision made by SA government but the study also considers the explanation that the 
decision was also politically orientated.  
5.4.2 Document 2: Long Term Mitigation Scenarios (LTMS) 
An LTMS was developed to produce a sound scientific analysis that would inform 
development of a policy. This document consists of two scenarios namely Growth without 
Constraints and Required by Science; both which produced the 34% and 42% targets. The 
LTMS was produced in 2007 and the targets were developed in 2009. The document also 
consists of a range of options that SA could explore to reduce carbon emissions such as 
renewable energy, wind energy and carbon tax. Arguably, the document failed to consider the 
political implications of climate change mitigation. For instance LTMS is based on the 
assumption that developed countries are required by UNFCCC to support developing 
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countries with finance, technology and capacity, of which this requirement has been the 
deterrent in the climate change negotiations due to unwillingness of developed countries to 
commit. The document also ignored technology evolution and development, the scenarios are 
limited to the technology that was perceived to be available at the time of the LTMS 
development. Both these factors namely political impact and technology would hinder SA to 
achieve the 34% and 42% targets. The LTMS was developed by a SBG (see Chapter 2) 
which comprised of government officials, business, NGO’s, academics, civil society and 
trade unions, it was then presented to the cabinet as a guideline for SA negotiating position. 
The LTMS was used to develop the 34% and 42% targets by the Energy Research Centre on 
the cabinets behalf. FM reported:   
Winkler’s unit at the University of Cape Town, the Energy Research Centre (ERC) is the 
group that did the technical work for the 34% target.  
However the stakeholders were excluded from the decision in which targets were developed 
and hence they were surprised. It is highlighted in the FM document that: 
The “internationalization” of scenarios didn’t please business ‘we had always stressed that 
these were just scenarios. Scenarios make many assumptions that is how scenarios work. You 
can’t use that information to set policy’ says a businessman who took part in the scenario 
process. 
This brings us to the conclusion that even though initial development of LTMS was 
consultative, the decision to commit to 34% and 42% excluded participation of multi-
stakeholders and was made a cabinet issue instead of being a national issue. 
5.5 Theoretical implications of the study 
What can we learn by applying Allison and Zelikow’s triple models namely Rational Actor 
model I, Organisational Behavior model II and Governmental Politics model III in the South 
African decision making process on international climate change obligations? The main aim 
of the study was to gain understanding of SA decision making process on international 
climate change obligations. Can the three models offered by Allison and Zelikow deepen 
understanding of the SA decision making process? To recap, the Rational Actor model 
focuses on goals and objectives of the nation; Organisational Behavior model puts more 
emphasis on organisational outputs, to processes and procedures and their existing functions 
and systems; and lastly the Governmental Politics model focuses attention on the behavior of 
individuals and their interest in national government. In the methodology chapter (see 
chapter 3), the Copenhagen decision was identified as a case study for application of the 
three models. 
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In the following section the study will apply the three models to the Copenhagen decision 
based on the findings collected through interviews and documents. 
5.5.1 Rational Actor Model I 
In this model the study focused on the problem the state was trying to solve when the 
decision was made. In Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
under the Rational Actor model I they modeled their question in this manner; what problem 
was the state trying to solve? Consequently looking at the Copenhagen decision made by SA 
it is clear that this decision was well calculated. This view is supported by few respondents 
who indicated that the Copenhagen decision was thought through, that options and 
alternatives were weighed and consequences were considered. Initially the Copenhagen 
decision appeared problematic when viewed at face value in that it contained economic 
implications and was high risk for the SA government. However findings indicated that 
economic implication were considered based on the fact that the decision was not intended 
for implementation, but for political reasons to trigger action from other parties such as 
developed countries. This was earlier stressed by INT1M-3: 
So it was the next best option at the time, it was cautionary captured to have the safe 
guards that I have alluded to. So we were not exposing our economies our 
developments you know, without putting in place checks and balances against this. 
And then INT2M-4: 
Personally I think it was a good choice to stimulate the ambitions. We should all be 
concerned that climate change issue is a real issue. So it’s a real issue… you can see 
the drought right now, there are many consequences of climate change. 
And also INT4F-4: 
I don’t… if you look back at it now I don’t think it mattered either way. I mean back 
then it was used as a means to demonstrate as I said SA’s particular pursuit on the 
role. But did they have a choice to something else or this is what they have been 
working towards? Eeh… this was the figures on the table this was the report that was 
presented. 
As indicated by the respondent SA was looking out for the country’s interest by pursuing 
national goals and objectives by suggesting their willingness to mitigate climate change to 
ensure SA, its citizens and its environment is protected from the risk of climate change. SA 
was also leading by example by encouraging others to take actions against climate change 
when all parties were unable to reach an agreement. Allison and Zelikow (1999: 18) 
suggested four core concepts (see chapter 2) associated with the rational actor model namely; 
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goals and objectives, alternatives, consequences and choice. These four concepts have been 
identified in the Copenhagen decision to reduce carbon emissions by 34% and 42% in 2020 
and 2025. First, SA had well-articulated goals and objectives which were intended to be 
achieved when the Copenhagen decision was made, for instance the decision was meant to 
lobby for support on climate change mitigation from developed countries, to get all parties 
participating and to take action against climate change. Most informants indicated that SA 
had alternatives or other options from which they chose their decision from. As Allison and 
Zelikow (1999: 18) states ‘the rational agent must choose among a set of alternatives 
displayed before him or her’. This was visible in the responses given by INT1M3:  
We had an option to say we want to put forward assistance on the adaptation side 
because looking at the nature of that pledge its more mitigation centric it’s about 
reducing GHG emissions by certain percentages that are stated and the pledge does 
not address the side of adaptation. 
And also INT1M4: 
Well of course there are always other options they could have had other numbers but 
eventually there had been a process on the mitigation side which is mainly where I 
worked having LTMS for SA the LTMS process which ehm… and out of that many 
other specific options be it renewable energy or nuclear energy for that matter or 
transport options many technical options were examined and then that was done a 
couple of years before Copenhagen meted. 
And finally INT1M1: 
So there was a lot of different options that SA could put forward, in the end they 
elected to go for an economy wide target for. China had efficiency targets, so they 
basically said they would increase their efficiency by this much. 
SA also considered consequences for the Copenhagen decision having calculated the risks 
associated with this decision. For each of the other options consequences were considered 
too. SA was aware that the decision would expose the economy to risks since it is carbon 
intensive economy and carbon reduction would have a negative impact on it. Moreover SA 
was also aware that the announcement of the decision would either receive the anticipated 
reception or a negative reception. The FM reported: 
SA’s commitment to an ambitious target will motivate for more and mitigating actions 
which will be good for SA’s competitiveness in the long run. But the targets are far 
away from commercial and macroeconomics reality. Unlike China, India and Brazil 
whose booming economy mean abundant resources are available for mitigation 
actions, the SA state doesn’t have similar influence. 
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Finally SA’s decision was a well calculated choice where rationality had been applied. 
Informants indicated that the decision was as a result of an intensive consultative LTMS 
process. Decision makers had also sought advice from expects such as the Energy Research 
Centre on the LTMS process and also on the formulation of the 34% and 42% targets. 
5.5.2 Organisational Behavior model II 
Allison and Zelikow (1999:143) argued in their book ‘But a government is not an individual. 
It is not just the president and his entourage, nor even just a presidency and Congress. It is a 
vast conglomerate of loosely allied organisations, each with a substantial life of its own’. 
Accordingly SA government behavior can also be understood according the Organisational 
Behavior model. Departmental processes and procedures were visible in the outcome of the 
Copenhagen decision as well as participation of government agencies. The process began 
with a consultation with different organisations and government agencies which produced the 
LTMS document. This document was recommended to the cabinet and president who later 
used it to develop the 34% and 42% targets. According to informants decision making 
process has levels, departmental officials inform and advise the cabinet or their ministers who 
then advice the president on the best option and its consequences. Referring to this process 
INT1M-3 commented ‘So it’s not a linear kind of a thing but for communication that has to 
go international; for instance it has to go that route and then there would be political aspect 
that come out where the cabinet may require certain things to be done within the space of 
climate change’. The cabinet makes political decisions based on the information provided by 
department officials. 
Departments responsibilities were clear and well-structured for instance DEA was mandated 
with the responsibility of organizing and coordinating consultation with business, academics, 
civil society and NGO’s during the  preparation of COP17 in Copenhagen. DEA organised 
the team for negotiations and ensured that the minister and president had the necessary 
technical information. DIRCO was assigned with the responsibilities to handle the political 
part of negotiations which is to lobby with other parties such as G77 and China, Africa group 
and BASIC group and also to coherence. Other departments such as Energy, Water and 
Agriculture are included when it is necessary, for instance the Department of Energy was 
involved in Copenhagen because there were a lot of technical energy issues that were part of 
the negotiations. Department processes and procedures played a significant role in the 
decision making process of the Copenhagen decision in that involved departments were able 
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to organise themselves and perform all process that were required for the decision making 
process to take place. 
5.5.3 Governmental Politics Model III  
The strength of governmental politics model lies in its ability to explain the role of 
individual’s in government decision making process. Allison and Zelikow (1999: 6) suggest 
that when approaching a decision through this model the focus should be on the players 
whose interest and actions impact the issue in question. In actual fact the focus in 
Organisational Politics model is to discover who did what to whom that resulted in the 
Copenhagen target commitment. Findings indicated that the Copenhagen decision was made 
at the Cabinet level. Other stakeholders were given an opportunity to participate in the LTMS 
development process from which the targets were formulated. As a results FM reported that 
business stakeholders who participated in the LTMS were enraged when the president made 
the announcement about committing to reduce carbon emissions: 
The “internationalising” of targets based on the scenarios didn’t please business. 
“We had always stressed that these were just scenarios, scenarios make many 
assumptions, that is how scenarios work, you can’t use that information to set policy” 
says a business who took part in the scenario process. 
And later reported: 
Most of the local delegates were in Copenhagen when the announcement was made 
and were shocked that before the negotiations began SA had committed to a 
numerical target. 
Both these statements indicate that the decision making process was exclusive, only ministers 
were involved at the political level where climate change decisions are made. Government 
officials and other stakeholders were not part of this process as their participation is limited to 
departmental consultation. However it was indicated that the 34% and 42% targets were 
developed by the Energy Research Center who also provided technical advise on the 
decision. Based on this information it can be concluded that the influence of secondary and 
tertiary actors (see chapter 2) was minimal on this decision; however ministers had greater 
influence on the outcome of the decision. 
5.6 Arriving at the conclusion 
It is evident that the Rational Actor model I had a significant influence in the Copenhagen 
decision. Empirically, the South African government was pursing national interest, it was 
pursuing national goals and objectives, and it was positioning the country in global 
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environmental politics. Organisational processes and procedures were also visible in the 
build-up of the decision and making of the decision by different government departments 
allocated roles was based on the specialization of the department. For instance DEA was the 
champion organising consultations with other stakeholders and informing the cabinet. DEA 
has the responsibility to provide technical knowledge and lead in climate change issues 
domestically, whereas DIRCO leads in negotiations and in political issues internationally. We 
were able to explain the participation process through the Organisational Behavior model.  
This was indicated by most respondents and documents. Therefore the SA decision was well 
explained through the windows of Rational Actor model I and Organisational Behavior 
model II. 
Chapter 6 is the last chapter and presents the conclusion of the study. The settings of chapter 
six begins with the summary of Alison and Zelikow’s triple model, where the contribution of 
these models to the study is further discussed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the research process, it also reflects on the research findings and 
summerises Allison and Zelikow’s models. In the introduction the research question is 
reiterated, emerging issues from the case study are also discussed and data collection process 
is reviewed. Lastly, application of Allison and Zelikow’s to the case study is briefly 
discussed. 
South Africa has emerged as a prominent global citizen whose participation in the global 
environmental politics is increasingly becoming vital to its persuasion of SA’s foreign policy 
agenda. This pattern can be associated with the emergence of a new South Africa post 1994 
which required that SA reposition itself in the international community by reviewing and 
reinventing its foreign policy. SA’s relations with the outside were marked by isolation and 
growing marginalisation by international institutions (Death, 2013). Furthermore, 
estrangement by African counterparts and other countries who were displeased by the 
apartheid regime was visible. Democracy brought an opportunity for SA to re-integrate itself 
to the international community, this was pursued through its re-invented foreign policy and 
diplomacy.  
Since 1994 SA has pursued participation in the multilateral system and as a result participated 
and hosted a number of international events such as World Parks Congress in 2003, World 
Conference against Racism in 2001, UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1999 and 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerances in 2001 (Death, 2011: 457). Since then SA took up the 
role of being a bridge-builder between the North and South, consequently SA assumed this 
role at the UNFCCC since 2009. SA has led climate change negotiations both in Copenhagen 
COP15 of 2009 and in Durban COP17 of 2011 by leading by example and encouraging 
parties to commit to reduce carbon emissions. The announcement made by SA President 
Jacob Zuma in 2009 for carbon emission targets before boarding the plane to Copenhagen 
and during the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen, sent shocks globally and domestically. It was 
surprising that a developing country had committed to numerical targets considering its vast 
economic and development challenges notwithstanding its dependency on coal for electricity 
and production. SA committed to reduce carbon emissions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025.  
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The decision making process leading to this commitment had flaws due to exclusion of 
external actors at the political level where the targets were decided. 
6.2 Conclusion of Allison and Zelikow’s models of Foreign Policy Analysis 
6.2.1 Rational Actor model I 
As indicated in the previous chapter the Rational Actor model views government intricacies 
as a unified actor pursuing national goals and objectives. Rational Actor model involves a 
decision, decider, a choice, alternative and goals: A decision necessitates a decider to make a 
choice out of available alternatives in pursuit of national goals. Additionally, Allison and 
Zelikow (1999:18) associates Rational Actor model with rationality which suggest that 
decision makers are able to think rationally when making decisions, they calculate risks 
associated with alternatives to decide on the best choice. Through this model the study is able 
to explain why SA made the decision to commit to reduce carbon emissions in 2009, the 
study was also able to identify national goals SA government was pursuing when the decision 
was made and  the study discovered there were other alternatives and risks which were 
considered before the choice was made. Consequently, the Rational Actor model was 
adequate for the explanation of the SA decision making process on the commitment to reduce 
carbon emissions by 34% and 42% in 2020 and 2025. 
6.2.2 Organisational Behaviour model II 
This model explains how different organisations within government behave and how they 
contribute in decision making processes. The Organisational Behaviour model immerses into 
government organisational processes and procedures that produces a foreign policy decision. 
The notion is that foreign policy decision is an output of government organisation. This was 
also visible in the SA decision of committing to reduce carbon emissions in that government 
processes and procedures played a significant role. Departmental processes and procedures 
were applied through research which was done by DEA to gather technical knowledge 
required to inform the decision. Participation by different government departments and 
external actors such as academics, NGO’s, civil societies and businesses was done for the 
development of the LTMS which was later used to develop the 34% and 42% targets. The 
Cabinet also had sessions for decision making process where they later advised the president 
on choices to be taken (see chapter 4). This evidence supports the views of this study that a 
part of this decision was as a result of governmental organisation outputs. 
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6.2.3 Governmental Politics model III 
Minimal evidence points to the foreign policy decision making process as political resultant. 
As Allison and Zelikow (1999:255) alluded that the features of this model are competitive 
games where ‘ actors are seen as players: players who focus not on a single strategic issue but 
on may diverse international problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set 
of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organisational, 
and personal goals; players who make government decisions not by single, rational choice but 
by pulling and hauling; that is politics’. 
Summary of results: 
Case study Model I Model II Model III 
South African foreign policy 
decision making on climate 
change 
Yes Yes Partially 
 
6.3 SA government decision making process 
Based on the experience provided by this study, SA’s decision making proved to be unique 
and couldn’t be compared with any other. As indicated earlier in the analysis chapter, the 
decision making process on climate change obligations consists of two phases: phase one was 
charecterised by intense consultation with different stakeholders such as government 
departments, NGO’s, civil societies, academics and businesses who contributed in 
development of the LTMS policy, phase two was a political process which involved only the 
cabinet and the president but excluded external actors. The decision making of SA 
government on carbon emissions reductions by 34% in 2020 and 42% in 2025 was exclusive 
to cabinet and president. 
6.4 Contribution of Allison and Zelikow’s models 
Allison and Zelikow’s triple models have made a significant contribution to this study. The 
Rational Actor model alone provides a powerful explanation of government events relating to 
national goals and objectives but inclusion of organisational process and government politics 
provided more understanding especially in the SA government setting. The latter looks 
deeper into behaviour of organisations within government and behaviour of individuals 
during decision making process. It was inadequate to explain the decision made by SA 
government using the Rational Actor model because of the complexity of the setup of SA 
government. It becomes problematic when one ignores SA’s bureaucratic and democratic 
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system instead focusing on national interest, assuming national government as a unitary body. 
SA is a democratic government which encourages participation of multiparty rather than a 
single party and participation of civil societies and other organisations.  
Even though the models put more emphasis on the national interest in terms if this decision, it 
also provided an opportunity to deepen understanding of government organisational settings. 
Indeed governments are not just individuals but they are made up of different organisations 
and with each organisation allocated a specialty. Subsequently, a government decision is an 
output of collective efforts of different government organisation. Similarly, different 
government department such as DEA, DIRCO, Water and Energy brought in the technical 
element that informed this decision. Furthermore, processes such as consultation, 
organisation of negotiating team, organisation of cabinet committee and procedures of the 
decision making played a significant role in the outcome of the decision. 
The contribution of Governmental Politics model cannot be ignored in government foreign 
policy decision making, however this model was not dominant in the SA government 
decision making process due to similar interest of the decision making actors. SA government 
includes cabinet members of the same party, the ruling party and therefore competition is 
minimal because the interest of the ruling party and the government are similar.  
6.5 Recommendation 
The researcher recommends that future studies of similar nature focus more on the political 
level of foreign policy decision making on climate change where cabinet members exert 
influence on the outcome of the decision. Such a study should put more emphasis on 
behaviour of cabinet members, personality of the president and the process itself. There is 
also a need to deepen understanding of the participation of the private sector on foreign 
policy decisions relating to climate change since reduction of carbon emissions affects them 
the most. In terms of Allison and Zelikow’s models, the models do not consider the history of 
countries such as SA which has contributed immensely on its decision making settings. And 
lastly capturing of institutions such as the UNFCCC is necessary for the explanation of 
decision processes on climate change. 
6.6 Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, application of Allison and Zelikow’s (1999) models on the analysis of foreign 
policy decision making process on climate change is highly recommended especially in 
Africa, however this must be content specific so that it yields better results. The use of the 
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three models in one study provides a powerful explanation about the state, government 
processes and bureaucracies within government. A more political approach is needed to 
address climate change issues as climate change has become a political matter rather than an 
environmental matter. 
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Appendix  
1.0 Interviews analysis 
Thematic analysis- coding and themes 
1.1 Rational Actor Model 1 
Why did South African government make the decision to tackle climate change? 
Conditional Commitment CC CC x12 CC 
Addressing Problem AP AP x7  
Decision Making DM DM x5  
Carbon Emissions Reduction CE CE x11  
Climate Negotiations CN CN x6  
Peak Plateau Decline PPD PPD x4  
Key Players KP KP x1  
Multilateral System MS MS x4  
International Pressure IP IP x3  
Economic Impact EI EI x8  
 
What international problem was South Africa trying to solve? 
Themes Codes Open-ended coding Axial coding 
Climate Negotiations CN CN x6  
International Pressure IP IP x4  
Progressive Leadership PL PL x3  
Peak Plateau Decline PPD PPD x2  
Multilateral Systems MS MS x5  
International System IS IS x3  
Addressing Problem AP AP x9  
Climate Injustice CI CI x13 CI 
Political Pressure PP PP x1  
Higher Ambition HA HA x2  
Political decision PD PD x6  
Conditional Commitment CC CC x6  
Policy Development PDV PDV x4  
Carbon Emissions CE CE x16 CE 
Economic Impact EI EI x11  
Responsible Citizen RC RC x4  
Developing Country DC DC x7  
 
Themes Codes Open coding Axial coding 
National Goals NG NG x10  
Developing Country DC DC x3  
Political Decision PD PD x11 PD 
Progressive Leadership PL PL x7  
Higher Ambition HA HA x8  
Assumption Based AB AB x5  
International System IS IS x6  
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What other options did South Africa have to address this issue? 
Addressing Problem AP AP x10 AP 
Policy Development PDV PDV x7  
Multilateral Systems MS MS x2  
Climate Negotiations CN CN x4  
Carbon Emissions CE CE x7  
Government Consultation GC GC x1  
Other Options OP OP x11 OP 
Conditional Commitment CC CC x6  
International System IS IS x1  
Decision Making DM DM x4  
Policy Development PDV PDV x7  
Progress Leadership PL PL x1  
National Goals NG NG x1  
Implementation  IMP IMP x5  
Higher Ambition HA HA x1  
 
What was South African government’s best choice under the conditions? 
Government Consultation GC GC x3  
Economic Impact EI EI x3  
Conditional Commitment CC CC x4  
Political Decision PD PD x1  
Policy Development PDV PDV x3  
Decision making DM DM x3  
Multilateral System MS MS x7 MS 
Addressing Problem AP AP x4  
Domestic Response DR DR x1  
Developing Country DC DC x5  
Internal Process IP IP x8 IP 
Carbon Emission CE CE x4  
Implementation IMP IMP x1  
Higher Ambition HA HA x 2  
National Goals NG NG x  
Other Options OP OP x2  
 
1.2 Organisational Behaviour Model II 
What role did organisations and agencies play in the making of this decision? That is 
setting of the 34% and 42% targets? 
Themes Codes Open-coded Axial 
Conditional Commitment CC CC x2  
Internal Process IP IP x17 IP 
Decision Making DM DM x3  
Policy Development PDV PDV x2  
Carbon Emissions CE CE x1  
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Political Decision PD PD x3  
Climate Negotiations AP CN x4 CN 
Government Consultation GC GC x2  
Decision Making DM DM x3  
Multilateral System MS MS x1  
 
What capabilities and constraints did organisational procedures and pressures exert on 
the decision making process? 
Theme Codes Open-coded Axial 
Decision Making DM DM x5  
Government Consultation GC GC x5  
Internal Process IP IP x12 IP 
Climate Negotiations CN CN x9 CN 
National Goals NG NG x3  
Multilateral System MS MS x5  
Departmental Roles DR DR x2  
 
From what organisational context, pressure and procedure did the Copenhagen 
decision emerge? 
Themes Codes Open-coded Axial 
Internal Process IP IP x3 IP 
Developing Country DC DC  x7 DC 
Multilateral System MS MS x2  
Peak Plateau Decline PPD PPD x1  
Decision Maker DM DM x1  
Political Decision PD PD x1  
Departmental Roles DR DR x2  
 
How does decision making work in your department? 
Themes Codes Open-coded Axial 
Internal Process IP IP x14 IP 
Multilateral System MS MS x2  
Decision Making DM DM x12 DM 
National Goals NG NG x1  
 
Who sets the government’s foreign policy agenda on climate change? 
Themes Codes Open-coded Axial 
Decision Making DM DM x2  
Carbon Emission CE CE x5 CE 
Policy Development PD PD x4 PD 
Climate Negotiation CN CN x2  
Internal Process IP IP x2  
Departmental Role DR DR x3  
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1.3 Governmental Politics Model III 
Who are the players? Whose views and values count in shaping the choice and actions? 
Themes Codes Open-coded Axial 
Internal Process IP IP x2 IP 
International System IS IS x1  
Domestic Response DR DR x2  
Climate Negotiations CN CN x3 CN 
Carbon Emissions CE CE x1  
 
Who are the advisors  
Internal Process IP IP x3 IP 
Climate Negotiations CN CN x2  
Decision Making DM DM x1  
 
What is the process all about? 
Government Consultation GC GC x1  
Internal Process IP IP x1  
Decision Making DM DM x4 DM 
Rational Decision RD RD x2  
International System IS IS x2  
Climate Negotiations CN CN x1  
Other Options OP OP x3  
 
What kind of bargaining among from which players produced the decision to commit to 
reduce carbon emissions? 
Internal Politics IPT IPT x6 IPT 
Internal Process IP IP x3  
Decision Making DM DM x2  
 
2.0 Documentation Analysis 
Content Analysis- coding and themes 
2.1 National Climate Change Response White Paper 
 
Government Consultation GC GC x2  
Legal Obligations LB LB x1  
International System IS IS x2  
Carbon Emissions CE CE x2  
Decision Making DM DM x1  
Mitigation Process MP MP x6 MP 
Addressing Problem AP AP x1  
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Scenario Process SP SP x1  
Conditional Commitment CC CC x5  
Unexpected Announcement UA UA x1  
Developing Countries DC DC x1  
Multilateral System MS MS x5  
Peak Plateau Decline PPD PPD x4  
Policy Development PD PD x4  
Internal Process IP IP x2  
Carbon Emissions CE CE x12 CE 
Economic Impact EI EI x1  
 
2.2 Long Term Mitigation Scenario 
 
Carbon Emissions CE CE x6  
Electricity Generation EG EG x7  
Other Options OP OP x8  
Economic Impacts EI EI x2  
Mitigation Process MP MP x1  
Peak Plateau Decline PPD PPD x  
Scenario Process SP SP x4  
Addressing Problem AP AP x2  
Multilateral System MS MS x2  
 
2.3 Financial Mail (Secondary sources) 
 
Decision making DM DM x2  
Conditional Commitment CC CC x4  
Climate negotiations CN CN x1  
Carbon Emissions CE CE x2  
Peak Plateau Decline PPD PPD x1  
Unexpected Announcement UA UA x  
 
1.2 Interview List 
Interviewees Organisation Date 
Fred Goede North-West University 02/11/2015 
Jaco du Toit World Wildlife Fund 03/11/2015 
Dr Lesley Masters University of 
Johannesburg 
15/11/2015 
Peter Lukey Department of 
Environmental Affairs 
08/11/2015 
Mkhuthazi Steleki Department of 
Environmental Affairs 
03/03/2016 
Simon Cardy DIRCO 13/01/2016 
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Dr Sphamandla Zondi Institute for Global 
Dialogue 
03/02/2016 
Tristen Taylor Earth Life Africa 03/02/2016 
Prof Harold Winkler Energy Research Centre 01/02/2016 
Prof Patrick Bond University of KwaZulu 
Natal 
14/03/2016 
 
 
